Contreras v. United States

• Court: District Court, D. South Dakota
• Decided: November 8, 2018
• Docket: 4:17-cv-04075
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT No V 08 a, Ue DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA “See CLERK SOUTHERN DIVISION fe fe HE of AC aC 92K fe ofc ake a ake fg oe ae oe of akc oe fs oie ai Re ai ofc ake fe 28 IE 2 of afc a oe 2s 2s feo 2s fe 24 2 ae 2s fe 2s fe 2s 2 2 2 a os ote oft ok ok ok * MARIO M. CONTRERAS, * CIV 17-4075 * CR 12-10047 Movant, * * -Vs- * ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL * UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, * * Respondent. * * SE HGR SRE e808 a fe ake ah ae ae ae fc oft of ae ok oc of oc 2 af ae of 2 28 ae fe fe 28 ae ae feo ae fe fe fe 2 28 2 oe ake 2 af 3 ee fe fe 2 2g ae 5 9 2 2 eo 2 2 ke □□ 2 □□ Mario M. Contreras has filed four motions seeking appointment of a lawyer to represent him in his Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Docs. 19, 44, 54 and 69.)

It is well settled that “[a] habeas corpus proceeding is civil in nature, and ‘the Sixth Amendment right to counsel afforded for criminal proceedings does not apply.”” Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Boyd v. Groose, 4 F.3d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1993)). Although there is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings, a court may, “in the interests of justice,” appoint representation to any financially eligible person who is secking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). The Eighth Circuit has discussed the circumstances in which the appointment of counsel is appropriate: When exercising its discretion, a district court should first determine whether a pro se habeas petitioner has presented a nonfrivolous claim. If the petitioner has presented only claims that are frivolous or clearly without merit, the district court should dismiss the case on the merits without appointing counsel. Ifthe petitioner has presented a nonfrivolous claim, the district court should then determine whether, given the particular circumstances of the case, the appointment of counsel would benefit the petitioner and the court to such an extent that “the interests of justice so require” it. To determine whether appointment of counsel is required for habeas petitioners with nonfrivolous claims, a district court should consider the legal complexity of the case, the factual complexity of the case, the petitioner’s ability to investigate and present [articulate] his claim, and any other relevant factors.

Abdullah v. Norris, 18 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1994)(internal citations omitted); see also McCall v. Benson, 114 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1997); Battle v. Armontrout, 902 F.2d 701, 702 (8th Cir. 1990).

Applying the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, this Court finds that Mr. Contreras has presented anonfrivolous claim. Among other things, he claims that medical records show a pre-existing heart defect may have caused his daughter’s death. This issue alone is complex and Mr. Contreras is hampered in his ability to investigate the facts. Mr. Contreras has found a lawyer who is willing to represent him, and that lawyer has identified issues that may necessitate medical testimony and an evidentiary hearing. The Court finds that the appointment of counsel would benefit Mr. Contreras and the Court to such an extent that the interests of justice require the appointment of counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).' Christopher D. Dohrer is willing to accept this appointment. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED: 1. That the motions for appointment of counsel are granted (docs. 19, 44, 54 and 69), and Christopher D. Dohrer, Attorney at Law, 202 South Main Street, Suite 230, Aberdeen, SD 57401, is appointed, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b), to represent Mario M. Contreras in this action. Ww Dated this @ ~ day of November, 2018. BY THE COURT: ( CUUnue Ruise awrence L. Piersol United States District Judge ATTEST: MATTHEW W. THELEN, CLERK py Lena wablicd (SEAL) DEPUTY

1 The Court also finds and concludes that Mr. Contreras is a “person financially unable to obtain adequate representation” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) and therefore a “financially eligible person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).