MERHIGE, District Judge.
This matter comes before this 28 U.S.C. § 2281 three judge district court on remand from the United States Supreme Court for “further consideration in light of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona [433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810].” Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 433 U.S. 917, 97 S.Ct. 2993, 53 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1977). In its order, the Supreme Court vacated this court’s prior judgment, reported at 427 F.Supp. 506 (E.D.Va.1976).
The facts of the instant case were stated at length in Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. American Bar Association, 427 F.Supp. 506, 508-512 (E.D.Va.1976), and shall, therefore, be recounted now only briefly. Plaintiffs, Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (hereinafter “Consumers Union”) and Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (hereinafter “Consumers Council”), are non-profit consumer organizations which have brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and reimbursement from defendants for their costs and attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this action.
Defendants, Virginia State Bar (hereinafter “State Bar”), the Supreme Court of Virginia, Howard W. Dobbins, Rothwell J. Lillard and the Honorable Lawrence W. I’Anson, were all responsible, in varying degrees, for the adoption, interpretation, and/or enforcement of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Virginia State Bar.1
In 1974, plaintiff Consumers Union, through questionnaires, sought to elicit certain information from all Arlington County, Virginia attorneys who were licensed to practice law in Virginia; Consumers Union planned to use the information it received in publication of a directory that was intended to help consumers select and evaluate Arlington County attorneys. Much of the information which Consumers Union solicited and planned to publish in the directory, however, was data which, if disseminated to the public, would violate certain Vir[1058]*1058ginia Code of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter “State Bar Code”) Disciplinary Rule 2-102(A)(6) prohibitions on lawyer advertising.
Plaintiffs, recognizing that few, if any, Arlington County attorneys would risk professional disciplinary sanctions by sending information for use in a publication which would violate State Bar Code rules, “. . . seek a declaration that the defendants have violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs and their members to gather, publish and receive factual information in reference to attorneys practicing in Arlington County, Virginia, and seek additionally an injunction permanently enjoining the enforcement and operation of [State Bar Code Disciplinary Rule 2-102(A)(6)]. . Jurisdiction over the action is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).” Consumers Union, supra, 427 F.Supp. at 508.
First Amendment Claims:
In this Court’s previous, now vacated opinion, the majority held that both the non-fee information2 and the information on attorneys’ initial consultation fees which plaintiffs sought to include in their directory was commercial speech protected by the First Amendment, and made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court found that State Bar Code Disciplinary Rule 2-102(A)(6) (hereinafter “State Bar Code DR2-102(A)(6)” or “DR2-102(A)(6)”) was overbroad and unconstitutionally infringed upon plaintiffs’ rights to receive and gather consumer information. The Court therefore permanently enjoined defendants from enforcing the State Bar Rules and Regulations against publishing such information. Consumers Union, supra, 427 F.Supp. at 523.
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), reinforces our prior opinion as to the unconstitutionality of the State Bar Rules’ prohibition against publication of both the non-fee information and attorneys’ initial consultation fees information at issue in this case. The Court therefore reinstates and reissues its original opinion and order as to these issues. See Consumers Union, supra, 427 F.Supp. at 517-523.
Furthermore, in light of Bates, this Court holds that plaintiffs are entitled to gather and publish, and their members are entitled to receive, truthful information as to the fees at which the listed lawyers will perform the routine legal services enumerated in plaintiffs’ questionnaire.3
The heart of the dispute before us today is whether lawyers may constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain routine services will be performed . whether the State may prevent the publication in the newspaper of appellants’ truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services. We rule simply that the flow of such information may not be restrained
Bates, supra, 433 U.S. at 367-68, 384, 97 S.Ct. at 2701-2709. (Emphasis in original).
Attorneys Fees:
Plaintiffs have asked this Court to grant them reasonable counsel fees, as well as their costs in prosecuting this action. Defendants have not opposed plaintiffs’ motion that defendants be ordered to pay costs.4 Indeed, it is well established that a [1059]*1059federal court may tax costs against state parties to federal law suits, in the same way that it may tax costs against any other federal court litigant. See e. g., Rule 54(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 696, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978); Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 77, 48 S.Ct. 97, 72 L.Ed. 168 (1926); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991, 999 (3rd Cir. 1976).
Defendants do contend, however, that this Court may not, or, in the alternative, should not, allow plaintiffs to recover attorneys fees from defendants. The Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act provides that
. In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of Section . 1983 ... of this Title (42 U.S.C.), . the Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (emphasis added).
Despite the broad language of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, giving this Court discretion in “any action or proceeding” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to allow the prevailing party attorneys fees as part of costs, the state defendants assert that the doctrines of sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and “good faith” immunity preclude awarding attorneys fees against them. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978), decided after defendants filed their brief in this case, the Supreme Court held that neither the sovereign immunity nor “good faith” defenses insulate state defendants, when sued in their official capacities, from liability for attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Hutto v. Finney, at 693-700, 98 S.Ct. 2565.
The only remaining issue raised by defendants as to this court’s jurisdiction, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to order that defendants pay plaintiffs reasonable attorneys fees is whether defendants are protected by judicial immunity from such an award. Defendants I’Anson, Dobbins and Lillard, sued in both their official and their individual capacities, are absolutely immune, in their individual capacities, from personal liability for plaintiffs’ attorneys fees. “Awards against the official in his individual capacity, in contrast, were not to be affected by the statute (42 U.S.C. § 1988)”. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. at 700, 98 S.Ct. at 2579. Defendant I’Anson, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia, is clearly immune, in his individual capacity, from all liability — damages, attorneys fees and other costs — for all of his “judicial acts.”
As early as 1872, the Court recognized that it was “a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872).
The record reflects that defendant Supreme Court of Virginia has the jurisdiction to adopt, modify, or refuse to modify the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility. See Virginia Code § 54-48 (1974). Chief Justice I’Anson’s actions, as a member of the Supreme Court of Virginia, relating to the Court’s failure to amend or repeal DR2-102(A)(6), were clearly judicial acts within the Court’s jurisdiction; Chief Justice I’Anson therefore in the instant case enjoys absolute judicial immunity from individual liability for attorneys fees.
Defendants Dobbins and Lillard likewise have absolute immunity, in their individual capacities, for their acts as officers of the State Bar. The State Bar is the state administrative agency through which the Supreme Court of Virginia regulates the practice of law in that state. The State Bar, in recommending rules and rule changes to the Supreme Court of Virginia, and in interpreting those rules for its members, acts both at the direction of the court and as a quasi-judicial body. Its members, in the [1060]*1060exercise of those quasi-judicial functions are immune from personal liability. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972).
Defendants State Bar and Supreme Court of Virginia, as well as defendants Dobbins, Lillard and I’Anson, in their official capacities, however, are not immune from liability for attorneys fees. Both the extensive legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as well as the numerous court opinions interpreting the statute clearly indicate that all branches and agencies of state governments may be liable for attorneys fees in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.
The Civil Rights Acts, to be effective, depend heavily upon enforcement by private parties such as the instant plaintiffs.
. fee awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain. ... If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, . . . citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.
S.Rep.No.94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 5908, 5910.
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), the Supreme Court recognized that Congress had the power to abolish the common law immunity defenses in actions for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court found, however, that the judicial immunity defense was still viable in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions for damages, because the legislative record of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 gave “. . .no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1218.
In contradistinction to the silence of the legislative record on common law immunities from damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, discussed in Pierson v. Ray, the legislative record of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 clearly enunciated Congress’s intention to make all common law immunities inapplicable in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 actions for attorney fees.
Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by S. 2278 (42 U.S.C. § 1988) in accordance with Congress’ powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 [Defendants in these cases are often State or local bodies or state or local officials. In such cases it is intended that the attorneys’ fees, like other items of cost, will be collected either directly from the official, in his official capacity, from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the State or local government (whether or not the agency or government is a named party).
S.Rep.No.94-1011, at 5, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1976, at 5913. (Footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
The instant action is one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a case “covered by” 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and therefore a case in which attorneys fees normally should be awarded to the prevailing plaintiffs. The previously quoted language of the statute itself reinforces this interpretation. “The Act itself could not be broader. It applies to ‘any’ action brought to enforce certain civil rights laws.” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2575, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978).
Furthermore, statements in the congressional record specifically reject extending Pierson v. Ray judicial immunity from damages to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 actions for attorneys fees.
[I]n some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy17 [citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)]. Consequently awarding counsel fees to prevailing plaintiffs in such litigation is particularly important and necessary if Federal civil and constitutional rights are to be adequately protected. To be sure, in a large number of cases . only injunctive relief is sought, and prevailing [1061]*1061plaintiffs should ordinarily recover their counsel fees.
H.R.Rep.No.94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976).
In light of the clear wording of the statute and the extensive legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, we hold that this Court has the authority to order the state defendants in this case to pay plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys fees. See also, Alsager v. District Court, 447 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Iowa 1977) (attorneys fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against defendants, including the county court and the county court judge); White v. Crowell, 434 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.1977) (per curiam) (three judge district court awarded 42 U.S.C. § 1988 attorneys fees against the State of Tennessee for the state legislature’s unconstitutional ad hoc partial reapportionment).5
Defendants next contend that this Court should exercise its discretion to deny plaintiffs’ request for attorneys fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that, in any action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “ . . . the Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” (Emphasis added).
A court, in exercising its discretion, should ordinarily award reasonable attorneys fees to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff “ . . . unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). This standard is applicable in all 42 U.S.C. § 1988 actions for attorneys fees. S.Rep.No.94-1011, at 4, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1976, at 5912; H.Rep.No.94-1558, at 6 (1976); Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1300 (5th Cir. 1978); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 557 (8th Cir. 1977).
Defendants cite several factors which they contend constitute “special circumstances” which would render unjust an award of attorneys fees to plaintiffs. Defendants first assert that a “special circumstance” is the importance of maintaining the independence of the state judiciary to regulate the practice of law. Awarding attorneys fees in this case, so defendants contend, would promote undue timidity in interpreting those regulations.
We find this argument unpersuasive. All state officials and governmental units subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits are entrusted with safeguarding citizens’ constitutional rights. Those, including defendants, who must exercise discretion in performing their legislative, executive or judicial duties are afforded varying degrees of immunity from damage actions, so that they may exercise that discretion without fear of personal consequences. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 did not affect the common law immunities from damages, but provided that such immunities would be inapplicable in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 actions for attorneys fees. H.Rep.No.94-1558, p. 9 (1976), supra.
If this Court held that defendants were immune from being required to pay plaintiffs’ attorney fees, the result would be that private parties with meritorious civil rights claims against governmental defendants would be prevented by the specter of substantial legal costs from bringing civil rights actions for injunctive relief. This is precisely the impediment to private enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts which Congress, through 42 U.S.C. § 1988, sought to eradicate. “If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys fees, fewer aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.” H.Rep.No.94-1558 at 6 (1976), quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., supra.
Defendants additionally state that it is merely fortuitous that the instant case was pending at the time the 42 U.S.C. § 1988 attorney fee provision was enacted, as the case was tried five months previous to the [1062]*1062attorneys fee act becoming law. This argument is irrelevant to any discussion of “special circumstances”, however, since Congress clearly intended the act “to apply to all cases pending on the date of enactment . . . .” H.Rep.No.94-1558, at 4, n. 6 (1976), citing Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1976); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 695 n. 23, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978); Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1978).
Defendants argument that plaintiffs should not receive attorneys fees because their own staff counsel, and not outside attorneys, prepared the case, is equally without merit. The Civil Rights Acts provide for awards of attorneys fees to prevailing plaintiffs regardless of whether the plaintiffs’ organizational counsel prosecuted the action, or whether the plaintiffs were represented by attorneys of a public interest organization. See Reynolds v. Coomey, 567 F.2d 1166, 1167 (1st Cir. 1978); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1147-48 (4th Cir. 1975).
Finally, defendants contend that they should not be ordered to pay attorneys fees because plaintiffs accomplished nothing of any public benefit in the instant case. See, Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 843, 59 L.Ed.2d 38 (1979); Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 433 F.Supp. 1369 (N.D.N.Y.1977). Defendants claim that the matters on which plaintiffs have prevailed in the instant case add virtually nothing to the holding in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).
• Defendants’ contentions that plaintiffs’ suit has resulted in little or no benefit to the public are totally at odds with the facts. Plaintiffs brought this suit because defendant State Bar had ruled that DR2-102(A)(6) made it inappropriate for Virginia lawyers to include their names and information, which this Court has held to be constitutionally protected, in a legal directory. The directory was to be published as a public service to Arlington County area consumers, and was to be sold at its cost of production. As a result of the State Bar’s interpretation of DR2-102(A)(6), few, if any, Arlington County lawyers would respond to Consumers Union’s questionnaire.
Not only was the public deprived of constitutionally protected information at the time this suit was instituted, but the deprivation continues to this day.
Defendant Supreme Court of Virginia still has not amended the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility to conform to the requirements of the Constitution as enunciated in Bates, and the Consumers Union directory has yet to be published. In December, 1978, a Virginia Beach, Virginia attorney was indicted under two Virginia statutes for publication of an advertisement that was virtually identical to the advertisement which the Supreme Court in Bates found constitutionally protected, but which DR2-102(A)(6) still prohibited. The chilling effect of DR2-102(A)(6) on First Amendment freedoms is yet extant, even if not subject to objective calculations.
Recognizing, as discussed earlier, that good faith is not a defense to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 liability for attorneys fees, nonetheless special circumstances would make unjust any award of attorneys fees against defendant State Bar or against defendants Dobbins and Lillard in their official capacities as State Bar officers. The Supreme Court of Virginia, and not defendants State Bar, Dobbins or Lillard, has the power to change the State Bar Code disciplinary rules. The record reflects that defendant State Bar and its appropriate officers endeavored to persuade the Supreme Court of Virginia to amend DR2-102(A)(6) to conform to what they deemed to be constitutional guidelines. Defendant Lillard presided over a committee of the Virginia State Bar which recommended to the State Bar council that DR2-102(A)(6) be amended; defendant Dobbins presided over the State Bar council which petitioned the Supreme Court of Virginia to change DR2-102(A)(6). Despite these entreaties, the Supreme Court oT Virginia declined to amend DR2[1063]*1063102(A)(6). .Under these particular facts, it would be unjust to require the State Bar defendants to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys fees. See Chastang v. Flynn and Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1045 (4th Cir. 1976).
Similar circumstances, however, are not present to make unjust an award of attorneys fees against the Supreme Court of Virginia in its official capacity, and defendant Chief Justice I’Anson in his official capacity. The Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to amend State Bar Code DR2102(A)(6) to conform with the clear constitutional requirements of Bates — a decision handed down June 29, 1977, more than twenty months ago. Indeed, this district court, in the interest of comity has delayed the instant opinion to the point that any further delay would be, as we view it, dereliction of our responsibilities.
The Supreme Court of Virginia, too, denied defendant State Bar’s petition to amend DR2-102(A)(6) to conform with the American Bar Association proposals and the perceived constitutional requirements of Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), a case which set forth certain First Amendment protections for commercial speech. It would hardly be unjust to order the Supreme Court of Virginia defendants to pay plaintiffs reasonable attorneys fees in light of their continued failure and apparent refusal to amend State Code DR2-102(A)(6) to conform with constitutional requirements.
Counsel for the Supreme Court of Virginia defendants and counsel for plaintiffs will be directed to attempt to reach an agreement on a reasonable sum as plaintiffs’ attorneys fees, and to submit any such agreement to this Court. In the event the parties fail to reach agreement, this Court shall determine an appropriate sum to which plaintiffs are entitled.