Cook v. Torres

District Court, N.D. California·Decided May 12, 2020·No. 4:19-cv-01370·Unknown

Opinion

DAVID L. COOK, Case No. 19-cv-01370-PJH

Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v. Re: Dkt. No. 25 CITY OF ANTIOCH, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff, a detainee, proceeds with a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint. Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim (citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly arrested and detained on multiple occasions. A claim of unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 for violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure if the complaint alleges that the arrest was without probable cause or other justification. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-558 (1967); Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 n.1. (9th Cir. 2015) (absence of probable cause is essential element of § 1983 false arrest claim). And a claim of unlawful detention/imprisonment is cognizable under § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process if the arrest was without probable cause or other justification and the defendant knew or should have 145 (1979); Lee v. County of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 684-85 (9th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff stated due process claim where police allegedly arrested plaintiff’s son without probable cause, detained him without verifying that he was the person for whom police had an arrest warrant, despite his obvious mental incapacity, and detained him for one day before extradition hearing, which led to his incarceration in another state for two years). But cf. Gant v. County of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 619, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2014) (because plaintiff did not inform defendants of his mistaken identity and because he received a prompt hearing, his due process claim based on unlawful post-arrest detention failed). Plaintiff states that he was improperly arrested and taken to jail on multiple occasions, and he was not on probation as alleged by the police officers. It appears that he was released from custody after a few days for each incident. Plaintiff is currently in jail though he does not indicate that he is in custody related to the arrests that are the subject of this action. Liberally construed this is sufficient to state a claim against defendants Torres, Cox, Downie, Sansen, Ramirez and Hynes. The remaining defendants are dismissed with prejudice. The only allegations against Chief Tammny is that plaintiff left messages to speak with him and did not receive a return call. There are no allegations against Piceno and Beringer. Plaintiff has failed to link these defendants to the underlying allegations. 1. Plaintiff’s motion for release to home confinement (Docket No. 25) is DENIED. Plaintiff must seek release from custody in his federal criminal case, not this civil rights action. It does not appear that his federal criminal case is related to this civil case. 2. All defendants are dismissed with prejudice except for Torres, Cox, Downie, Sansen, Ramirez and Hynes. The clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without prepayment of fees, copies of the amended complaint (Docket No. 24) with attachments and copies of this order on the following defendant 5705, J. Downie # 5557, John Ramirez # 5236 and Martin Hynes # 4164. The United States Marshal shall also serve at the Concord Police Department, Officer Ollie Sansen #0392. 3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the court orders as follows: a. No later than ninety days from the date of service, defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and shall include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from the events at issue. If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the court shall be promptly served on the plaintiff. b. At the time the dispositive motion is served, defendants shall also serve, on a separate paper, the appropriate notice or notices required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003). See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940-941 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rand and Wyatt notices must be given at the time motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cook v. Torres, (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Cook v. Torres (Cook v. Torres) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Pierson v. Ray
386 U.S. 547 (Supreme Court, 1967)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
United States v. David Joe Martin
15 F.3d 943 (Tenth Circuit, 1994)
Earnest Woods, II v. Tom Carey
684 F.3d 934 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Kelvin Gant v. County of Los Angeles
772 F.3d 608 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Robert Yousefian v. City of Glendale
779 F.3d 1010 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Wyatt v. Terhune
315 F.3d 1108 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)