Continental Western Insurance Company v. Amplicon Express Inc

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Washington
DecidedAugust 4, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-00341
StatusUnknown

This text of Continental Western Insurance Company v. Amplicon Express Inc (Continental Western Insurance Company v. Amplicon Express Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Continental Western Insurance Company v. Amplicon Express Inc, (E.D. Wash. 2020).

Opinion

1 EASTERU N. S D. I SD TI RS IT CR TI C OT F C WO AU SR HT I NGTON

Aug 04, 2020 2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 4 CONTINENTAL WESTERN No. 2:19-cv-00341-SMJ 5 INSURANCE COMPANY, an Iowa corporation, 6 ORDER GRANTING MOTION Plaintiff, FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 7 v. 8 AMPLICON EXPRESS INC., a 9 Washington corporation,

10 Defendant.

11 Before the Court, without oral argument, is Plaintiff Continental Western 12 Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, default 13 judgment, ECF No. 17. Plaintiff seeks entry of a declaratory judgment that it owes 14 no duty to defend Defendant Amplicon Express, Inc., to whom it sold liability 15 insurance, in a dispute involving the release of hazardous substances by Defendant. 16 Id. Despite being properly served, Defendant has neither answered the Complaint 17 nor responded to Plaintiff’s motion. As such, and in view of the ongoing prejudice 18 that would result from Plaintiff continuing to defend Defendant under a reservation 19 of rights until this matter is resolved, the Court finds default judgment appropriate 20 and grants Plaintiff’s motion. 1 BACKGROUND 2 This action for declaratory relief arises out of a commercial general liability

3 insurance policy Plaintiff issued to Defendant. See ECF No. 1-3 at 1–56 (insurance 4 policy). According to Plaintiff, Defendant operates a molecular biology laboratory 5 in Pullman, Washington, where it leases space from Washington State University

6 (“WSU”). ECF No. 17 at 3. In early 2019, hazardous substances allegedly escaped 7 from Defendant’s laboratory into a neighboring tenant’s facility, resulting in 8 property damage and lost revenues. Id. at 3–6. As a result, both the neighboring 9 tenant and WSU demanded compensation and threatened legal action (the

10 “underlying dispute”). Id. Although no legal action has been brought, Plaintiff has 11 appointed counsel to assist Defendant. ECF No. 18 at 2. 12 On October 9, 2019, Plaintiff brought suit in this Court, seeking a declaratory

13 judgment that it owes no duty to defend Defendant because none of the claims at 14 issue in the underlying dispute fall within the coverages provided by Plaintiff’s 15 policy. See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 17 at 10–19. Plaintiff served Defendant’s 16 registered agent with a Summons and the Complaint on October 14, 2019. ECF

17 No. 8. Defendant did not appear or otherwise respond to the Complaint, and on 18 January 15, 2020, Plaintiff sought default judgment. See ECF No. 6. On March 13, 19 2020, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion because it had not sought entry of an

20 order of default from the Clerk’s Office. ECF No. 11 (citing LCivR 55). Plaintiff 1 then sought and obtained a Clerk’s Order of Default against Defendant. ECF 2 Nos. 13, 15.

3 Plaintiff now seeks summary judgment that it owes Defendant no duty to 4 defend against the threatened legal action in the underlying dispute. ECF No. 17. 5 Plaintiff also renews its motion for entry of default judgment. See id. at 2, 7–9.

6 Defendant still has not filed an answer or otherwise responded to Plaintiff’s 7 Complaint, and counsel has not appeared on its behalf. 8 LEGAL STANDARD 9 Entry of default judgment is discretionary. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089,

10 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Where possible, cases should be resolved on their merits, and 11 the entry of default judgment is an extreme measure reserved for unusual 12 circumstances. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 585 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th

13 Cir. 2009) (citing Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th 14 Cir. 1985)). In evaluating the propriety of default judgment, the Court is guided by 15 seven non-exclusive factors: 16 (1) [T]he possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 17 the sum of money at stake in the action[,] (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts[,] (6) whether the default was due to 18 excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 19

20 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court assumes the 1 facts alleged in the complaint are true. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 2 560 (9th Cir. 1977).

3 DISCUSSION 4 Having reviewed the motion and the record in this matter in light of the Eitel 5 factors, the Court is fully informed and finds that entry of default judgment is

6 appropriate in this case. First, the Court is persuaded that refusing to enter default 7 judgment would prejudice Plaintiff. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. Plaintiff 8 represents that in an abundance of caution it has appointed counsel to assist 9 Defendant in the underlying dispute, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s position that the

10 claims at issue in that dispute are not covered under the policy it issued to 11 Defendant. See ECF No. 18 at 2. Such action is consistent with Plaintiff’s duty of 12 good faith under Washington law. Osborne Constr. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 356

13 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (“If the insurer remains uncertain 14 [concerning its duty to defend], the insurer must provide a defense under a 15 reservation of rights while seeking a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to 16 defend.” (citing Truck Ins. Exch. v. Vanport Homes, Inc., 58 P.3d 276, 282

17 (Wash. 2002))). But it is also a costly measure—one in which Plaintiff must 18 continue until it secures a judgment in this case absolving it of continued 19 responsibility to represent Defendant. See id. As such, the Court finds denying

20 Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment would result in prejudice both now and on 1 a continuing basis, and thus this factor weighs heavily in favor of default judgment. 2 Second, the Court is satisfied based on a review of the record that Plaintiff’s

3 claim is meritorious. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. The policy Plaintiff issued to 4 Defendant excludes from coverage any property damage or personal injury arising 5 by virtue of “the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, . . . release or escape of

6 ‘pollutants.’” ECF No. 1-3 at 10, 39–40. The policy defines “pollutants” to include 7 “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, 8 vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.” Id. at 22. Taking the 9 allegations in the Complaint as true, the claims in the threatened lawsuit and various

10 demand letters in the underlying dispute arise out of the release of hazardous 11 chemicals from Defendant’s laboratory space and would thus appear to fall squarely 12 within the pollution policy exclusion. See ECF No. 18 at 5–28. The Court’s view of

13 the merits is, of course, limited by Defendant’s non-appearance and the resultant 14 one-sided nature of the evidence. Even so, the Court concludes, based on the record 15 before it, that Plaintiff’s claim is meritorious. This factor therefore also weighs in 16 favor of default judgment. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72.

17 Next, the Court considers the sum of money at stake in the action. See 18 Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72.

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Bluebook (online)
Continental Western Insurance Company v. Amplicon Express Inc, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/continental-western-insurance-company-v-amplicon-express-inc-waed-2020.