Cooper v. City of New Orleans

680 So. 2d 1259, 96 La.App. 4 Cir. 0243, 1996 La. App. LEXIS 2325, 1996 WL 577989
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedSeptember 18, 1996
DocketNo. 96-CA-0243
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 680 So. 2d 1259 (Cooper v. City of New Orleans) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cooper v. City of New Orleans, 680 So. 2d 1259, 96 La.App. 4 Cir. 0243, 1996 La. App. LEXIS 2325, 1996 WL 577989 (La. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

IxLOBRANO, Judge.

This appeal arises from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, Darlene Cooper, individually and as tutrix of her minor daughter, Courtney Cooper, and against defendant, the Orleans Parish School Board, in the amount of $2,929,777.39 for injuries sustained by Courtney Cooper.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

On December 18,1991, Courtney Cooper, a six year old student at Medare Nelson Elementary School, was playing on a multi-event playground structure during recess. The playground structure included a firepole attached to a deck standing approximately 62 inches above the ground. The playground structure was designed to allow a child to stand on the deck, grasp the pole and slide down to the ground. As Courtney was standing on the deck and reaching for the pole, she was either bumped or pushed by another child. Courtney fell to the ground. She landed on her back. The fall caused a shearing injury to her spine rendering her a paraplegic.

Darlene Cooper, Courtney’s mother, individually and on behalf of Courtney, sued the Orleans Parish School Board, owner of the school; Landscape ^Structures, Inc., the manufacturers of the playground structure; D and A Associates, the seller of the playground structure; Donahue Favret, the contractor who installed the playground structure; Hewitt-Washington, architects and planners and Leonard Washington, architect, who were assigned to the construction project, which included the playground structure, various employees of the School Board as well as the liability insurers of the various defendants.

Landscape Structures, Inc., D and A Associates, Donahue Favret, Hewitt-Washington and Leonard Washington, all filed cross-claims against the School Board and each other. The School Board also filed cross-claims against these defendants. Each cross-claim alleged that the negligence of the cross-defendants was the proximate cause of Courtney’s injuries in whole or in part. If the cross-claimant was deemed responsible for Courtney’s injury, then the cross-defen[1261]*1261dants were liable pursuant to theories of indemnity and/or contribution.

A bifurcated trial began on October 10, 1994. The trial judge was to render judgment on all claims against the School Board and its employees, (hereinafter, the Board). The jury was to render judgment on all claims against the other defendants.

On October 20, 1994, prior to the conclusion of the trial, plaintiffs settled their claims against all defendants except the Board.

After the various settlements were finalized, plaintiffs moved to dismiss the jury. By oral motion, the Board requested that the jury remain impaneled to hear the remaining claims.1 Plaintiff’s motion was granted. The ^Board’s motion was denied. The trial court then recessed the trial to allow the Board time to seek supervisory writs to this court.

In its Petition for Supervisory Writs, the Board asserted that it had pending cross-claims against its co-defendants, that its co-defendants were only partially dismissed and, as such, it had a right to trial by jury on its cross-claims.

On October 21, 1994, this Court denied writs stating, “We find no error in the ruling complained of’.2

A bench trial then proceeded against the Board.

Judgment was rendered on November 9, 1994 in favor of plaintiff and against the Board finding it to be fifty (50%) percent liable for plaintiffs losses and against Donahue Favret, the contractor, Hewitt-Washington, the architect and Leonard Washington, architect, for the remaining fifty (50%) percent of plaintiffs losses. The court found no fault on the part of plaintiff, the unknown pushing child, Landscape Structures, Inc. or D and A Associates, the manufacturer and seller, respectively.

Defendant appeals the trial court judgment asserting the following assignments of error:

1) The trial court erred by denying the Board’s request for trial by jury.
2) The trial court erred in its allocation of fault among the Board, Donahue Favret and Hewitt Washington.
3) The trial court erred in limiting the combined fault of Donahue Favret and Hewitt Washington.3

| ^ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1:

The Board asserts that it was error for the trial court to dismiss the jury because it was entitled to trial by jury of its cross-claims against the settling defendants. In support of its argument, the Board cites McCoy v. Ouachita Parish Police Jury, 564 So.2d 747, 750 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1990).4

In McCoy, the trial court denied a request for trial by jury filed by both the parish police jury (political subdivision of the state) and its liability insurer. The appellate court granted writs and ordered a jury trial of all demands against the insurer and of the incidental demands of the police jury.

In rendering its decision, the reviewing court found that while Louisiana Revised Statute 13:5105 prohibited a jury trial of claims against the state and its subdivision, Louisiana Revised Statute 13:5035 explicitly allows jury trials for specified suits filed on behalf of the state.

At the time the instant suit was filed, these Statutes provided:

LSA R.S. 13:5105:
[1262]*1262No suit against the state or a state agency or political subdivision5 shall be tried by jury.6
LSAR.S. 5035:
All suits for trespass, for damages, or for possession of real property, filed by the State against any person, firm or corporar tion, and all matters incidental thereto shall be heard and determined by the court in a summary manner, Rin term time or vacation. Should a trial by jury be demanded, a special panel shall be drawn for such purpose in accordance with the presently existing law. All judgments rendered in any of these causes shall also be tried summarily by the appellate court having jurisdiction, (emphasis added)

In addressing this issue, we agree with the Court in McCoy that the interrelationship between Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5105 and 13:5035 allows a political subdivision of the state to demand trial by jury of its incidental demands. These statutes, however, do not preclude adherence to the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1733 provides that a party may obtain a trial by jury by filing a pleading demanding same no later than ten days after either the service of the last pleading directed to any issue triable by a jury, or the granting of a motion to withdraw a demand for a trial by jury. Here, unlike in McCoy,7 the Board failed to make a timely request for trial by jury on its cross-claims. The first request made by the Board was an oral request after trial had begun and plaintiff had settled with the other defendants. In fact, when the initial suit was filed, the Board was successful in having the claims against it and its employees tried by the judge. It did not seek a jury trial on the cross-claims against the other defendants at that time nor any other time except after trial commenced.

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Related

Cooper v. Orleans Parish School Board
742 So. 2d 55 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1999)
Freeman v. State
679 So. 2d 364 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
680 So. 2d 1259, 96 La.App. 4 Cir. 0243, 1996 La. App. LEXIS 2325, 1996 WL 577989, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cooper-v-city-of-new-orleans-lactapp-1996.