Cook Banking Co. v. Davis (In Re Davis)

40 B.R. 163, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 43, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5435
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedJune 21, 1984
Docket19-30101
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 40 B.R. 163 (Cook Banking Co. v. Davis (In Re Davis)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cook Banking Co. v. Davis (In Re Davis), 40 B.R. 163, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 43, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5435 (Ga. 1984).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTORNEY AS COUNSEL FOR CREDITOR

ROBERT F. HERSHNER, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge. •

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 31, 1983, Debtor William H. Davis, individually and formerly doing business as Davis Electric & Plumbing Supply Co., filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On January 23, 1984, Cook Banking Company, Plaintiff, filed a “Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt.” The complaint is signed by Mr. Alvin W. Arnold and Mr. Kenneth R. Fielder as attorneys for Plaintiff.

Before the Court is the “Motion to Disqualify Attorney as Counsel for Creditor” filed by Debtor on May 11, 1984. The motion requests the Court to disqualify Mr. Fielder from serving as counsel for Plaintiff because of Mr. Fielder’s prior representation of Debtor. The motion came on to be heard by the Court on May 29,1984, and the Court, having considered the evidence presented at the hearing, now publishes its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Beginning in 1979, Debtor began employing Mr. Fielder as his personal attorney and as attorney for his business, Davis Electric & Plumbing Supply Co. From 1979 until November of 1983, Mr. Fielder represented Debtor in approximately eight lawsuits to collect accounts receivable, and also represented Debtor on legal matters involving certain real estate rented out by Debtor. Mr. Fielder also represented Debt- or in eight lawsuits brought against Debt- or. Between January 8,1982, and March 3, 1983, Debtor drew seven checks made payable to Mr. Fielder in the total amount of $3,082.22, representing payment to Mr. Fielder for legal services and settlement of certain of the lawsuits against Debtor. On March 28, 1983, Mr. Fielder mailed a bill to Debtor in the amount of $300.00 for legal services rendered, which bill has not been paid by Debtor. 1 Between 1979 and 1983, Mr. Fielder was the only attorney used by Debtor.

During the course of the professional relationship, Debtor, on several occasions, told Mr. Fielder about his financial condition. Debtor testified that he told Mr. Fielder of the circumstances that led to his filing in bankruptcy. He testified that Mr. Fielder advised him to take certain precautions prior to the bankruptcy filing, and that Mr. Fielder advised him to retain a bankruptcy lawyer in Macon, Georgia. Debtor testified that Mr. Fielder assisted him in transferring some real estate to his wife during the two years preceding the bankruptcy filing. Mr. Fielder denies ad *165 vising Debtor about bankruptcy, but does not deny assisting Debtor with the transfer of real estate.

At the time of the bankruptcy filing on October 31, 1983, Mr. Fielder was attorney of record for Debtor in a lawsuit pending against Debtor in the Superior Court of Bleckley County, Georgia. By letter dated November 5, 1983, Mr. Fielder requested that the Clerk of the Bleckley County Superior Court remove him as attorney of record for Debtor. Mr. Fielder questioned Debtor at the 341(a) meeting of creditors held on December 14, 1983, and filed this adversary proceeding on January 23, 1984.

The complaint to determine discharge-ability of debt filed by Mr. Fielder alleges that Plaintiff was induced to make loans to Debtor based upon certain false security agreements. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Debtor did not own certain farm equipment that he pledged to Plaintiff as collateral. Plaintiff requests that the Court declare Debtor’s debt to Plaintiff nondischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(B) (West 1979). 2 The complaint also alleges that under 11 U.S. C.A. § 523(a)(6) (West 1979), Debtor caused willful and malicious injury to inventory in which Plaintiff had a security interest.

Debtor admits that he did not specifically consult with Mr. Fielder about his loans from Plaintiff. When asked how the prior representation was related to this adversary proceeding, Debtor stated that Mr. Fielder was intimately familiar with his dealings and financial condition. Debtor did not testify as to any specific information disclosed to Mr. Fielder upon the ground that such information is protected by the attorney-client privilege.

Mr. Fielder does not have the consent of Debtor to prosecute this adversary proceeding.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility governs the conduct of lawyers practicing before the federal courts, and it is a guideline for the federal courts to follow in the regulation of their affairs. Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 n. 5 (5th Cir.1979); Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir.1976). The American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility is applicable to the disqualification of attorneys in bankruptcy proceedings. Kraft, Inc. v. Alton Box Board Co. (In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation), 659 F.2d 1341, 1349 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit A); In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 20 B.R. 328, 336 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1982).

Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: “A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client.” Canon 4 prevents a lawyer from representing a client in a legal action against one of his former clients where there is a substantial relationship between the two representations. 3 Kraft, Inc., 659 F.2d at 1344; Paro v. Tetzlaff (In re Tetzlaff), 31 B.R. 560, 562 (Bankr.E.D.Wisc.1983); Ludwig v. Coldwell, Banker & Co. (In re Barton & Ludwig), 9 B.R. 222, 224 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1981). To be substantially related to a pending action, the prior legal representation “need only be akin to the present action in a way reasonable persons would understand as important to the issues involved.” Kraft, Inc., 659 F.2d at *166 1346. If a substantial relationship is found, a conclusive presumption arises that confidential information has been given to the attorney. Id. at 1347. Under the substantial relationship test, doubts on the existence of a conflict of interest should be resolved in favor of disqualification. In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc., 31 B.R. 836, 838-39 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1983).

In this adversary proceeding, the Court is of the opinion that Mr. Fielder’s prior representation of Debtor is substantially related to this adversary proceeding. First, the Court notes a substantial attorney-client relationship over a four-year period. See Kraft, Inc., 659 F.2d at 1346-47. Mr. Fielder represented Debtor in numerous civil actions and in the transfer of real estate. In fact, Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
40 B.R. 163, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 43, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5435, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cook-banking-co-v-davis-in-re-davis-gamb-1984.