UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
JOSHUA COOK,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:23-cv-2314 v. JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers KATIE TROSTEL, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER Plaintiff, Joshua Cook, an inmate at the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 3.) Ms. Cook1 is proceeding without counsel. (Id.) Ms. Cook alleges that Defendants violated her Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference to her safety and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC”) Policy 67-MNH-12 that requires mandatory sex offender programing. (ECF No. 48.) This matter is before the Court on the Order and Report and Recommendation issued by the Magistrate Judge on July 12, 2024. (Order and R&R, ECF No. 72.) The Order and R&R addressed several pending motions (see ECF Nos. 32, 41, 48, 50, 66) and offered recommendations on the disposition of the remaining motions before the Court (ECF Nos. 27, 29, 30, 31, 49, 55, 68). I. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint First, the Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 48) and then conducted a re-screening of the Amended Complaint pursuant
1 Plaintiff, a transgendered inmate, previously moved the Court to use female pronouns when referring to her. (ECF No. 24.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s request. (ECF No. 26.) to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (ECF No. 72, PageID 690–91.) After conducting the initial re- screening of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Magistrate Judge made several recommendations based on a review of that Complaint. The Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff’s claims for damages against
Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed because the State of Ohio did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity and accordingly such claims against state employees for monetary relief are barred. (Id. at PageID 691–92.) But the Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed on her remaining claims. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge also recommended that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against Defendants Edward Shutek and Joshua Neff be dismissed because any claim against each Defendant arises from past conduct and does not seek prospective relief from the allegedly unconstitutional policy mandates of 67- MNH-12. (ECF No. 72, PageID 693.) II. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Next, the Magistrate Judge reviewed Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 27, 55)
and recommended that the Motions be granted, in part, as it relates to Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their individual capacities and denied in part as to Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against Defendants Katherine Trostel, Kelly Storm, Corby Free, and Annette Chambers-Smith in their official capacities. (ECF No. 72, PageID 702, 705.) In other words, the recommendation is that only Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against Defendants Trostel, Storm, Free, and Chambers-Smith in their official capacities should proceed. III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment The Magistrate Judge also recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29) be denied for failing to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. (ECF No. 72, PageID 703, 705.) Because Plaintiff failed to address the preliminary injunction standard, the Magistrate Judge also recommended that Plaintiff’s Accelerated Calendar Request for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to Rule 65.1 (ECF No. 30); Motion for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 49); and Notice to the Court that Defendants are Causing Further Injury/Request for a Hearing on
Plaintiff’s Unheard Injunctive Relief Motion (ECF No. 68) be denied. (ECF No. 72, PageID 703.) Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment (ECF No. 31) be denied because a party may not make a motion for declaratory relief but must bring an action for declaratory judgment. (ECF No. 72, PageID 704 (citation omitted)). IV. Analysis Ms. Cook timely filed an Objection to the Order and R&R (ECF No. 80), and Defendants replied to Ms. Cook’s Objection (ECF No. 81). When a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendation to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After a de novo review, this Court agrees with and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Order and R&R. Beyond restating her claims that Defendants have shown a deliberate indifference to her safety and that ODRC Policy 67-MNH-12 is discriminatory, Ms. Cook only objects to the Magistrate Judge’s application of the Leaman doctrine. (See ECF No. 80, PageID 726.) Ms. Cook argues that the Leaman doctrine should only apply to preclude her federal cause of action if her claims were litigated to a final judgment in the Ohio Court of Claims. (ECF No. 80, PageID 726–28.) Because she dismissed her Court of Claims complaint before that court ruled on the merits of her cause of action, she argues the Magistrate Judge erred in applying the Leaman doctrine. (Id.) But the Magistrate Judge addressed the fact that Ms. Cook “withdrew” or dismissed her Court of Claims complaint in the Order and R&R. (ECF No. 72, PageID 699–700.) There, the
Magistrate Judge explained that “whether Plaintiff’s claims against the ODRC survived post- filing is immaterial—it is the act of bringing a claim in the Court of Claims, regardless of its success, that triggers the Leaman doctrine’s complete waiver.” (ECF No. 72, PageID 699; citing Thomson v. Harmony, 65 F.3d 1314, 1319 (6th Cir. 1995); Thomas v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1999).) The Leaman doctrine, as the Magistrate Judge explained, recognizes that in some cases a plaintiff waives the right to bring claims against state employees by suing in the Ohio Court of Claims. (ECF No. 72, PageID 694; Leaman v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc).) The Ohio legislature intended for the waiver derived from Ohio Revised Code § 2743.02 to operate as a “quid pro quo” – “the state
consents to be sued [in the Court of Claims] in exchange for a plaintiff’s waiver of claims against the state’s employees.” (Id. PageID 697; citing Harris v. Sowers, No. 2:16-cv-888, 2022 WL 1637564, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2022); Plinton v. Cty. of Summit, 540 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 2008).) The Court adopts this analysis. Ms.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
JOSHUA COOK,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:23-cv-2314 v. JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers KATIE TROSTEL, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER Plaintiff, Joshua Cook, an inmate at the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 3.) Ms. Cook1 is proceeding without counsel. (Id.) Ms. Cook alleges that Defendants violated her Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference to her safety and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC”) Policy 67-MNH-12 that requires mandatory sex offender programing. (ECF No. 48.) This matter is before the Court on the Order and Report and Recommendation issued by the Magistrate Judge on July 12, 2024. (Order and R&R, ECF No. 72.) The Order and R&R addressed several pending motions (see ECF Nos. 32, 41, 48, 50, 66) and offered recommendations on the disposition of the remaining motions before the Court (ECF Nos. 27, 29, 30, 31, 49, 55, 68). I. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint First, the Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 48) and then conducted a re-screening of the Amended Complaint pursuant
1 Plaintiff, a transgendered inmate, previously moved the Court to use female pronouns when referring to her. (ECF No. 24.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s request. (ECF No. 26.) to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (ECF No. 72, PageID 690–91.) After conducting the initial re- screening of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Magistrate Judge made several recommendations based on a review of that Complaint. The Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff’s claims for damages against
Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed because the State of Ohio did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity and accordingly such claims against state employees for monetary relief are barred. (Id. at PageID 691–92.) But the Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed on her remaining claims. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge also recommended that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against Defendants Edward Shutek and Joshua Neff be dismissed because any claim against each Defendant arises from past conduct and does not seek prospective relief from the allegedly unconstitutional policy mandates of 67- MNH-12. (ECF No. 72, PageID 693.) II. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Next, the Magistrate Judge reviewed Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 27, 55)
and recommended that the Motions be granted, in part, as it relates to Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their individual capacities and denied in part as to Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against Defendants Katherine Trostel, Kelly Storm, Corby Free, and Annette Chambers-Smith in their official capacities. (ECF No. 72, PageID 702, 705.) In other words, the recommendation is that only Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against Defendants Trostel, Storm, Free, and Chambers-Smith in their official capacities should proceed. III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment The Magistrate Judge also recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29) be denied for failing to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. (ECF No. 72, PageID 703, 705.) Because Plaintiff failed to address the preliminary injunction standard, the Magistrate Judge also recommended that Plaintiff’s Accelerated Calendar Request for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to Rule 65.1 (ECF No. 30); Motion for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 49); and Notice to the Court that Defendants are Causing Further Injury/Request for a Hearing on
Plaintiff’s Unheard Injunctive Relief Motion (ECF No. 68) be denied. (ECF No. 72, PageID 703.) Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment (ECF No. 31) be denied because a party may not make a motion for declaratory relief but must bring an action for declaratory judgment. (ECF No. 72, PageID 704 (citation omitted)). IV. Analysis Ms. Cook timely filed an Objection to the Order and R&R (ECF No. 80), and Defendants replied to Ms. Cook’s Objection (ECF No. 81). When a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendation to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After a de novo review, this Court agrees with and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Order and R&R. Beyond restating her claims that Defendants have shown a deliberate indifference to her safety and that ODRC Policy 67-MNH-12 is discriminatory, Ms. Cook only objects to the Magistrate Judge’s application of the Leaman doctrine. (See ECF No. 80, PageID 726.) Ms. Cook argues that the Leaman doctrine should only apply to preclude her federal cause of action if her claims were litigated to a final judgment in the Ohio Court of Claims. (ECF No. 80, PageID 726–28.) Because she dismissed her Court of Claims complaint before that court ruled on the merits of her cause of action, she argues the Magistrate Judge erred in applying the Leaman doctrine. (Id.) But the Magistrate Judge addressed the fact that Ms. Cook “withdrew” or dismissed her Court of Claims complaint in the Order and R&R. (ECF No. 72, PageID 699–700.) There, the
Magistrate Judge explained that “whether Plaintiff’s claims against the ODRC survived post- filing is immaterial—it is the act of bringing a claim in the Court of Claims, regardless of its success, that triggers the Leaman doctrine’s complete waiver.” (ECF No. 72, PageID 699; citing Thomson v. Harmony, 65 F.3d 1314, 1319 (6th Cir. 1995); Thomas v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1999).) The Leaman doctrine, as the Magistrate Judge explained, recognizes that in some cases a plaintiff waives the right to bring claims against state employees by suing in the Ohio Court of Claims. (ECF No. 72, PageID 694; Leaman v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc).) The Ohio legislature intended for the waiver derived from Ohio Revised Code § 2743.02 to operate as a “quid pro quo” – “the state
consents to be sued [in the Court of Claims] in exchange for a plaintiff’s waiver of claims against the state’s employees.” (Id. PageID 697; citing Harris v. Sowers, No. 2:16-cv-888, 2022 WL 1637564, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2022); Plinton v. Cty. of Summit, 540 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 2008).) The Court adopts this analysis. Ms. Cook filed a complaint in the Ohio Court of Claims on August 25, 2022 alleging similar constitutional violations and seeking the same relief as her federal cause of action. (ECF No. 72, PageID 702.) Because the act of bringing a claim in the Court of Claims triggers the Leaman’s doctrine waiver, Ms. Cook waived her right to pursue a claim for damages against Defendants in federal court. Ms. Cook raises no other objection to the
recommendations in the Magistrate Judge’s Order and R&R. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Objection is OVERRULED and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part as it relates to these claims. V. Conclusion The Court has therefore made a de novo review of this record as required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 638(b) and Rule 72(b). Upon said review, Plaintiff’s Objection is OVERRULED. (ECF No. 80.) The Order and Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED and AFFIRMED. (ECF No. 72.) Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities and Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief as to Defendants Edward Shutek and Joshua Neff are DISMISSED. Plaintiff may proceed on her remaining claims. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 27, 55) are GRANTED in part as to Plaintiff’s claim for damages against Defendants in their individual capacities and DENIED in part as to Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief against Defendants Katherine Trostel, Kelly Storm, Corby Free, and Annette Chambers-Smith in their official capacities. The Court also DENIES the following Motions: Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 29); Plaintiff’s Accelerated Calendar Request for Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to Rule 65.1 (ECF No. 30); Motion for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 49); and Plaintiff’s Notice to the Court that Defendants are Causing Further Injury/Request for a Hearing on Plaintiff’s Unheard Injunctive Relief Motion (ECF No. 68); and Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment (ECF No. 31). This case remains open. IT IS SO ORDERED.
8/30/2024 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE