Coomes v. Coomes

2020 Ohio 3839
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 27, 2020
DocketCA2019-10-076
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2020 Ohio 3839 (Coomes v. Coomes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coomes v. Coomes, 2020 Ohio 3839 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

[Cite as Coomes v. Coomes, 2020-Ohio-3839.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

CLERMONT COUNTY

JOHN COOMES, :

Appellant, : CASE NO. CA2019-10-076

: OPINION - vs - 7/27/2020 :

JENNIFER COOMES, :

Appellee. :

APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. 2015 DRB 01089

John J. Coomes, 4934 Ford Street, Suite 201, Speedway, Indiana 46224, pro se

Zachary D. Smith, 895 Central Avenue, Suite 305, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for appellee

RINGLAND, J.

{¶1} Appellant, John Coomes ("Husband"), appeals the decision of the Clermont

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, awarding attorney fees and

costs to appellee, Jennifer Coomes ("Wife"). For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the

decision of the trial court.

{¶2} On December 14, 2016, Husband and Wife were divorced. In November Clermont CA2019-10-076

2017, Husband moved the trial court to modify spousal support. Thereafter, in December

2017, Wife also moved the trial court to modify spousal support. In response, Husband

moved the trial court to dismiss Wife's motion to modify spousal support. In his motion,

Husband argued he was unable to form any response to Wife's motion, as it failed to allege

any change of circumstance and therefore, should be dismissed.

{¶3} In April 2018, Wife moved the trial court to compel Husband to respond to the

request for admissions Wife propounded upon Husband on February 23, 2018. According

to Wife, the request for admissions asked Husband to authenticate his 2016 tax return and

a mortgage application he submitted in 2016, to which Husband responded were irrelevant

to the subject matter at hand. In response, Husband filed three motions with the trial court,

including a motion to stay Wife's motion to compel; a motion to limit Wife's discovery; and

a combined motion in opposition to Wife's motion to compel and to dismiss Wife's motion

to compel. After a hearing regarding the motions, the motion to compel, motion to stay, and

motion to limit discovery were dismissed as moot "because [Wife] [wa]s not seeking any

further discovery from [Husband]."

{¶4} Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing regarding Husband's motion to

dismiss. Ultimately, the trial court denied Husband's motion, and found that Wife's filing,

the motion to modify spousal support, was not a pleading to which a responsive pleading

was permitted. The court continued, and indicated that even if a responsive pleading was

permissible, Husband was permitted to move the court for a more definite statement

pursuant to Civ.R. 12(E), not move to dismiss Wife's motion. As a result, the trial court

found that Husband's motion to dismiss was not a proper method for addressing an

allegedly defective pleading and denied the motion accordingly.

{¶5} On July 9, 2018, Wife moved the trial court for an order granting her attorney

fees and costs in connection with the post-decree litigation. One basis for the motion was

-2- Clermont CA2019-10-076

Husband's conduct during the litigation. Husband also moved the trial court for an order for

defense counsel to pay his duplicated costs in the amount of $477.10.

{¶6} In September 2018, after a hearing, the trial court denied Husband's motion

to modify spousal support and granted Wife's motion to modify spousal support. Shortly

thereafter, a hearing was held regarding the motion for attorney fees and costs. At the

hearing, Wife's attorney and Husband both testified. Subsequently, the magistrate issued

a decision granting Wife's motion for attorney fees, and ordered Husband to pay $5,852.10.

Husband objected to the magistrate's decision, arguing that the magistrate erred in

awarding attorney fees and costs to Wife. After reviewing the transcript, exhibits, and the

magistrate's decision, the trial court sustained Husband's objections in part, finding that

$567.00 of the fees should have been excluded from the attorney fee calculation. The trial

court overruled Husband's objections in all other respects, and ordered Husband to pay

Wife's attorney fees in the amount of $5,285.10.

{¶7} Husband now appeals, raising a single assignment of error for our review.

{¶8} Assignment of Error No. 1:

{¶9} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF

APPELLANT TO PAY DEFENDANT APPELLEE $5285.10 IN ATTORNEY FEES AND

COSTS.

{¶10} Husband argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Wife

$5,285.10 in attorney fees and costs. Specifically, Husband claims the award was

inequitable for three reasons: (1) The trial court only considered Husband's income, which

was inflated; (2) Husband did not engage in any misconduct throughout the case; and (3)

Wife's counsel could not clearly indicate what services the fees were for.

{¶11} Pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(B), "[i]n any post-decree motion or proceeding that

arises out of an action for divorce," a trial court "may award all or part of reasonable

-3- Clermont CA2019-10-076

attorney's fees and litigation expenses to either party if the court finds the award equitable."

In determining whether such an award is equitable, the trial court "may consider the parties'

income, the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors the court deems

appropriate, but it may not consider the parties' assets." R.C. 3105.73(B).

{¶12} An award of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Reynolds-Cornett v. Reynolds, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-09-175, 2014-Ohio-2893, ¶

28. A trial court's decision to award attorney fees will be reversed only if it amounts to an

abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law; it implies the

trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5

Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

{¶13} Here, the trial court concluded that an award to Wife of $5,285.10 in attorney

fees and costs was fair and equitable. In awarding Wife a portion of her attorney fees and

costs related to the post-decree litigation, the trial court found that Husband had "engaged

in conduct that resulted in the accrual of avoidable attorney fees * * * and that [Husband]

ha[d] the ability to pay these fees and costs."

{¶14} After a review of the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in awarding Wife a portion of her attorney fees and costs. Husband first argues the trial

court abused its discretion in awarding the fees and costs without analyzing Wife's income.

Husband claims the exclusion of Wife's income from the court's analysis was arbitrary, and

therefore, did not lead to an equitable decision. However, while R.C. 3105.73(B) states the

court may consider the parties' income, the statute does not require the trial court to

consider either party's income. Therefore, contrary to Husband's argument, an award of

attorney fees can be equitable without any consideration of the parties' income at all. See

e.g., Davis v. Davis, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-15-028, 2016-Ohio-1388, ¶ 25. As such, the

trial court was permitted to consider Husband's income and was not required by the statute

-4- Clermont CA2019-10-076

to consider Wife's.

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2020 Ohio 3839, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coomes-v-coomes-ohioctapp-2020.