Cook v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Alaska
• Decided: May 6, 2026
• Docket: A-14361
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 WL 1243496

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION

NOTICE

This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a). Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

Robert H. COOK, Appellant,

v.

STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. A-14361

May 6, 2026

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Kodiak, Stephen B. Wallace, Judge. Trial Court No. 3KO-23-00034 CR

Attorneys and Law Firms

C. Maeve Kendall, Cashion Gilmore & Lindemuth, Anchorage, for the Appellant.

Heather Stenson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.

SUMMARY DISPOSITION

*1 Robert H. Cook was convicted, following a jury trial, of third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.¹ At trial, investigating troopers testified that they discovered two-and-a-half pounds of methamphetamine in a bedroom of a house and that, during an interview with one of the troopers, Cook admitted to renting that room. Cook testified at trial in his defense; he admitted to paying rent in exchange for using amenities at the house and occasionally sleeping on the living room couch, but he denied renting the bedroom where the drugs were found. The jury found Cook guilty. Cook now appeals, raising three claims.

First, Cook argues that the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to prove that he possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. When we review a claim of insufficiency, we are required to view the evidence, “and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.”² Viewing the evidence in this light, we must then determine whether a fair-minded fact-finder could reasonably find that the State met its burden of proving all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.³

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence showed that Cook had been renting the bedroom for approximately one year at the time the drugs were discovered. The troopers testified that the two-and-a-half pounds of methamphetamine discovered in the bedroom equated to thousands of doses and could yield a profit of nearly $120,000. In addition to methamphetamine crystals of various sizes, including some as big as golf balls, the bedroom contained over $4,000 in cash, drug paraphernalia, a digital scale with methamphetamine on it, letters addressed to Cook, a carboard box with Cook's name on it, and a backpack holding Cook's identification card as well as a baggie of methamphetamine.

At trial, Cook admitted that he used methamphetamine, that he stored his belongings in the bedroom, and that the methamphetamine in the backpack belonged to him (although he denied that the two-and-a-half pounds of methamphetamine belonged to him). A search of Cook's phone revealed that Cook received multiple texts soliciting drugs from him, including one text soliciting methamphetamine.

Based on this evidence, a fair-minded juror could reasonably find that the large amount of methamphetamine found in the bedroom belonged to Cook. Additionally, “a jury can infer an intent to deliver from possession of a large quantity of drugs, provided that the amount at issue is larger than for personal use.”⁴ Here, the amount of methamphetamine was significantly more than an amount for personal use, and a reasonable juror could find that Cook possessed the methamphetamine with an intent to deliver.

*2 On appeal, Cook points to evidence that suggested that the homeowner was responsible for the large amount of methamphetamine found in the bedroom and that it was only the small amount of methamphetamine found in the backpack that belonged to Cook. But this argument rests on viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Cook rather than in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, as we are required to do when reviewing claims of insufficiency.⁵ Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove Cook guilty of third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance.

Second, Cook argues that the superior court erred in its treatment of a discovery violation by the State. Prior to trial, Cook received discovery that included a police report that documented Cook's interview with the police and, specifically, Cook's admission that he had rented the room where the methamphetamine was found. However, the State did not provide Cook's attorney with the audio recording of the interview until trial had already begun.

The superior court ruled that the State had violated Alaska Criminal Rule 16 by failing to provide the audio recording before trial, and, as a remedy for the discovery violation, the court precluded the State from introducing the recording at trial.⁶ Cook's attorney requested this remedy and did not ask for any further remedy.

On appeal, however, Cook argues that the court plainly erred in failing to suppress all evidence of Cook's statement that he was renting the room. We find no merit to this claim. As Cook's attorney acknowledged at trial, the State had timely discovered the contents of the interview, including the incriminating statement, and it was only the audio recording of that interview that was late-discovered and that had taken the attorney by surprise. Given these circumstances, the superior court's decision to preclude the use of the audio recording but to allow evidence of the statement was not an abuse of discretion.⁷

Lastly, Cook argues that the court erred in declining to find the mitigator under AS 12.55.155(d)(2) — that the defendant played only a minor role in the offense. He asserts that the evidence clearly shows that he played only a minor role in his offense and that the owner of the house where the drugs were found was the principal offender.

Alaska Statute 12.55.155(f)(1) establishes that the defendant must prove the “minor role” mitigator by “clear and convincing evidence.”⁸ A defendant is not entitled to application of the mitigator merely because they acted as an accomplice, rather than a principal; they must clearly convince the court that they “played only a minor role in the offense under consideration.”⁹

Here, the sentencing court made factual findings supporting the conclusion that Cook played more than a minor role in the offense of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. The court found that Cook had been renting the room, noting that Cook's backpack, his identification, and a box with his name on it were all discovered inside the room. The court also pointed to the evidence in the room indicating that Cook played more than a minor role in the offense, including the two-and-a-half pounds of methamphetamine, the “substantial volume of cash,” drug paraphernalia, the digital scale, and chemicals used to make methamphetamine. Cook does not dispute any of these factual findings as clearly erroneous.

*3 Based on the findings of the sentencing court, we conclude that the court did not err in declining to find the “minor role” mitigator.¹⁰

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

Footnotes

1

AS 11.71.030(a)(9).

2

Phornsavanh v. State, 481 P.3d 1145, 1156 (Alaska App. 2021).

3

See id.

4

Stacy v. State, 500 P.3d 1023, 1032 (Alaska App. 2021); see also Bochkovsky v. State, 356 P.3d 302, 310 (Alaska App. 2015) (“It is well established that possession of a large quantity of drugs is evidence of intent to deliver.”).

5

See Iyapana v. State, 284 P.3d 841, 848-49 (Alaska App. 2012).

6

Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(A)(ii) requires the State to provide before trial “[a]ny written or recorded statements and summaries of statements ... made by the accused.”

7

See Harris v. State, 195 P.3d 161, 165, 180 (Alaska App. 2008) (explaining that a trial court's decision regarding the proper remedy for a discovery violation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

8

See Juneby v. State, 665 P.2d 30, 32 (Alaska App. 1983).

9

Shinault v. State, 258 P.3d 848, 849 (Alaska App. 2011).

10

See Michael v. State, 115 P.3d 517, 519 (Alaska 2005) (holding that whether a mitigating factor has been established is a mixed question of law and fact).

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