Constantinovici v. Bondi

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: October 10, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-02405
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 ADONIS CONSTANTINOVICI, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02405-RBM-AHG

10 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 11 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. § 2241 12 PAMELA BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL

et al., 13 [Doc. 1] Defendants. 14 15 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Adonis Constantinovici’s (“Petitioner”) 19 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). 20 Along with his Petition, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion or Request for Expedited 21 Handling Under 28 U.S.C. § 1657 with Reference to 28 U.S.C. Ch. 153 (“Motion to 22 Expedite”) (Doc. 2) and an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Under 23 FRCP 65(b) and Preliminary Injunction Under FRCP 65(a) (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 3). 24 Respondents filed a Response (“Response”) (Doc. 8), and Petitioner filed a Reply 25 (“Reply”) (Doc. 9). 26 The Court held a hearing on October 1, 2025. For the reasons set forth below, the 27 Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 Petitioner, formerly a citizen of Romania, is currently detained by U.S. Immigration 4 and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in San Diego, 5 California. (Doc. 1 ¶ 16.)1 Petitioner states he is “currently stateless” and that he “lost his 6 Romanian citizenship in 1987 when he illegally crossed the border from Romania to 7 Hungary.” (Id. ¶ 2.) On April 17, 2001, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed. 8 (Id.; see Doc. 13-1 at 1.) The order of removal became final on May 17, 2001. (Doc. 1 9 ¶ 3.) On May 18, 2001, Petitioner was released under an order of supervision pursuant to 10 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e) (the “Order of Supervision”). (Id. ¶ 4; see Doc. 1-3 at 1–4.) 11 On February 10, 2010, Petitioner was arrested for a DUI. (Id. ¶ 5; Doc. 1-3 at 2.) 12 Shortly after he was released from county jail, Petitioner was re-detained and taken into 13 ICE custody. (Doc. 1 ¶ 5.) On October 7, 2010, Petitioner was released on his existing 14 Order of Supervision. (Doc. 1-3 at 1–2; Doc. 8-1, Declaration of Denise E. Barroga 15 [“Barroga Decl.”] ¶ 5.) The record reflects that Petitioner was re-detained by ICE at some 16 point between October 7, 2010 and November 2010. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6, 10; Doc. 8-1 17 [Barroga Decl.] ¶¶ 5–6 (stating Petitioner was released on an Order of Supervision on 18 October 7, 2010 and on August 23, 2011).) “On November 18, 2010, while detained by 19 immigration, [Petitioner] filed a Motion to Reopen and Reconsider, Freedom of 20 Information Act Request Regarding Former Counsel and a Motion for Stay of Removal.” 21 (Doc. 1 ¶ 6; see Doc. 13-1 at 3.) An immigration judge denied the motions on December 22 8, 2010. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7–8; see Doc. 13-1 at 2–4.) Petitioner appealed the denial, which the 23 Board of Immigration Appeals denied on February 14, 2011. (Doc. 1 ¶ 9; Doc. 8-2 at 4.) 24 On or about August 23, 2011 (Doc. 8-1 [Barroga Decl.] ¶ 6), Petitioner was released 25 from ICE custody on his existing Order of Supervision “because it was determined that he 26 27 28 1 1 had demonstrated to ICE’s satisfaction that his removal would not occur in the reasonably 2 foreseeable future.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 10.) According to Petitioner, it was “also necessarily 3 determined at that time that [he] did not present an ongoing danger or a flight risk.” (Id. 4 ¶ 11 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e)(2)–(6).) Petitioner “was required to complete annual (and 5 often more frequent) check ins with ICE through August 2025.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Petitioner’s 6 most recent check-in, prior to his arrest, was in July 2025 where he was informed that his 7 assigned immigration officer was unavailable. (Id. ¶ 14.) 8 On August 21, 2025, while attending a check-in required under the conditions of his 9 release, Petitioner was re-detained by ICE. (Id. ¶ 15.) Petitioner was detained pursuant to 10 an arrest warrant issued on a DHS Form I-200. (Doc. 8-2 at 3; see Doc. 13-1 at 7.) On 11 September 17, 2025, 27 days after Petitioner was arrested and two days after filing this 12 lawsuit, Deportation Officer M. Aguilar served Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of 13 Release stating the following: 14 This letter is to inform you that your order of supervision has been revoked, and you will be detained in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs 15 Enforcement (ICE) at this time. This decision has been made based on a 16 review of your official alien file and a determination that there are changed circumstances in your case. 17

18 ICE has determined that you can be expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to the outstanding order of removal against you. On April 17, 19 2001, you were ordered removed to Romania by an authorized U.S. DHS/DOJ 20 official. Your case is under current review for removal to Romania.

21 Based on the above, and pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 / 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, you 22 are to remain in ICE custody at this time. You will promptly be afforded an informal interview at which you will be given an opportunity to respond to 23 the reasons for the revocation. You may submit any evidence or information 24 you wish to be reviewed in support of your release. If you are not released after the informal interview, you will receive notification of a new review, 25 which will occur within approximately three months of the date of this notice. 26 27 (Doc. 13-1 at 5–6.) Petitioner currently remains in ICE custody. 28 1 B. Procedural History 2 On September 15, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant Petition challenging the 3 lawfulness of his ongoing detention against Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, 4 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Todd M. Lyons, Marcos Charles, Patrick 5 Divver, Christopher J. LaRose, and ICE (collectively, “Respondents” or the 6 “Government”). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 33–40.) The next day, Petitioner filed the Motion to Expedite 7 and the TRO Motion. (Docs. 2, 3.) On September 17, 2025, the Court issued an Order 8 Requiring Response to Habeas Corpus Petition and the TRO Motion. (Doc. 5.) 9 Respondents filed a Response in Opposition to Petitioner’s Habeas Petition and 10 Application for Temporary Restraining Order on September 19, 2025 (“Response”). (Doc. 11 8.) On September 21, 2025, Petitioner filed a Reply (“Reply”). (Doc. 9.) 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 14 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 15 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 16 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 17 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a 18 district court has the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in 19 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 20 § 2241(c)(3). The Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in 21 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 22 2241(c)(3). 23 III. DISCUSSION 24 Petitioner challenges his detention as unlawful based on the following grounds: 25 (1) Respondents failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 prior to re-detaining him and 26 revoking his release under the Order of Supervision; (2) such non-compliance violated his 27 due process rights; and (3) his continued detention violates the Immigration & Nationality 28 Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)–(3), and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 1 because he has accrued more than six months of post-removal detention and the 2 Government has failed to rebut his prior showing that his removal is not reasonably 3 foreseeable (Doc. 9 at 6–8 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699).) 4 Respondents do not respond to Petitioner’s arguments concerning ICE’s regulatory 5 violations. Rather, Respondents argue Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. 6 § 1231(a) because “ICE revoked his Order of Supervision for the purpose of executing his 7 final order of removal.” (Doc. 8 at 5–6.) Respondents also argue that Petitioner’s claims 8 are jurisdictionally barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). (Id. at 3–4.) As this Court has an 9 obligation to “determine that [it has] jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits” of any 10 case, it will first address Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments. Lance v. Coffman, 549 11 U.S. 437, 439 (2007). For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds it has jurisdiction 12 to consider the Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court further concludes that 13 ICE violated Petitioner’s due process rights in revoking Petitioner’s release without 14 complying with the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions that afford fundamental 15 procedural safeguards to noncitizens.2 16 A. Jurisdiction 17 1. Habeas Corpus 18 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality 19 of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 20 custody.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484. “[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 21 § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to immigration detention that are sufficiently 22 independent of the merits of [a] removal order.” Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 23 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2011)). 24 In the Petition, Petitioner seeks his immediate release from ICE custody, which he 25 contends violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and 26

27 2 Having reached this conclusion, the Court need not address Petitioner’s remaining 28 1 the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 91–105.) Because 2 Petitioner is in custody under the authority of the United States, and he claims he is being 3 detained in violation of federal law, Petitioner has properly invoked the Court’s habeas 4 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 5 2. Judicial Review under the INA 6 Respondents argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant 7 to 8 U.S.C § 1252(g). (Doc. 8 at 3–4.) This statutory bar against judicial review precludes 8 this Court from exercising jurisdiction over the Government’s decision to “commence 9 proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.” 8 U.S.C 10 § 1252(g). However, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted § 1252(g) as applying 11 “only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: [his] ‘decision or action’ 12 to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.- 13 Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 14 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)); see Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) 15 (noting courts have “distinguished between challenges to ICE’s discretion to execute a 16 removal order, which are barred, and challenges to the manner in which ICE executes the 17 removal order, which are not.”). 18 Here, Petitioner does not challenge the legitimacy of his April 2001 order of removal 19 or ICE’s discretionary authority to decide “when” or “whether” to execute such removal 20 order. See Rauda v. Jennings, 55 F.4th 773, 777 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Tazu v. Att’y 21 Gen. United States, 975 F.3d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 2020)). Rather, Petitioner challenges his 22 present detention as unlawful, as well as the Government’s authority to re-detain him under 23 the post-removal detention statute without notice and an opportunity to respond. 24 Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims. See Zadvydas, 533 25 U.S. at 687 (confirming that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to 26 hear cases about the detention of individuals with final removal pending their removal). 27 B. Due Process 28 Petitioner challenges his detention as unlawful based on ICE’s decision to revoke 1 his release without providing the required notice and opportunity to be heard. (Doc. 9 at 2 3–5.) Petitioner’s claims therefore implicate the Due Process Clause. 3 The Due Process clause prohibits deprivations of life, liberty, and property without 4 due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. Due process rights extend to noncitizens 5 present in the United States, including those subject to final removal orders. Zadvydas, 6 533 U.S. at 693–94; see Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (“‘It is well established 7 that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal 8 proceedings.” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). The fundamental 9 requirements of procedural due process are that a person be afforded notice and opportunity 10 to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 11 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 12 Section 1231 governs the arrest and detention of noncitizens who have been ordered 13 removed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231. This statute directs the Attorney General of the United 14 States to effect the removal of a noncitizen from this country “within a period of 90 days,” 15 also known as the “removal period.” § 1231(a)(1). It also authorizes detention of the 16 noncitizen during this removal period. § 1231(a)(2). However, once that time passes and 17 after “removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer 18 authorized by statute,” and the noncitizen must be released. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699– 19 700; see 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (“If the alien does not leave or is not removed within the 20 [90-day] removal period, the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under 21 regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.”). 22 The Government has promulgated regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations 23 concerning the release of noncitizens who are subject to a final removal order. See 8 C.F.R. 24 § 241.4; 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. These regulations also govern the revocation of such 25 noncitizens’ release. Both 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) and § 241.13(i)(3) provide that, upon 26 revocation of release, the noncitizen “will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his 27 or her release,” and will be given “an initial informal interview promptly after his or her 28 return to Service custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for 1 revocation stated in the notification.” 2 At the hearing, Respondents suggested revocation procedures were not required 3 when revoking Petitioner’s release because he was re-detained pursuant to § 241.4(l)(2) 4 and the notice and informal interview requirements are set forth in § 241.4(l)(1).3 5 Respondents did not provide any legal support for their interpretation of § 241.4(l) in their 6 briefing or during the hearing. District courts have consistently rejected this argument and 7 held that § 241.4(l)(1)’s procedural requirements apply equally to revocation of a 8 noncitizen’s release pursuant to § 241.4(l)(2). See Diaz v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01079 9 JLT EPG, 2025 WL 2581575, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) (“The Court agrees with those 10 decisions that the notice and interview requirements apply to anyone whose supervision 11 has been revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1).”); Ceesay, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 164 12 (rejecting such interpretation of § 241.4 as it would mean “a noncitizen suspected of 13 violating a condition of release gets more process than a noncitizen . . . who has met his 14 obligations to report.”); Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387 (D. Mass. 2017) 15 (finding an informal interview was required under §§ 241.4 and 241.13 where ICE intended 16 to enforce the petitioner’s removal order but nothing in the record showed it conducted 17 such an interview); M.Q. v. United States, 776 F. Supp. 3d 180, 187, 190, 190 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 18 2025) (holding § 241.4(l) required ICE to provide petitioner, who had not violated 19 conditions of release, with notice and an informal interview). 20 The Court agrees with these courts’ decisions. “[T]he Government has significant 21 discretion to enforce the immigration laws and . . . to revoke an Order of Supervision.” 22 Diaz, 2025 WL 2581575, at *7 (quoting Zhu v. Genalo, No. 1:25-CV-06523 (JLR), 2025 23 WL 2452352, at * 6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2025)). However, “the government’s discretion 24 to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.” 25 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017); see M.S.L. v. Bostock, Civ. No. 26

27 3 Hereinafter, all citations are to Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations unless otherwise 28 1 6:25-cv-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *8 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025) (“Although ICE has 2 the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after 3 that individual is released from custody, they have a protected liberty interest in remaining 4 out of custody.”) (quoting Rosado v. Figueroa, No. CV 25-02157 PHX DLR (CDB), 2025 5 WL 2337099, at *12 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025)). 6 Both 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 were intended to “provide due process 7 protections to [noncitizens] following the removal period as they are considered for 8 continued detention, release, and then possible revocation of release . . .” Santamaria 9 Orellana v. Baker, Civil Action No. 25-1788-TDC, 2025 WL 2444087, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 10 25, 2025). Under the Government’s proposed interpretation of this regulation, noncitizens 11 re-detained for violating a condition of release would be entitled to more due process than 12 noncitizens, like Petitioner, who have otherwise complied with their obligations. See 13 Ceesay, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 164 (“Under the government’s interpretation of the regulation, 14 someone arrested based on the revocation of an order of supervision not related to a 15 violation of conditions might spend three months or more in custody before 16 getting any opportunity to contest the person’s detention.”) (emphasis in original); Zhu, 17 2025 WL 2452352, at *7 (“The Government’s interpretation of paragraph 241.4(l) 18 would . . . result in imbalanced procedural safeguards for noncitizens” re-detained under 19 § 241.4(l)(2)). Moreover, ICE’s own statements in the Notice of Revocation also conflict 20 with Respondents’ argument as the Notice incorporates § 241.4(l)’s procedural 21 requirements and states that Petitioner would “promptly be afforded an informal 22 interview.” (Doc. 13-1 at 5.) Even if ICE has discretion to revoke a noncitizen’s release 23 under § 241.4(l)(2), the noncitizen’s liberty interests are still implicated by his or her re- 24 detention. The Court therefore finds such procedural requirements apply to any noncitizen 25 whose supervision is revoked under § 241.4(l), including Petitioner. See Mathews v. Diaz, 26 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, 27 or transitory is entitled to [the Fifth Amendment’s] constitutional protection.”). 28 1 C. Violations of the INA and its Regulations 2 Petitioner asserts that “[t]he central defect in this case is that ICE failed to comply 3 with its own governing regulations.” (Doc. 9 at 3.) Specifically, Petitioner contends that 4 ICE failed to: (1) provide him with notice that his Order of Supervision was revoked; 5 (2) conduct an informal interview or afford Petitioner an opportunity to be heard; and 6 (3) sufficiently demonstrate the changed circumstances that render his removal 7 significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Id. at 4.) 8 As previously noted, both regulations require that “upon revocation of release,” the 9 noncitizen “be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release,” and be afforded 10 “an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford 11 the [noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the 12 notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1); id. § 241.13(i)(3). 13 It is well-established that government agencies are required to follow their own 14 regulations. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); 15 United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is a well-known maxim that 16 agencies must comply with their own regulations.”) (quoting Ramon–Sepulveda v. INS, 17 743 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1984)). “A court’s duty to enforce an agency regulation is 18 most evident when compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution or 19 federal law.” Sanchez v. Barr, 919 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J., concurring) 20 (quoting United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749 (1979)). Numerous district courts, 21 including courts in the Ninth Circuit, “have determined that where ICE fails to follow its 22 own regulations in revoking release, the detention is unlawful and the petitioner’s release 23 must be ordered.” Rokhfirooz v. Larose, Case No.: 25-cv-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 24 2646165, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025) (granting a habeas petition and ordering the 25 petitioner’s release where the Government failed to comply with § 241.13); see Hoac v. 26 Becerra, No. 2:25-cv-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) 27 (finding petitioner was likely to succeed on his unlawful re-detention claim because “there 28 is no indication that an informal interview was provided”); Rombot, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1 387–88 (holding that ICE’s failures to follow the revocation procedures in § 241.4 rendered 2 the petitioner’s detention unlawful); Ceesay, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 164 (“[B]ecause ICE did 3 not follow its own regulations in deciding to redetain [the petitioner], his due process rights 4 were violated, and he is entitled to release.”).4 5 In this case, the record before the Court shows that Petitioner was not given any 6 notice of the reasons for his re-detention prior to his arrest or an opportunity to respond to 7 such reasons. First, despite both regulations requiring notice “upon revocation,” ICE did 8 not provide Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release until almost a month after 9 he was taken into custody and two days after he filed this lawsuit. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) 10 (emphasis added); id. § 241.13(i)(3). The record therefore establishes that Petitioner did 11 not receive notice at any point before, or at the time of, his arrest. See M.S.L., 2025 WL 12 2430267, at *11 (holding ICE failed to provide the petitioner a timely notice of revocation 13 where it was issued “after nearly a month in detention.”). 14 In the same vein, an informal interview is required “promptly after [the noncitizen’s] 15 return to Service custody.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) (emphasis added); § 241.13(i)(3). 16 Nothing in the record indicates that Petitioner was provided with an interview in connection 17 with the revocation of his release or otherwise afforded an opportunity to respond to the 18 reasons for his re-detention. At the hearing, Respondents stated that ICE planned to 19 provide Petitioner with an interview within two days of the hearing—nearly 6 weeks after 20 his arrest. This cannot reasonably be construed as a “prompt” informal interview. See 21 Hoac, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (finding petitioner was likely to succeed on his unlawful 22 23 24 4 The Court was able to identify only one decision where a district court did not grant the 25 petitioner’s release in a similar immigration habeas proceeding. See Medina v. Noem, Case No. 25-cv-1768-ABA, 2025 WL 2306274, at *12 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2025). However, the 26 court in Medina denied the petition without prejudice because the petitioner had “not 27 pointed to authority showing that the remedy for a violation of [§ 241.4] (if such a violation has occurred) is release from detention.” Id. at *11. Unlike in Medina, Petitioner in this 28 1 re-detention claim as “there [was] no indication that an informal interview was provided”). 2 Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner was subject to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, as 3 Petitioner argued in his briefing and at argument, the revocation of his release violated 4 those regulations as well. Petitioner claims that ICE failed to determine “there is a 5 significant likelihood that [he] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future,” as 6 required under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). (Doc. 9 at 4–5.) At the hearing, Respondents’ 7 counsel claimed that ICE’s documented decision to revoke Petitioner’s release was 8 contained in the arrest warrant. The arrest warrant, issued on DHS Form I-200, states 9 “there is probable cause to believe [Petitioner] is removable from the United States. . . . 10 based upon the pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against [Petitioner]. (Doc. 13- 11 1 at 7.) But, as counsel for Petitioner noted, Petitioner’s removal proceedings have not 12 been ongoing since 2001 when he was ordered removed. Apart from the arrest warrant, 13 there is no evidence of ICE’s decision to revoke Petitioner’s release, let alone evidence that 14 ICE determined Petitioner’s removal was significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable 15 future based on any “changed circumstances.” See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). The Court 16 therefore finds that, under any of the potential bases for revocation, Petitioner’s re- 17 detention violated the regulations designed to afford him due process. 18 ICE’s failure to follow such regulations thereby also violated Petitioner’s 19 constitutional due process rights. See Diaz, 2025 WL 2581575, at *7 (“DHS’s failure to 20 follow its own procedural regulations may constitute a due process violation.”); M.S.L., 21 2025 WL 2430267, at *11 (“More fundamentally, ICE’s failure to provide Petitioner with 22 a timely Notice of Revocation or conduct an informal interview until nearly a month after 23 taking her into custody is a grave violation of Petitioner’s due process rights in that they 24 deprived her both of meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard.”); Santamaria 25 Orellana, 2025 WL 2444087, at *8 (“[T]here is absolutely no record of the decision to 26 revoke [the petitioner’s] release . . . which reveals an even more significant due process 27 problem because no one . . . knows with any degree of certainty what legal and factual 28 basis was relied upon in making the determination, which hinders any meaningful 1 || challenge to the decision.”); Grigorian v. Bondi, CASE NO. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2 || 2604573, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025) (“Although [the petitioner’s release] was subject 3 § 241.4(1) and not § 241.13), the Court nevertheless finds that ICE failed to provide 4 || [him] with a meaningful opportunity to contest the revocation of his [order of supervision] 5 ||through an informal interview [in violation of] both ICE’s own regulations and the Due 6 || Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 7 Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. In light of the disposition herein, the Court 8 || declines to address the remaining grounds in the Petition for seeking release. 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly: 11 1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, 12 subject to his preexisting Order of Supervision. 13 2. Petitioner’s Motion to Expedite (Doc. 2) and Motion for TRO (Doc. 3) are therefore 14 DENIED AS MOOT. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 || DATE: October 10, 2025 1 Fa Bormadey Mange 18 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13