Continental Land & Fur Co. v. Lacoste

188 So. 700, 192 La. 561, 1939 La. LEXIS 1111
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedApril 3, 1939
DocketNo. 35165.
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 188 So. 700 (Continental Land & Fur Co. v. Lacoste) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Continental Land & Fur Co. v. Lacoste, 188 So. 700, 192 La. 561, 1939 La. LEXIS 1111 (La. 1939).

Opinion

O’NIELL, Chief Justice.

This is a petitory action. The property in contest is a shell mound, having an area of about 10 acres, located on the east bank of the Atchafalaya River, in the Parish of Terrebonne. The defendant claims title by virtue of two patents from the State, issued to his grandparents. Hé pleaded, in the alternative, the prescription of ten years and of thirty years. The judge of the district court sustained the plea of prescription of thirty years and rejected the plaintiff’s demand. The plaintiff is appealing from the decision.

The tract of land described in the two patents on which the defendant relies has an area of 162.07 acres, and is the equivalent of a quarter of a section, bordering on the east side of the Atchafalaya River, and described as the fractional SE% of NE% and fractional NE1/^ of SE^L of Section 19, containing 82 acres, and the SW%, of NW% and NW% of SWy4 of *565 Section 20, containing 80.07 acres, in T. 18 S., R. 12 E. The patent for the 82 acres in Section 19, hordering on the river, was issued to the defendant’s grandmother, Mrs. Margeret De Hart, wife of Jesse De Hart, on the 28th of August, 1869. The patent for the adjacent 80.07 acres, in Section 20, was issued to the defendant’s grandfather, Jesse De Hart, on the 11th of March, 1879, under a homestead entry, made according to the provisions of Act No. 21 of 1871. It is recited in the patent that the proof of settlement and cultivation was made under a certificate dated March 25, 1872, located upon the SWJ4 of NW% and NWJ4 of SWy4 of Section 20, in T. 18 S., R. 12 E., containing 80.07 acres, “according to the official plat of the survey of the said lands in the State Land Office.” By the terms of Act No. 21 of 1871, the Register of the State Land Office was forbidden to issue a patent before the expiration of five years from and after the original entry and the accompanying affidavit, and then only upon proof that the entryman had resided upon or cultivated the land for the term of five years immediately succeeding the date of the filing of the affidavit. That means that Jesse De Hart was residing upon or cultivating land which was supposed to be described in his patent, from March 25, 1872, to March 11, 1879. The evidence in this case, however, shows that the only cultivable land in that neighborhood, or within a radius of many miles around, was the shell mound, or elevation, in contest in this suit; and the evidence shows that that is the land that Jesse De Hart was residing upon and cultivating at that time.

The expression, “according to the official plat of the survey of the said lands in the State Land Office”, appears also on the patent that was issued to Mrs. Jesse De Hart, for the adjacent 82 acres, in fractional Section 19, bordering on the river; and the expression seems to refer particularly, if not only, to the area of the land conveyed. The defendant attaches great importance to these references to the official plat of survey in the State Land Office, because the only official plat of survey in the State Land Office at that time showed that the shell mound, or elevation, which is now in contest, was located entirely within the 162.07 acres described in the two patents that were issued to the De Harts. The official plat of survey, in that respect, was wrong, because the section lines in that township were only partially surveyed in the field; and the location of the shell mound, or elevation, now in contest, was shown on the plat about half a mile north from its actual location on the ground. On the plat the mound is located on the extreme north end of Deer Island, on the west side thereof, bordering on the Atchafalaya River. The actual location of the mound, as shown by a survey made after this suit was filed, is about midway between the north end and the south end of Deer Island, on the west side thereof, bordering on the Atchafalaya River. Deer Island is about three-quarters of a mile long, measured along the east bank of the Atchafalaya River. The island has a maximum width of about a third of its length, and an area of about 100 acres, or less. It is bounded on the southeast side *567 by Deer Island Bayou, for the distance of about halfway around the east side of the island, and is bounded on the northeast side by a smaller bayou, which is a continuation of Deer Island Bayou, and which extends from the north end of Deer Island Bayou, around the northeast side of the island, to the Atchafalaya River.

All of Deer Island except that part of the north end which is within the De Hart patents, forms part of a vast area of marsh land — 126,000 acres — belonging to the plaintiff in this suit. Therefore, the shell mound, or elevation, claimed by the plaintiff and occupied by the defendant, is within the vast area covered by the plaintiff’s title deeds. The defendant claims that the patents which were issued to his grandparents conveyed title to the shell mound, or elevation, now in contest, because of the reference, in the patents, to the official plat of survey then on file in the State Land Office, which plat of survey represented to the purchasers of the land from the State that the shell mound, or elevation, was within the area described in the patents. Our opinion, however, is that the mere reference to the official plat of survey, which indicated that there was a shell mound, or an elevation, within the area described in the patents, did not convey title to the shell mound, or elevation, which was not within the area described, but was half a mile away from it. If the shell mound, or elevation, had been described in terms, in the patents, so as to indicate that the intention was to convey title for the shell mound, or elevation, wherever it might be actually located on the land, then the description of the sectional subdivisions might be disregarded. But the land that was conveyed by the patents was described therein according to sectional subdivisions which stated correctly the exact area and location of the land that was conveyed. The picture of the shell mound, or elevation, on the official plat of survey, which is referred to in the patents, merely deceived the De Harts, with regard to the character and the actual location of the land which their patents called for.

The defendant’s plea of prescription of ten years is founded upon the fact that an examination of the official plat of survey, referred to in the patents, would have indicated that the patents conveyed title for the shell mound, or elevation, now in contest. It is true that, in determining whether a description in a deed is sufficient to support a plea of prescription of ten years, resort may be had to another public record, such as a plat of survey, if it is referred to in the deed. Frantom v. Nelson, 142 La. 850, 77 So. 767; Leader Realty Co. v. Taylor, 147 La. 256, 84 So. 648. But the two patents, as well as the plat of survey referred to in the patents under which the De Harts took possession of the shell mound, or elevation, now in contest, described accurately a tract of land half a mile distant from this shell mound, or elevation. Hence the doctrine that seems appropriate to this case is that possession of a tract of land other than the tract described in the possessor’s title cannot support a plea of prescription of ten years. Albert Hanson *569 Lumber Co. v. Angelloz, 118 La. 861, 862, 43 So. 529; Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v. H. Weston Lumber Co., 144 La. 186, 80 So. 249.

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Bluebook (online)
188 So. 700, 192 La. 561, 1939 La. LEXIS 1111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/continental-land-fur-co-v-lacoste-la-1939.