Cooper v. Cooper

30 Pa. D. & C.2d 503, 1963 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 264
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Mifflin County
DecidedFebruary 28, 1963
Docketno. 320
StatusPublished

This text of 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 503 (Cooper v. Cooper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Mifflin County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cooper v. Cooper, 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 503, 1963 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963).

Opinion

Lehman, P. J.,

On January 21, 1963, after argument and filing of a brief on behalf of defendant, we granted plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s rule to file a bill of particulars, declared the divorce action “at issue” and that we would entertain a motion for the appointment of a master. By reason of defendant’s appeal from this decree to the Superior Court, we have withheld making said appointment. This opinion is written in support of said decree.

Plaintiff filed his complaint in divorce on August 1, 1960, charging defendant with indignities to the person and desertion. The action has been beset by an interminable amount of pleadings caused, on the one hand, by hasty preparation of the complaint and amended complaints and, on the other hand, by dilatory pleadings on behalf of the defendant.

Pursuant to defendant counsel’s praecipe, a bill of particulars was filed January 3,1961. Preliminary objections were filed to said bill, charging lack of specificity as to many assigned reasons. Some of these reasons were sustained and plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended bill of particulars to supply the required [504]*504specifications. After preliminary objections were lodged against the amended bill, we decreed same to be adequate.

Meanwhile, counsel for defendant was successful in having us sustain preliminary objections to plaintiff’s complaint in that it failed, inter alia, to allege a period of time for the indignities to the person.1 We granted leave to plaintiff to file an amended complaint to remedy this omission. Preliminary objections were filed to the amended complaint and we sustained them in so far as said amended complaint failed to allege defendant’s citizenship2 and length of time plaintiff has resided in the Commonwealth.3 We granted leave to plaintiff to file a second amended complaint in accordance with our decree. We filed no opinion with this decree. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint,, inter alia, alleged that “the Defendant is a citizen of the United States of Amer- ' ica” and that “the Plaintiff has been a resident in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for a period of thirty-six years.” This pleading was attacked by preliminary objections in that it failed to aver the State citizenship [505]*505of defendant and that plaintiff had been a bona fide resident in this Commonwealth at least one whole year immediately previous to the filing of his complaint.4 We sustained the preliminary objections5 for these two reasons and granted leave to plaintiff to file a third amended complaint. We filed an opinion in support of this decree.

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint was met with [506]*506preliminary objections but, after argument and briefs, we overruled same as to its sufficiency in pleading.

Counsel for defendant then filed a praecipe with the prothonotary for a rule upon plaintiff to show cause why a bill of particulars should not be filed. Counsel for plaintiff countered with a motion to strike said rule and it is from our decree granting plaintiff counsel’s motion to strike that counsel for defendant has appealed.

All four complaints in divorce: the complaint, amended complaint, second amended complaint and third amended complaint, charged defendant with the same grounds, viz: indignities to the person and desertion. The only question before us was whether plaintiff should be required to file a bill of particulars to the third amended complaint when he had filed a bill of particulars and an amended bill of particulars, the latter of which we have held adequate.

Counsel for plaintiff has argued that having fully satisfied the court as to the sufficiency of his amended bill of particulars, it would be repetitious for him to be required to file another bill of particulars in support of a pleading that charges the same grounds for divorce. Counsel for defendant has argued that there is a distinction between an amendment to a complaint and an amended complaint in that the latter implies an entirely new document, whereas the former is a document that must be considered with the complaint already filed. He has contended that the third amended complaint, which we directed be filed by that designation, is an entirely new document and that no bill of particulars of a prior complaint is any particularization or amplification of any part of the new document.

Strictly speaking, the amended pleading takes the place of the original pleading in framing the issue and determining the scope of the trial, whereas an amendment to a complaint is not a substitute for the original [507]*507but merely in the nature of additional averments tending to make the original more specific: Revised Standard Pa. Pract. Vol. 3, pp. 736, 737, and cases therein cited.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1121 (b) provides that, except as otherwise provided, the procedure in a divorce action shall be in accordance with the rules relating to the action of assumpsit. Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1028 and 1033 concern assumpsit actions. Each of said rules speaks of both an amended pleading and an amendment to a pleading.

It will be observed that the Rules of Civil Procedure fail to set forth any requirements as to the form of an amended pleading or to that of an amendment: Revised Standard Pa. Pract., Vol. 3, p. 737.

We have no local rule of court specifying whether the new pleading, when permitted, shall be an amended pleading or an amendment to the pleading. Our practice has been to allow, when deemed proper, an amended pleading and in such instances, the pleading, as thus amended, is set out anew.

If our decree of court had granted leave to plaintiff to file a third amendment to the complaint, counsel for defendant would not have been entitled to another bill of particulars because the third amendment to the complaint would be considered together with the complaint and an amended bill of particulars had been filed which particularized the alleged facts in support of indignities to the person and desertion charged in the complaint. Can counsel for defendant successfully contend he is entitled to another bill of particulars merely because we granted leave to plaintiff to file a third amended complaint rather than a third amendment to the complaint? We think not, because the grounds for divorce have remained the same in all pleadings and defendant has been sufficiently apprised of their particulars. “A bill of particulars is an amplification or [508]*508more particular specification of the matter set forth in the pleading. While it need not state more than the party furnishing it is bound to prove under the pleading, it must be as specific as the circumstances of the case will allow, and should fairly apprise the opposite party and the court of the nature of the claim or defense made and the nature of the evidence: 3 Ency. of Pleading & Practice, 519, 532”: Weedon v. Weedon, 34 Pa. Superior Ct. 358, 362.

Likewise, in commenting upon Pa. R. C. P. 1128(a), which relates to a bill of particulars, Goodrich-Am-ram §1128 (a) -1, states:

“The purpose of the bill of particulars is to require the plaintiff to furnish the defendant with a specification of the particulars relied on as the basis for the action. In other words, it is an amplification of the complaint.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
30 Pa. D. & C.2d 503, 1963 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 264, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cooper-v-cooper-pactcomplmiffli-1963.