Conway v. City of San Mateo

127 Cal. App. 3d 330, 179 Cal. Rptr. 561, 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 2531
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 31, 1981
DocketCiv. 48073
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 127 Cal. App. 3d 330 (Conway v. City of San Mateo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conway v. City of San Mateo, 127 Cal. App. 3d 330, 179 Cal. Rptr. 561, 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 2531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinion

Opinion

SCOTT, Acting P. J.

Appellant John Conway filed a petition for writ of mandate, seeking to compel officials of the City of San Mateo to call an election and submit a proposed housing project for approval by city voters. After a hearing, judgment was entered denying the petition and this appeal followed.

I

On August 21, 1978, the city council of respondent City of San Mateo approved the execution of a lease of the land and air rights over certain city-owned real property then in use as a public parking lot. The lessee, respondent intervener Flores Gardens, 1 a California partnership, plans to construct a 72-unit apartment building over the parking lot, which would still be available for public use. The term of the lease is 55 years, with an option to renew for an additional 25 years. The rent for the first five-year period is $1,000 per month; for each succeeding five-year period thereafter, the rent is to be either increased or decreased according to a formula based on the area Consumer Price Index.

The apartment building is intended to be occupied by senior citizens and handicapped persons who are eligible for housing assistance payments from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The lease expressly recites that the proposed site and project have been approved by HUD as a “Section 8” project. 2

*333 The city council approved the project, subject to 39 conditions, among them the following: “35. Proof that this development has received a Section 8 allocation as a rent supplement project shall be submitted to the City of San Mateo before a building permit is issued. 36. The developer shall guarantee to operate this senior citizens’ housing development under the Section 8 rent supplement program as long as this federal program or any like successor program exists, but in no case for less than a 20 year period now in force.”

II

Article XXXIV, section 1 of the California Constitution provides in pertinent part, “No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified electors of the city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue, approve such project by voting in favor thereof at an election .. .. ”

Relying on article XXXIV, appellant John Conway, a San Mateo resident, taxpayer, and registered voter, sought to compel city officials to submit approval of the proposed project to the city electorate.

Denying appellant’s petition for mandamus, the trial court found inter alia that the city’s involvement in this project was “limited to that of a lessor and a regulator of land use pursuant to ordinary provisions of its Municipal Code.” The court concluded that the city’s involvement was not so extensive as to support a conclusion that the city was developing, constructing, or acquiring a housing project within the meaning of article XXXIV. The court denied appellant’s request for a special finding that the project is a “low cost 3 housing project” as contemplated under article XXXIV.

Appellant contends that: (1) the project is a low rent housing project within the meaning of article XXXIV and the court erred in failing to so find; and (2) the court erred when it found that the city was not developing the project within the meaning of the article.

*334 Preliminarily, we note that mandamus is the proper remedy for compelling an officer to conduct an election according to law. (Wenke v. Hitchcock (1972) 6 Cal.3d 746, 751 [100 Cal.Rptr. 290, 493 P.2d 1154].) However, it has long been the rule that in a petition for writ of mandate, the burden is on the petitioner to prove the existence of duty on the part of the defendants, rather than upon the defendants to disprove the same. (MacLeod v. Long (1930) 110 Cal.App. 334, 339 [294 P. 54].) Furthermore, we presume the judgment denying the petition to be correct, and the burden is on appellant to show reversible error. (California Federation of Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary Sch. (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 514, 541 [77 Cal.Rptr. 497].)

The purpose underlying adoption of article XXXIV was to permit the people of a community to have a voice in decisions which affect the future development of their community and which could substantially increase their tax burden. (California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliot (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 591 [131 Cal.Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193].) In Elliot the court considered the definition of a “low rent housing project,” and concluded that it could encompass a “mixed-income” development in which rental accommodations for persons of “moderate” income were combined with rental units for those who, without financial assistance, could not obtain adequate housing. (Id., at p. 592.) The court also held that a private ownership of a project did not preclude a finding that a public body had developed, acquired, or constructed the project within the meaning of article XXXIV, if the public body’s financial and regulatory involvement was sufficiently extensive. (Id., at pp. 589-591.)

The projects at issue in Elliot were developments in which no more than 75 percent of the units would be made available to those who needed financial assistance. Left unsettled was whether Elliot precluded a different result in other cases in which other or lesser proportions of housing units were reserved for low income tenants. In response to Elliot, the Legislature in 1976 enacted the Public Housing Election Implementation Law (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 37000-37002, and 50093) in order to “clarify ambiguities” in the meaning of article XXXIV. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1339, § 3, p. 6076.) In section 37000, the Legislature explained the need for the clarification. In part, that section provides, “The Legislature finds and declares that new forms of housing assistance can provide housing for persons of low income in a manner consistent with and supportive of optimum community improvement. Such forms of housing assistance may allow for mixed income occupan *335 cy in developments representative of and competitive with similar market rate developments provided by the private sector. Such mixed income developments are frequently comparable to market rate projects in terms of architecture, design, and locational standards as well as the level of amenities provided, and may be subject to ad valorem property taxes. [¶] Recognizing that new forms of housing assistance provide new approaches for housing persons of low income, it is the intent of the Legislature ... to clarify ambiguities relating to the scope of the applicability of Article XXXIV which now exist.”

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Bluebook (online)
127 Cal. App. 3d 330, 179 Cal. Rptr. 561, 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 2531, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conway-v-city-of-san-mateo-calctapp-1981.