Cookie Crews, in Her Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Campbell County, Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: July 11, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-1150
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JULY 11, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1150-MR

COOKIE CREWS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00068

CAMPBELL COUNTY, KENTUCKY; BILL HENSLEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS BOYD COUNTY JAILER; BOYD COUNTY, KENTUCKY; J. BARRY BRADY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MARION COUNTY JAILER; JAMES DALEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CAMPBELL COUNTY JAILER; JASON WILSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS WHITLEY COUNTY JAILER; KENTON COUNTY, KENTUCKY; KENTUCKY JAILERS ASSOCIATION; MARC FIELDS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS KENTON COUNTY JAILER; MARION COUNTY, KENTUCKY; AND WHITLEY COUNTY, KENTUCKY APPELLEES

OPINION AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: COMBS, L. JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: Appellants, The Kentucky Department of Corrections and

Cookie Crews, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Kentucky

Department of Corrections, appeal from an opinion and order of the Franklin

Circuit Court granting the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the

following Appellees: Campbell County; James Daley, in his official capacity as

Campbell County Jailer; Kenton County; Marc Fields, in his official capacity as

Kenton County Jailer; Boyd County; Bill Hensley, in his official capacity as Boyd

County Jailer; Marion County; J. Barry Brady, in his official capacity as Marion

County Jailer; Whitley County; Jason Wilson, in his official capacity as Whitley

County Jailer; and the Kentucky Jailers Association (KJA) . This order became

final on August 18, 2024, when the circuit court granted a motion to dismiss all

remaining claims. We affirm.

The parties agree: that an inmate housed in a county jail becomes a

“state inmate” when he is sentenced by the circuit court to a term of imprisonment

of 12 months or more; that the Department of Corrections has 14 state prison

-2- facilities that can house approximately 13,200 inmates; and that the number of

state inmates routinely exceeds that number. In order to keep state prison facilities

at or below capacity, state inmates often remain housed in county jails. This

arrangement is governed either by the terms of a contractual agreement between

the county and state government or on a per diem basis. With respect to this

arrangement, KRS1 441.045 provides that the “costs of necessary medical, dental,

or psychological care, beyond routine care and diagnostic services, of prisoners

held in the jail for which the county receives a per diem payment shall be paid by

the state.” (Emphasis added.)

On January 20, 2023, the counties and jailers of Campbell County,

Kenton County, and Marion County, joined with the KJA to file a civil action

against Commissioner Crews and the Department of Corrections. Later, two more

counties and their jailers joined the action. According to the counties, jailers, and

KJA, the purpose of the action was to force the Department of Corrections to treat

county jails, county taxpayers, and state inmates in accordance with applicable

law: 1) by requiring the Department of Corrections timely to classify and transfer

state inmates to state prison facilities; and 2) by compelling it to fund adequately

the cost of caring for state inmates housed in county jails.

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-3- The complaint charged that the Department of Corrections routinely

fails to abide by provisions of KRS 532.100(8) that require it to classify all state

inmates within 45 days of final sentencing and to transfer all Class A, Class B, and

qualifying Class C inmates to a state prison; and that as a result of this failure,

county jails must exceed their capacity. Additionally, Appellees (plaintiffs below)

complained that the Department of Corrections does not compensate them

adequately for the costs of providing state inmates with necessary medical, dental,

and/or psychological care.

The counties, jailers, and KJA alleged that the statutory scheme

contemplates that the Department of Corrections will negotiate with counties and

will execute contracts addressing the costs of housing and of otherwise caring for

state inmates. Instead, they alleged that the Department of Corrections arbitrarily

establishes a per diem rate of compensation ($35.34, which includes $2.15 for

medical expenses), which fails to cover the costs of necessary medical, dental,

and/or psychological care that exceed routine care and diagnostic services required

by prisoners. For example, Campbell County indicated that it had been required to

bear the costs of a suspected heart attack; pregnancy; the surgical repair of an

eardrum; cancer treatment; sutures; eye surgery; and biopsies. Kenton County

indicated that it had borne the costs of providing necessary orthotics and

prosthetics.

-4- On May 28, 2024, the circuit court granted the motion of the counties,

jailers, and KJA for partial summary judgment. The court ordered the Department

of Corrections to comply with the requirements of KRS 532.100(8) by removing

all Class A, Class B, and some designated Class C inmates from county facilities

within 45 days of final sentencing. The court directed that where a county does not

object to an additional 45-day period (as authorized by House Bill 1, enacted April

13, 2022), the Department of Corrections must remove all Class A, Class B, and

some designated Class C inmates from county facilities within 90 days of final

sentencing.

The circuit court next addressed the responsibility of the state to bear

the costs of providing prisoners’ “necessary medical, dental, or psychological care,

beyond routine care and diagnostic services” as provided by KRS 441.045(5)(a).

The Department of Corrections had implemented a long-standing policy

incorporating its definition of “routine care” to include every medical, dental, or

psychological procedure that did not require hospitalization or general anesthesia.

The court concluded that this interpretation was overly broad and saddled the

counties and jailers with excessive costs not envisioned by the legislation. It

concluded that the application of the statute by the Department of Corrections was

arbitrary and contrary to its plain language.

-5- Once the court granted the motion of the counties, jailers, and KJA to

dismiss the remaining claims and the order became final, Commissioner Crews and

the Department of Corrections filed this appeal. We had declined to grant the

intermediate relief sought by Crews and the Department of Corrections.

On appeal, Commissioner Crews and the Department of Corrections

argue that the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment with respect to

their interpretation of the provisions of KRS 441.045. They contend: that their

construction of the term “routine care” is derived from the definition applied by

industry experts; that their construction of the term comports with the intent of the

legislature; and that we are constrained to defer to their expertise with respect to

meaning of the provision. We disagree.

The standard of review in a declaratory judgment action is the same as

that in other civil actions. Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Ky. 2006). We

assess whether the Department of Corrections and Commissioner Crews correctly

applied the law under a de novo standard. See Smith v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of

Kentucky, 515 S.W.3d 672, 675 (Ky. App. 2017) (citing Bd. of Comm’rs v. Davis,

238 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Ky. App. 2007)).

The Department of Corrections cannot construe or limit the effect of a

statute by the implementation of its own internal policies. See KRS 13A.130(1)(b).

In matters involving statutory interpretation, our role is to “ascertain and give

-6- effect to the General Assembly’s intent.” See Kentucky Bd. of Med. Licensure v.

Strauss, 558 S.W.3d 443, 448 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted). We must presume

that the “plain meaning of the statutory language is . . . what the legislature

intended[.]” Revenue Cabinet v. O’Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Ky. 2005)

(citation omitted).

Commissioner Crews and the Department of Corrections provided the

court with the medical-claims handbook that it supplies to county jails. The

handbook is prepared by Wellpath, an offsite medical claims administrator, that

provides county jails with the information necessary to process claims. It explains

that a county facility housing state inmates “is financially responsible for all off-

site claims payments, for any medical or dental services, other than inpatient

hospital stays or outpatient services with anesthesia.”

Commissioner Crews and the Department of Corrections explain that

Wellpath is a “well-known health care company that provides medical and mental

health services to hundreds of correctional facilities throughout the United States.”

They contend that the circuit court erred by concluding that Wellpath’s definition

of “routine care” is arbitrary or that it fails to comport with legislative intent

because the company’s definition “was developed under the expertise of

Wellpath’s experience in understanding the different levels of care and the costs

for that care.” Commissioner Crews and the Department of Corrections argue that

-7- “routine care” is a technical term that they have consistently defined in accordance

with the usage of its claims administrators for more than a decade.

Again, in the absence of a statutory definition, words and phrases of a

statute are to be construed according to their common usage. See KRS 446.080(4).

Here, the term “routine care” is not statutorily defined, but we commonly use it to

refer to the regular, basic care required to maintain health and to prevent disease.

The term “routine care” has not acquired a peculiarized meaning in the law as a

technical term. The provision cannot be construed to require more of the counties

than what is directed by the plain language used by the General Assembly.

Furthermore, courts owe no deference to Commissioner Crews or to the

Department of Corrections with respect to their interpretation of this statute or any

other. Our deference lies with the integrity of the plain statutory language itself.

Revenue Cabinet v. O’Daniel, supra.

Consequently, the circuit court did not err by concluding that to

construe “routine care” to include every medical, dental, or psychological

procedure that does not require hospitalization or general anesthesia is

impermissibly broad. Through this interpretation of statutes and the

implementation of its own policy, Crews and the Department of Corrections are

impermissibly requiring counties to absorb costs not awarded by the legislature.

-8- Last, we have considered the motion of the American Civil Liberties

Union of Kentucky to file a brief in this matter as amicus curiae. That motion is

hereby denied, and a separate order will be entered accordingly.

We affirm the order of the Franklin Circuit Court dismissing this case.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Peter Ervin Jeffrey C. Mando Allison R. Brown Olivia F. Amlung Crystal L. Thompson Casmir M. Thornberry Frankfort, Kentucky Covington, Kentucky

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