Continental Indus, v. Coltec Indus. CV-96-264-JD 02/04/97 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Continental Industries, Inc.
v. Civil No. 96-264-JD
Coltec Industries, Inc.
O R D E R
The plaintiff and counterclaim-defendant, Continental
Industries, Inc. ("Continental"), brought this action under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, against the
defendant and counterclaim-plaintiff, Coltec Industries, Inc.
("Coltec"). Before the court is Continental's motion to dismiss
Coltec's counterclaims (document no. 9).
Background
This action concerns environmental contamination of a site
located on Monument Road in Hinsdale, New Hampshire. Coltec and
its predecessors-in-interest1 owned and operated a manufacturing
operation at the site, which is now owned by Continental. From
approximately 1967 through 1977, Coltec's operation used the
'Coltec's predecessors-in-interest at the site are Pratt & Whitney, Inc. and Coltec Industries Operating Corporation. This order refers to Coltec generally to denote either Coltec or its relevant predecessor-in-interest. contaminant perchloroethylene (PCE) as a chemical degreaser for
metal drill bits and end mills at the site. Continental alleges
that Coltec periodically discharged PCE into a drywell on the
site.
Coltec sold the site to Continental in 1977. Continental
subseguently discovered that the site was contaminated by haz
ardous wastes, including PCE. It instituted this action against
Coltec, seeking, inter alia, monetary damages representing the
costs of cleaning up the site and a declaratory judgment that
Coltec is liable to Continental for future response costs.
Coltec filed a six-count counterclaim against Continental,
asserting the following: (1) Continental is jointly and
severably liable to Coltec for all response costs on a cost
recovery theory under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); (2) Coltec is entitled
to a declaratory judgment that Continental is liable to Coltec
for future necessary costs of response; (3) if Coltec is liable
under CERCLA, then Continental is liable to Coltec for contri
bution under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f); (4) Coltec is entitled to a
declaration of the rights and duties of itself and Continental
arising from this dispute; (5) Coltec is entitled to statutory
contribution from Continental under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ("RSA")
§ 147-B:10; and (6) Coltec is entitled to statutory contribution
from Continental in accordance with RSA § 507:7-f.
2 Continental has moved to dismiss Coltec's counterclaims
against it, asserting that (1) as a party liable under CERCLA
Coltec cannot maintain a cost recovery action against
Continental, and (2) because Coltec has not shown that
Continental polluted the site it cannot maintain a contribution
claim against Continental.2
Discussion
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is one of
limited inguiry, focusing not on "whether a [party] will
ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer
evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 236 (1974). Accordingly, the court must take the factual
averments contained in the counterclaim as true, "indulging every
reasonable inference helpful to the [counterclaim] plaintiff's
cause." Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 958
F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Dartmouth Review v.
Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989). Great
specificity is not reguired to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
"[I]t is enough for a plaintiff to sketch an actionable claim by
Continental's first argument is directed at Coltec's first two counterclaims and its second argument is directed at the remaining counterclaims.
3 means of 'a generalized statement of facts from which the
defendant will be able to frame a responsive pleading.'" Garita,
958 F.2d at 17 (guoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (1990)). In the end, the
court may grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "'only if
it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the
plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.'" Garita, 958
F.2d at 17 (guoting Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaqa-Belendez, 903
F .2d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 1990)) .
For a private-action plaintiff to prevail in a cost recovery
action under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) it must
prove that (1) a release of a "hazardous substance" from the subject "facility" occurred or is threatened; (2) the defendant comes within any of four categories of "covered persons," which include current owners or operators of the facility, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (B), as well as the owners and operators of the facility at the time the contamination occurred; (3) the release or threatened release has caused (or may cause) the claimant to incur response costs; and (4) the response costs are "necessary" and "consistent with the national contingency plan."
In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 931 (1st Cir. 1993)
(footnote omitted). Coltec's counterclaim asserts that (1) the
site is a "facility," (2) Continental currently owns and operates
the site, (3) the site contains "hazardous substances" which have
been released or threaten to be released from it, and (4) Coltec
has incurred and will continue to incur "necessary" costs of
4 "response" because of the release of such substances. Coltec's
Answer and Counterclaim, at 17-18. Coltec also claims that at
some point Continental used organic solvents as part of its
operation at the site and that Continental "owned and/or operated
the Site at the time of disposal of hazardous substances at the
site." Id. at 17, 18. If Coltec proves these assertions, it
would be entitled to a cost recovery against Continental. See
Hemingway, 993 F.2d at 931.
Despite the fact that Coltec has stated a cognizable
counterclaim under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 against Continental,
Continental argues that Coltec's counterclaims should be
dismissed because "a liable party, like Coltec, may not maintain
a cost recovery action under CERCLA but may only assert a
contribution claim based on the parties proportionate fault for
the counterclaim." In addition. Continental argues that "Coltec
has failed to allege any facts to support its contribution
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Continental Indus, v. Coltec Indus. CV-96-264-JD 02/04/97 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Continental Industries, Inc.
v. Civil No. 96-264-JD
Coltec Industries, Inc.
O R D E R
The plaintiff and counterclaim-defendant, Continental
Industries, Inc. ("Continental"), brought this action under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, against the
defendant and counterclaim-plaintiff, Coltec Industries, Inc.
("Coltec"). Before the court is Continental's motion to dismiss
Coltec's counterclaims (document no. 9).
Background
This action concerns environmental contamination of a site
located on Monument Road in Hinsdale, New Hampshire. Coltec and
its predecessors-in-interest1 owned and operated a manufacturing
operation at the site, which is now owned by Continental. From
approximately 1967 through 1977, Coltec's operation used the
'Coltec's predecessors-in-interest at the site are Pratt & Whitney, Inc. and Coltec Industries Operating Corporation. This order refers to Coltec generally to denote either Coltec or its relevant predecessor-in-interest. contaminant perchloroethylene (PCE) as a chemical degreaser for
metal drill bits and end mills at the site. Continental alleges
that Coltec periodically discharged PCE into a drywell on the
site.
Coltec sold the site to Continental in 1977. Continental
subseguently discovered that the site was contaminated by haz
ardous wastes, including PCE. It instituted this action against
Coltec, seeking, inter alia, monetary damages representing the
costs of cleaning up the site and a declaratory judgment that
Coltec is liable to Continental for future response costs.
Coltec filed a six-count counterclaim against Continental,
asserting the following: (1) Continental is jointly and
severably liable to Coltec for all response costs on a cost
recovery theory under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); (2) Coltec is entitled
to a declaratory judgment that Continental is liable to Coltec
for future necessary costs of response; (3) if Coltec is liable
under CERCLA, then Continental is liable to Coltec for contri
bution under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f); (4) Coltec is entitled to a
declaration of the rights and duties of itself and Continental
arising from this dispute; (5) Coltec is entitled to statutory
contribution from Continental under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ("RSA")
§ 147-B:10; and (6) Coltec is entitled to statutory contribution
from Continental in accordance with RSA § 507:7-f.
2 Continental has moved to dismiss Coltec's counterclaims
against it, asserting that (1) as a party liable under CERCLA
Coltec cannot maintain a cost recovery action against
Continental, and (2) because Coltec has not shown that
Continental polluted the site it cannot maintain a contribution
claim against Continental.2
Discussion
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is one of
limited inguiry, focusing not on "whether a [party] will
ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer
evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 236 (1974). Accordingly, the court must take the factual
averments contained in the counterclaim as true, "indulging every
reasonable inference helpful to the [counterclaim] plaintiff's
cause." Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 958
F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Dartmouth Review v.
Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989). Great
specificity is not reguired to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
"[I]t is enough for a plaintiff to sketch an actionable claim by
Continental's first argument is directed at Coltec's first two counterclaims and its second argument is directed at the remaining counterclaims.
3 means of 'a generalized statement of facts from which the
defendant will be able to frame a responsive pleading.'" Garita,
958 F.2d at 17 (guoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (1990)). In the end, the
court may grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "'only if
it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the
plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.'" Garita, 958
F.2d at 17 (guoting Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaqa-Belendez, 903
F .2d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 1990)) .
For a private-action plaintiff to prevail in a cost recovery
action under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) it must
prove that (1) a release of a "hazardous substance" from the subject "facility" occurred or is threatened; (2) the defendant comes within any of four categories of "covered persons," which include current owners or operators of the facility, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (B), as well as the owners and operators of the facility at the time the contamination occurred; (3) the release or threatened release has caused (or may cause) the claimant to incur response costs; and (4) the response costs are "necessary" and "consistent with the national contingency plan."
In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 931 (1st Cir. 1993)
(footnote omitted). Coltec's counterclaim asserts that (1) the
site is a "facility," (2) Continental currently owns and operates
the site, (3) the site contains "hazardous substances" which have
been released or threaten to be released from it, and (4) Coltec
has incurred and will continue to incur "necessary" costs of
4 "response" because of the release of such substances. Coltec's
Answer and Counterclaim, at 17-18. Coltec also claims that at
some point Continental used organic solvents as part of its
operation at the site and that Continental "owned and/or operated
the Site at the time of disposal of hazardous substances at the
site." Id. at 17, 18. If Coltec proves these assertions, it
would be entitled to a cost recovery against Continental. See
Hemingway, 993 F.2d at 931.
Despite the fact that Coltec has stated a cognizable
counterclaim under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 against Continental,
Continental argues that Coltec's counterclaims should be
dismissed because "a liable party, like Coltec, may not maintain
a cost recovery action under CERCLA but may only assert a
contribution claim based on the parties proportionate fault for
the counterclaim." In addition. Continental argues that "Coltec
has failed to allege any facts to support its contribution
counterclaims, as there is no evidence Continental contributed to
the contamination at the property." Both arguments are
unavailing.
Continental's first argument fails because Continental has
not yet established that Coltec is a liable party under CERCLA.
Continental has asserted Coltec's liability and may ultimately
prevail on this claim, but Continental assumes a resolution in
5 its favor of the question that lies at the heart of the very
controversy with which this lawsuit is concerned.3
Continental's second argument also fails. Although
Continental has asserted that there is no evidence that it
polluted the site and thus it cannot be liable for contribution,
Coltec's assertion that Continental "owned and/or operated the
site at the time of disposal of hazardous substances at the
site," if proven, would entitle Coltec to contribution from
Continental with respect to those costs. Taking the counterclaim
and the facts alleged therein in the light most favorable to
Coltec, the court finds that Coltec has "sketch[ed] an actionable
claim." See Garita, 958 F.2d at 17.
Continental cites United Techs. Corp. v. Browninq-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994), in support of its assertion. Its reliance on United is misplaced. Although in United the First Circuit held that a party liable under CERCLA could not pursue a cost recovery claim but must instead seek contribution, there the party seeking to assert a cost recovery claim had entered into a consent decree establishing its own liability. See id. at 97, 101. Because here Coltec maintains that it is not liable under CERCLA, at this stage it is not barred from seeking a cost recovery from Continental.
6 Conclusion
For the reasons stated above. Continental's motion to
dismiss Coltec's counterclaims (document no. 9) is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. Chief Judge
February 4, 1997
cc: Mark C. Rouvalis, Esquire George R. Moore, Esquire Charles E. Merrill, Esquire John R. Mayo, Esquire Daniel P. Luker, Esquire