UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TAJMERE COOKE, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-03135 (UNA) ) ANTHONY BLINKEN, et al., ) ) Respondents. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner initiated this case on October 19, 2023, by filing, inter alia, a civil pro se petition,
ECF No. 1. He failed, however, to provide a residential address, nor did he request leave to use
any alternative address, in contravention of D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1). See Order, ECF No. 5. On
November 9, 2023, the Court entered an order providing petitioner with a 30-day extension to
either file a notice of residence address or a motion for leave to use an alternative address provided
in that motion. Id. at 1.
On November 13, 2023, petitioner responded to the Court’s order by filing a notice
(“Not.”), ECF No. 6, attesting that he is currently homeless and living in his car, and therefore
cannot, and indeed, will not, submit any type of address, see id. at 1. While the petitioner’s
circumstances are challenging, without a residence address, or alternatively, a P.O. Box or general
mailing address, this Court and the respondents have no way of formally and consistently noticing
and communicating with petitioner, and vice versa. Although petitioner filed a consent to receive
electronic notice, ECF No. 3, he has not filed any motion for CM/ECF access, as required under
the local rules of this Court. See D.C. LCvR 5.4(b)(2). Even if such a motion were filed, plaintiff
does not appear to qualify because, among other problems, petitioner lives in his vehicle and may
not have consistent and reliable access to the internet, or the ability to file documents and receive filings electronically on a regular basis. See Not. at 1. Consequently, petitioner has failed to
comply with this Court’s order, thus, this case cannot proceed.
Even if petitioner had complied, this case would still fail to survive. His petition asks that,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2), the United States Secretary of State and the Bureau of Consular
Affairs: (1) formally remove his status as a United States citizen; (2) provide him with “tribal
nationality status[;]” (3) immediately issue him a passport with his corrected status, and; (4) assign
him a “permanent fiduciary” from the State Department, authorized to answer all of his questions,
as needed. See Pet. at 2–3. These requests fail to state cognizable claims.
First, although petitioner broadly alleges that he made efforts over the past year to renounce
his citizenship, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2), see id. at 2, 5, his pleading makes no reference
that petitioner submitted the required associated fees and mandatory information, or if he followed
the specific necessary procedures to obtain the certificate that he seeks, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(2),
1501; INA § 349(a)(2); see also Sluss v. U.S. Citizen. & Immig. Srvs., 899 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40–41
(D.D.C. 2012) (“The State Department has issued regulations to implement 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481 and
1501 that (1) prescribe the ‘form’ of formal renunciations of nationality before consular officers
and (2) prescribe regulations under which consular officers certify the facts that form the basis for
the belief that a person abroad has lost his U.S. nationality.”) (citation omitted).
Second, even the required fees had been paid and the necessary procedures followed,
petitioner has nonetheless failed to state a claim. “Congress has promulgated seven procedures
for voluntary expatriation.” Kwok Sze v. Johnson, 172 F. Supp. 3d 112, 118 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1)–(7)). Relevant here, “[t]he first five procedures[,]” including the one relied
upon by petitioner, § 1481(a)(2), “require the person seeking renunciation to be in a foreign
country.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1483(a)). In other words, petitioner cannot “lose United States nationality under this chapter while within the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1483(a). As noted,
petitioner refuses to provide the court with any address of record, see Not. at 1, and he believes
that, “[a]ccording to the Holy Bible[,]” the United States is not a nation, but rather, “a corporate
entity registered in the state of Delaware[,]” Pet. at 4–5. Regardless, his submissions in this matter
indicate that he is located somewhere in the United States, see, e.g., id. at 4; Not. at 1; Cert. of
Service, ECF No. 4.
Petitioner attempts to avoid this prohibition by asserting that his membership and
allegiance to an unnamed ancestral and indigenous tribal group is tantamount to his location in a
“nation foreign to the United States.” See Pet. at 5. While he has provided spare information
regarding the tribal group, petitioner notes that North American indigenous tribes are generally
considered “‘domestic dependent nations that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their
members and territories’ and the resources therein[,]” Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States
Army Corp. of Engineers, 985 F.3d 1032, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)),
and they are subject to the “‘plenary and exclusive’ authority” of the United States federal
government, Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Comm. of Oregon v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552, ,564
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004)). Consequently, as
presented, petitioner has not established that he is qualified to renounce his citizenship under §
1481(a)(2).
Third, petitioner asks this court to direct respondents to take specific actions on his behalf,
see Pet. at 2–3, but this Court is without jurisdiction to do so. “It is one thing to seek to compel an
agency to respond to an administrative complaint within a reasonable time. It is entirely another
to seek to control what that response says.” SAI v. Homeland Security, 149 F. Supp. 3d 99, 109 (D.D.C. 2015). Put differently, “[u]nder Section 706(1) of the APA, a court may at times compel
an agency ‘to take a discrete agency action that is it is required to take,’ but may not direct ‘how
it shall act.’ ” Id. (quoting Norton v. S.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TAJMERE COOKE, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-03135 (UNA) ) ANTHONY BLINKEN, et al., ) ) Respondents. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner initiated this case on October 19, 2023, by filing, inter alia, a civil pro se petition,
ECF No. 1. He failed, however, to provide a residential address, nor did he request leave to use
any alternative address, in contravention of D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1). See Order, ECF No. 5. On
November 9, 2023, the Court entered an order providing petitioner with a 30-day extension to
either file a notice of residence address or a motion for leave to use an alternative address provided
in that motion. Id. at 1.
On November 13, 2023, petitioner responded to the Court’s order by filing a notice
(“Not.”), ECF No. 6, attesting that he is currently homeless and living in his car, and therefore
cannot, and indeed, will not, submit any type of address, see id. at 1. While the petitioner’s
circumstances are challenging, without a residence address, or alternatively, a P.O. Box or general
mailing address, this Court and the respondents have no way of formally and consistently noticing
and communicating with petitioner, and vice versa. Although petitioner filed a consent to receive
electronic notice, ECF No. 3, he has not filed any motion for CM/ECF access, as required under
the local rules of this Court. See D.C. LCvR 5.4(b)(2). Even if such a motion were filed, plaintiff
does not appear to qualify because, among other problems, petitioner lives in his vehicle and may
not have consistent and reliable access to the internet, or the ability to file documents and receive filings electronically on a regular basis. See Not. at 1. Consequently, petitioner has failed to
comply with this Court’s order, thus, this case cannot proceed.
Even if petitioner had complied, this case would still fail to survive. His petition asks that,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2), the United States Secretary of State and the Bureau of Consular
Affairs: (1) formally remove his status as a United States citizen; (2) provide him with “tribal
nationality status[;]” (3) immediately issue him a passport with his corrected status, and; (4) assign
him a “permanent fiduciary” from the State Department, authorized to answer all of his questions,
as needed. See Pet. at 2–3. These requests fail to state cognizable claims.
First, although petitioner broadly alleges that he made efforts over the past year to renounce
his citizenship, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2), see id. at 2, 5, his pleading makes no reference
that petitioner submitted the required associated fees and mandatory information, or if he followed
the specific necessary procedures to obtain the certificate that he seeks, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(2),
1501; INA § 349(a)(2); see also Sluss v. U.S. Citizen. & Immig. Srvs., 899 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40–41
(D.D.C. 2012) (“The State Department has issued regulations to implement 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481 and
1501 that (1) prescribe the ‘form’ of formal renunciations of nationality before consular officers
and (2) prescribe regulations under which consular officers certify the facts that form the basis for
the belief that a person abroad has lost his U.S. nationality.”) (citation omitted).
Second, even the required fees had been paid and the necessary procedures followed,
petitioner has nonetheless failed to state a claim. “Congress has promulgated seven procedures
for voluntary expatriation.” Kwok Sze v. Johnson, 172 F. Supp. 3d 112, 118 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1)–(7)). Relevant here, “[t]he first five procedures[,]” including the one relied
upon by petitioner, § 1481(a)(2), “require the person seeking renunciation to be in a foreign
country.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1483(a)). In other words, petitioner cannot “lose United States nationality under this chapter while within the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1483(a). As noted,
petitioner refuses to provide the court with any address of record, see Not. at 1, and he believes
that, “[a]ccording to the Holy Bible[,]” the United States is not a nation, but rather, “a corporate
entity registered in the state of Delaware[,]” Pet. at 4–5. Regardless, his submissions in this matter
indicate that he is located somewhere in the United States, see, e.g., id. at 4; Not. at 1; Cert. of
Service, ECF No. 4.
Petitioner attempts to avoid this prohibition by asserting that his membership and
allegiance to an unnamed ancestral and indigenous tribal group is tantamount to his location in a
“nation foreign to the United States.” See Pet. at 5. While he has provided spare information
regarding the tribal group, petitioner notes that North American indigenous tribes are generally
considered “‘domestic dependent nations that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their
members and territories’ and the resources therein[,]” Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States
Army Corp. of Engineers, 985 F.3d 1032, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)),
and they are subject to the “‘plenary and exclusive’ authority” of the United States federal
government, Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Comm. of Oregon v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552, ,564
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004)). Consequently, as
presented, petitioner has not established that he is qualified to renounce his citizenship under §
1481(a)(2).
Third, petitioner asks this court to direct respondents to take specific actions on his behalf,
see Pet. at 2–3, but this Court is without jurisdiction to do so. “It is one thing to seek to compel an
agency to respond to an administrative complaint within a reasonable time. It is entirely another
to seek to control what that response says.” SAI v. Homeland Security, 149 F. Supp. 3d 99, 109 (D.D.C. 2015). Put differently, “[u]nder Section 706(1) of the APA, a court may at times compel
an agency ‘to take a discrete agency action that is it is required to take,’ but may not direct ‘how
it shall act.’ ” Id. (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)
(emphases in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Finally, petitioner cites, in passing, to the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), 28 U.S.C. §
1350. See Pet. at 3. He fails, however, to identify an operative tort and this failure is fatal to his
claim. See Stone v. U.S. Embassy Toyko, No. 19-3273, 2020 WL 6746925, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 16,
2023) (“Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how the alleged conduct, such as failing to issue a passport
or respond to letters, constitute legally cognizable torts.”). He also explicitly disclaims any demand
for damages, see Pet. at 2, further failing to establish a claim under the ATCA, see Burnett v. Al
Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 99–100 (D.D.C. 2003); Abur v. Repub. of Sudan,
437 F. Supp. 2d 166, 168–69 n.4 (D.D.C. 2006).
For all of these reasons this matter is dismissed without prejudice. Respondents’ motion
to extend time, ECF No. 8, to respond to the complaint, is denied as moot. An order consistent
with this memorandum opinion is issued separately.
/s/_______________________ BERYL A. HOWELL Date: December 22, 2023 United States District Judge