NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOEL CONTRERAS-LEON, No. 23-1234 Agency No. Petitioner, A206-191-353 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 21, 2025** Portland, Oregon
Before: CALLAHAN, M. SMITH, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Joel Contreras-Leon, a citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing his appeal of an
Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We deny
the petition for review in part and dismiss it in part.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and background of this case,
we provide only the information necessary to give context to our ruling. While in
Mexico, Contreras-Leon was robbed by gang members, and his family has been
embroiled in a property-related dispute with a local “boss.” Since coming to the
United States, Contreras-Leon has repeatedly been charged with alcohol-related
crimes, including driving under the influence. Contreras-Leon has two daughters
that were minors at the time of his immigration proceedings. After being charged
with removability, Contreras-Leon requested asylum, withholding of removal,
protection under the CAT, and cancellation of removal. Both the IJ and the BIA
denied the requested relief.
“We review the BIA’s decision and those parts of the IJ’s decision that the
BIA expressly adopted.” Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir.
2023). “We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, including whether the
BIA applied the wrong legal standard.” Id. “We review the BIA’s factual
determinations for substantial evidence, meaning we may reverse only if the
evidence compels a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s.” Id.
1. Contreras-Leon first challenges the BIA’s denial of his request for
asylum and withholding. The BIA concluded that Contreras-Leon had not shown
2 23-1234 (1) the requisite nexus between any persecution and a ground protected under the
Immigration and Nationality Act and (2) that it would be unreasonable for him to
relocate within Mexico to avoid persecution. Contreras-Leon challenges both
conclusions, but his arguments are unavailing.1
First, the BIA applied the right legal standard in reviewing the IJ’s nexus
determination. The BIA reviews the ultimate nexus determination de novo, and
the IJ’s underlying factual findings, such as motive, for clear error. See id. at 552.
That is exactly what the BIA did here—it reviewed the IJ’s motivation findings for
clear error. It did not purport to review the overall “nexus” issue for clear error.
Second, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of asylum and
withholding of removal on nexus grounds. Besides relying on general concerns
about crime in Mexico (which cannot suffice) Contreras-Leon pointed to two
events that he contends would give him a reasonable fear of future persecution—
the 1990s gang robbery and the family dispute with the local boss. Neither suffice.
As to the former, there is no record evidence indicating that the robbery was
anything more than ordinary criminal violence. As to the dispute with the boss,
record evidence does not compel the conclusion that the boss targeted Contreras-
1 The BIA did not decide whether the previous harm suffered by Contreras- Leon rises to the level of past persecution or whether Contreras-Leon’s proposed social group was cognizable. Contreras-Leon suggests that this evinces error, but the BIA was not required to make findings on issues that would be unnecessary to the ultimate decision. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976).
3 23-1234 Leon on protected grounds. To the contrary, the record evidence indicates that the
boss targeted Contreras-Leon out of an interest in acquiring property—not because
of his membership in any proposed social ground. “An alien’s desire to be free
from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang
members bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007,
1016 (9th Cir. 2010).
Third, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Contreras-
Leon is not entitled to asylum or withholding because he could reasonably relocate
within Mexico to avoid persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii). Contreras-
Leon has waived any challenge to this aspect of the decision by challenging it only
in passing. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929–30 (9th
Cir. 2003). Regardless, the BIA’s determination that it would be reasonable for
Contreras-Leon to relocate to avoid persecution is supported by substantial
evidence. The previous harms that he encountered—mistreatment by local gang
members and the boss—would not be present elsewhere in Mexico. A general
concern for criminality in other regions of Mexico cannot change that reality. See
Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 648 (9th Cir. 2021).
2. Contreras-Leon purports to challenge the denial of CAT relief. But he
has forfeited this challenge due to inadequate appellate briefing. See Indep.
Towers of Wash., 350 F.3d at 929–30. Despite the contrary assertion in Contreras-
4 23-1234 Leon’s reply brief, his challenges to the denial of CAT relief are not “actually
argued” in his briefs. Id.
3. Finally, Contreras-Leon challenges the BIA’s denial of his request for
cancellation of removal. To be entitled to this relief, “the alien must meet the
requirements of § 1229b(b)(1),” including showing that removal would cause
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. Gonzalez-
Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D)). If the alien is eligible, “the agency may exercise its discretion
to cancel the alien’s removal.” Id. (emphasis added).
The BIA concluded that Contreras-Leon had not shown that his removal to
Mexico would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his minor
daughters. It also agreed with the IJ that even if Contreras-Leon had been eligible,
it would deny his request for cancellation of removal in its discretion due to
Contreras-Leon’s history of alcohol-related crimes.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOEL CONTRERAS-LEON, No. 23-1234 Agency No. Petitioner, A206-191-353 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 21, 2025** Portland, Oregon
Before: CALLAHAN, M. SMITH, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Joel Contreras-Leon, a citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing his appeal of an
Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We deny
the petition for review in part and dismiss it in part.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and background of this case,
we provide only the information necessary to give context to our ruling. While in
Mexico, Contreras-Leon was robbed by gang members, and his family has been
embroiled in a property-related dispute with a local “boss.” Since coming to the
United States, Contreras-Leon has repeatedly been charged with alcohol-related
crimes, including driving under the influence. Contreras-Leon has two daughters
that were minors at the time of his immigration proceedings. After being charged
with removability, Contreras-Leon requested asylum, withholding of removal,
protection under the CAT, and cancellation of removal. Both the IJ and the BIA
denied the requested relief.
“We review the BIA’s decision and those parts of the IJ’s decision that the
BIA expressly adopted.” Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir.
2023). “We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, including whether the
BIA applied the wrong legal standard.” Id. “We review the BIA’s factual
determinations for substantial evidence, meaning we may reverse only if the
evidence compels a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s.” Id.
1. Contreras-Leon first challenges the BIA’s denial of his request for
asylum and withholding. The BIA concluded that Contreras-Leon had not shown
2 23-1234 (1) the requisite nexus between any persecution and a ground protected under the
Immigration and Nationality Act and (2) that it would be unreasonable for him to
relocate within Mexico to avoid persecution. Contreras-Leon challenges both
conclusions, but his arguments are unavailing.1
First, the BIA applied the right legal standard in reviewing the IJ’s nexus
determination. The BIA reviews the ultimate nexus determination de novo, and
the IJ’s underlying factual findings, such as motive, for clear error. See id. at 552.
That is exactly what the BIA did here—it reviewed the IJ’s motivation findings for
clear error. It did not purport to review the overall “nexus” issue for clear error.
Second, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of asylum and
withholding of removal on nexus grounds. Besides relying on general concerns
about crime in Mexico (which cannot suffice) Contreras-Leon pointed to two
events that he contends would give him a reasonable fear of future persecution—
the 1990s gang robbery and the family dispute with the local boss. Neither suffice.
As to the former, there is no record evidence indicating that the robbery was
anything more than ordinary criminal violence. As to the dispute with the boss,
record evidence does not compel the conclusion that the boss targeted Contreras-
1 The BIA did not decide whether the previous harm suffered by Contreras- Leon rises to the level of past persecution or whether Contreras-Leon’s proposed social group was cognizable. Contreras-Leon suggests that this evinces error, but the BIA was not required to make findings on issues that would be unnecessary to the ultimate decision. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976).
3 23-1234 Leon on protected grounds. To the contrary, the record evidence indicates that the
boss targeted Contreras-Leon out of an interest in acquiring property—not because
of his membership in any proposed social ground. “An alien’s desire to be free
from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang
members bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007,
1016 (9th Cir. 2010).
Third, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Contreras-
Leon is not entitled to asylum or withholding because he could reasonably relocate
within Mexico to avoid persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii). Contreras-
Leon has waived any challenge to this aspect of the decision by challenging it only
in passing. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929–30 (9th
Cir. 2003). Regardless, the BIA’s determination that it would be reasonable for
Contreras-Leon to relocate to avoid persecution is supported by substantial
evidence. The previous harms that he encountered—mistreatment by local gang
members and the boss—would not be present elsewhere in Mexico. A general
concern for criminality in other regions of Mexico cannot change that reality. See
Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 648 (9th Cir. 2021).
2. Contreras-Leon purports to challenge the denial of CAT relief. But he
has forfeited this challenge due to inadequate appellate briefing. See Indep.
Towers of Wash., 350 F.3d at 929–30. Despite the contrary assertion in Contreras-
4 23-1234 Leon’s reply brief, his challenges to the denial of CAT relief are not “actually
argued” in his briefs. Id.
3. Finally, Contreras-Leon challenges the BIA’s denial of his request for
cancellation of removal. To be entitled to this relief, “the alien must meet the
requirements of § 1229b(b)(1),” including showing that removal would cause
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. Gonzalez-
Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D)). If the alien is eligible, “the agency may exercise its discretion
to cancel the alien’s removal.” Id. (emphasis added).
The BIA concluded that Contreras-Leon had not shown that his removal to
Mexico would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his minor
daughters. It also agreed with the IJ that even if Contreras-Leon had been eligible,
it would deny his request for cancellation of removal in its discretion due to
Contreras-Leon’s history of alcohol-related crimes.
To the extent that Contreras-Leon intends to challenge the BIA’s
discretionary decision, we lack jurisdiction to review the substance of this
discretionary decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Wilkinson v. Garland,
601 U.S. 209, 218, 225 n.4 (2024). We have jurisdiction to reach Contreras-
Leon’s argument that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard in exercising its
discretion. See Magana-Magana v. Bondi, 129 F.4th 557, 571 n.7 (9th Cir. 2025).
5 23-1234 But the BIA properly applied a de novo standard of review and balanced
Contreras-Leon’s particular circumstances in making its discretionary decision.
See Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 920 (9th Cir. 2012). We lack jurisdiction to
inquire further and look at how the BIA balanced these circumstances. Therefore,
we do not reach Contreras-Leon’s challenges to the BIA’s antecedent hardship
determination.
Accordingly, we deny the petition to the extent it seeks to challenge the
merits of the BIA’s discretionary determination that it would deny cancellation of
removal to Contreras-Leon even if he was eligible for such relief. The remainder
of the petition is denied.
PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
6 23-1234