Cook Children's Health Foundation v. Diamondback E&P LLC

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedJanuary 2, 2024
Docket5:21-cv-00359
StatusUnknown

This text of Cook Children's Health Foundation v. Diamondback E&P LLC (Cook Children's Health Foundation v. Diamondback E&P LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cook Children's Health Foundation v. Diamondback E&P LLC, (W.D. Okla. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

COOK CHILDREN’S HEALTH ) FOUNDATION a/k/a W.I. COOK ) FOUNDATION, INC., on behalf of itself ) and a class of similarly situated persons, ) ) Case No. CIV-21-359-D Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) DIAMONDBACK E&P, LLC, ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Certify the Settlement Class for Settlement Purposes, to Preliminarily Approve the Class Action Settlement, to Approve the Form and Manner of Notice, and to Set a Date for a Final Fairness Hearing [Doc. No. 50] (the “Motion for Preliminary Approval”). Plaintiff Cook Children’s Health Foundation a/k/a W.I. Cook Foundation (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons described below (collectively, the “Settlement Class”) filed this lawsuit against Diamondback E&P, LLC (“Diamondback”) for the alleged underpayment of royalties on natural gas, natural gas liquids, and associated hydrocarbons produced from wells located in Texas during the Claim Period (the “Litigation”).1 On November 16, 2023, the Parties executed a Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement (the “Settlement Agreement”). The Settlement Agreement,

1 Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Order shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Settlement Agreement. together with the documents referenced therein and exhibits thereto, sets forth the terms and conditions for the proposed Settlement of the Litigation. In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff now presents the Settlement to the Court for preliminary

approval under FED. R. CIV. P. 23. The Court has reviewed the Motion for Preliminary Approval, the record in the Litigation and the Settlement Agreement, together with the exhibits attached thereto and incorporated by reference therein. Upon consideration, the Motion for Preliminary Approval is GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED as follows: 1. For purposes of this Order, the Court adopts all defined terms as set forth in the Settlement Agreement unless otherwise defined herein. 2. The Court finds the Settlement Class should be certified at this stage for the purposes of this Settlement, as the Settlement Class meets all certification requirements of

FED. R. CIV. P. 23 for a settlement class. The Settlement Class is certified for settlement purposes only, subject to the Court’s final consideration at the Final Fairness Hearing. Because this case has been settled at this stage of the proceedings, the Court does not reach the issue of whether the Settlement Class could have been certified in this case on a contested basis.

3. The certified Settlement Class is defined as follows: All royalty owners in Texas wells where Diamondback E&P LLC, Diamondback Energy, Inc., Energen Resources Corporation, and/or each’s respective affiliates was the operator (or a working interest owner who marketed its share of gas and directly paid royalties to the royalty owners) from April 1, 2011 to July 31, 2023 under oil and gas leases which expressly contain the off-lease use of gas royalty clause, the on-lease free use clause, or both, and in which Diamondback E&P LLC, Diamondback Energy, Inc., Energen Resources Corporation, and/or each’s respective affiliates are lessees or successors-in-interest under such agreements (collectively, the “Diamondback Entities”). Excluded from the Class are: (1) agencies, departments or instrumentalities of the United States of America, including but not limited to the U.S. Department of the Interior (the United States, Indian tribes, and Indian allottees); (2) agencies, departments, or instrumentalities of the State of Texas; (3) Diamondback Entities and their affiliates, officers, and directors; (4) any publicly traded entity (and its affiliates) that produces, gathers, processes, or markets gas; (5) the claims of royalty owners to the extent covered by arbitration clauses or prior settlement agreements, if any, still in effect on the date this lawsuit was filed; and (6) royalty paid by Diamondback Entities only as a pass-through for other non-affiliated entities, except to the extent any claims are asserted directly against the Diamondback Entities that arise from such royalty paid. 4. The Court finds, subject to the Court’s final consideration at the Final Fairness Hearing, the above-defined Settlement Class satisfies all prerequisites of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) for settlement purposes and on a preliminary basis: a. Numerosity. Plaintiff has shown that “[t]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). The Tenth Circuit has not adopted a set number as presumptively sufficient to meet this burden, and there is “no set formula to determine if the class is so numerous that it should be so certified.” Trevizo v. Adams, 455 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, the Settlement Class consists of several thousand royalty owners. See Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Cert. at 10. Therefore, the Court finds the numerosity prerequisite is met. b. Commonality. Plaintiff has shown that “[t]here are questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). A “common question is one where ‘the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie

showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, classwide proof.’” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (citation omitted). “Factual differences in the claims of class members should not result in a denial of class certification where common questions of law exist.” Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 938 (10th Cir. 1982). Here, Plaintiff’s “underpayment claims involve common

questions of law and fact, including whether the Settlement Class’s leases contain language addressing the payment of royalties on off-lease fuel gas, or contain free- use clauses, and whether the Diamondback Entities were required to pay royalties on off-lease fuel gas.” Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Cert. at 11. Therefore, the Court finds the commonality requirement is met.

c. Typicality. Plaintiff has shown that “[t]he claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). To meet this requirement, “[e]very member of the class need not be in a situation identical to that of the named plaintiff.” DG v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Rather, “[p]rovided the claims and Named

Plaintiffs and class members are based on the same legal or remedial theory, differing fact situations of the class members do not defeat typicality.” Id. at 1198- 99. Here, “Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Settlement Class’ claims because Plaintiff alleges that it owns a royalty interest under a lease that requires the Diamondback Entities to pay royalties on off-lease fuel use, and that the Diamondback Entities breached that obligation.” Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Cert. at 12.Therefore, the Court finds the typicality requirement is met.

d. Adequacy. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel have shown that “[t]he representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Adequacy is satisfied when (1) neither the plaintiff nor its counsel has interests that conflict with the interests of other class members, and (2) the plaintiff will prosecute the action vigorously through qualified counsel. See

Rutter Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2002).

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Related

Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.
314 F.3d 1180 (Tenth Circuit, 2002)
DG Ex Rel. Stricklin v. DeVaughn
594 F.3d 1188 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo
577 U.S. 442 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Trevizo v. Adams
455 F.3d 1155 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
Dow Chemical Co. v. Seegott Holdings, Inc.
768 F.3d 1245 (Tenth Circuit, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
Cook Children's Health Foundation v. Diamondback E&P LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cook-childrens-health-foundation-v-diamondback-ep-llc-okwd-2024.