Cooper v. Mitchell

247 N.W. 805, 188 Minn. 560, 1933 Minn. LEXIS 1056
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedApril 7, 1933
DocketNo. 29,312.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 247 N.W. 805 (Cooper v. Mitchell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cooper v. Mitchell, 247 N.W. 805, 188 Minn. 560, 1933 Minn. LEXIS 1056 (Mich. 1933).

Opinion

*561 HILTON, Justice.

Certiorari upon the relation of employe to review the decision of the industrial commission disallowing further compensation.

On November 6, 1929, relator, aged 47 years, was and had been for five years employed in the bakery of Ray J. Mitchell. On that date, due to an explosion in the basement furnace room and fire therefrom coming through a floor register, she was burned about her nose, face, and elbow and became unconscious for several hours. She sustained serious injuries and Avas confined to a hospital for some time. Compensation at the required rate Avas paid her until April 1, 1931, amounting to $864, and for hospitalization and physicians’ seiwices $1,247.83. Relator was represented at the hearings by tAvo able and competent counsel. The commission found:

“That as a result of said accident the employe became temporarily totally disabled and continued to be so temporarily totally disabled from November 6, 1929, and until April 1, 1931, * * *. That at the time of said hearing said employe did not suffer from any ailment caused or aggravated by, or in any Avay attributable to said accidental injury.”

The important question is Avliether or not an exophthalmic goiter, with which relator Avas suffering Avhen and after compensation ceased, Avas caused by or resulted from the accident. Relator’s theory was that the goiter Avas caused by a trauma at the time of the accident, and the case Avas tried on that issue. Although frequent examinations Arere made, the goiter was not discovered until February, 1931 (more than a year and three months after the accident), and then by the insurer’s physician. Relator’s attending physician, Avho had been caring for her for more than a year before the discovery, stated that it probably commenced four months before it was discovered by anyone. Two physicians for the insurer stated that a goiter caused by trauma Avould develop in a few weeks. The attending physician placed the time as usually within a few Aveeks, but stated that there are latent cases in which “the frank shoAving of exophthalmic goiter does not appear until very *562 much later.” One of relator’s physicians testified that in the average case where there is a latent thyroid some manifestation of it would appear within a week or two after a trauma. The testimony of two physicians was that the goiter condition did not result from the effects of the accident.

Eelator’s ailment, other than burns, was diagnosed as a gastric ulcer and perhaps a cancer of the stomach. She was treated therefor, and by June, 1930, that condition was cleared up to such an extent that she was only required to be careful of her diet. An X-ray taken in March, 1931, showed that the ulcer had entirely healed. Eelator’s attending physician gave as his opinion, based on that X-ray picture, that the ulcer was probably healed in September, 1930. Eelator’s condition had continued to improve steadily until September, 1930, when she suffered a setback occasioned by a heat prostration while attempting to do her housework during the then existing extremely hot weather. The attending physician testified that during the period from December, 1929, when he first saw relator, up to December, 1930, he did not notice any symptoms of thyroid trouble and did not suspect the presence of a goiter until February 26, 1931. During the period from December, 1930, to February 26, 1931, he diagnosed her then trouble as peritonitis and treated her accordingly.

The commission had before it the reports of various physicians and hospitals. It also had the testimony of relator and other lay witnesses and the testimony of four doctors (two for each party). A detailed statement of that evidence is not necessary. It is sufficient to say that, in so far as some of the physical conditions during the time since the accident are concerned, the evidence was somewhat in dispute. The same is true as regards certain other important medical opinions given by the respective physicians. There was sufficient evidence to justify the findings of the commission. This is clearly a case where the findings of the industrial commission are not manifestly contrary to the evidence. Its findings cannot be disturbed, because the evidence and the inferences permissible therefrom do not require reasonable minds to *563 adopt a contrary conclusion. There was sufficient evidence supporting the negative finding of the industrial commission. Jones v. Excelsior Laundry Co. 183 Minn. 531, 237 N. W. 419; Klugman v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co. 183 Minn. 541, 237 N. W. 420; 6 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed. & Supp.) § 10426.

G. S. 1923 (1 Mason, 1927) § 4283(2), provides:

“In case of dispute as to the injury, the Industrial Commission, * * may, upon its * * * own motion, * * * designate a neutral physician of good standing and ability to make an examination of the injured person and report his findings to the Industrial Commission, * '"' *. A copy of the. signed certificate of such neutral physician shall be mailed to the parties in interest and either party within five days from date of mailing may demand that such physician be produced for purpose of cross-examination. Such signed certificate of a neutral physician shall be competent evidence of the facts stated therein. * * *”

On June 3, 1932, the commission on its own motion appointed two neutral physicians. The order of appointment provided in part that the neutral physicians should make an examination of the transcript of testimony and medical reports, with particular reference to the causal' connection, if any, between employe’s present condition, as found from said transcript of testimony and medical reports, and the accidental injury, and report in writing their findings to the commission. This order was served on the attorneys of the respective parties. No one made any objection to the order or to the procedure adopted. On June 14, 1932, the neutral physicians filed a comprehensive detailed report in which it was given as their opinion “that as far as the goiter is concerned it is very doubtful that the accident in 1929 has any direct bearing on her present ailment.” On June 15 a copy of the report was served as the order had been. No objection was made or exception taken thereto. On July 11, 1932, the commission made its final decision.

The contention of relator now, made by new counsel, is that the procedure taken by the commission relative to neutral physicians -was not in compliance with the statute; that it was not authorized *564 to have the neutral physicians simply examine the transcript of the oral and documentary evidence or to examine the transcript at all; that all that thé neutral physicians could do was to examine relator physically and inquire of her relative to facts incident to the accident and her condition since then. Be that as it may, relator cannot here take advantage of the situation. The rule on an appeal from the result of an action tried to a court or a jury is that a party cannot take advantage of any objection to the admission of evidence which he did not clearly and specifically raise on the trial, 6 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed. & Supp.) § 9728. There is no reason why the same rule should not apply to this proceeding before the industrial commission.

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Bluebook (online)
247 N.W. 805, 188 Minn. 560, 1933 Minn. LEXIS 1056, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cooper-v-mitchell-minn-1933.