ACCEPTED 06-15-00125-CR SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 9/28/2015 5:04:24 PM DEBBIE AUTREY CLERK
NO. 06-15-00125-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT TEXARKANA, TEXAS 9/29/2015 8:33:00 AM TEXARKANA, TEXAS DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk CONSTANTINO RIOS MORALES APPELLANT
VS.
STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
APPEALED FROM THE 249TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF JOHNSON COUNTY, TEXAS CAUSE NO. F48830 HON. D. WAYNE BRIDEWELL, PRESIDING
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Lane E. Rugeley 16 N. Caddo Cleburne, Texas 76031 817-641-4055 Phone 817-641-0003 Fax Email: laner@rugeleylaw.com State Bar No. 17383000 Attorney for Appellant
NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
1 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a complete list of the names and addresses of all parties to the trial court's final judgment, as well as their counsel, if any:
Hon. D. Wayne Bridewell Constantino Rios Morals Judge, 249th Judicial District Court TDCJ No. 1995563 Guinn Justice Center Lynaugh Unit 204 So. Buffalo 1098 S. Hwy. 2037 Cleburne, Texas 76033 Fort Stockton, Texas 79735
Dale Hanna District Attorney Guinn Justice Center 204 S. Buffalo Cleburne, Texas 76033
Bryan Bufkin Lindsey Lehrmann Assistant District Attorneys Guinn Justice Center 204 S. Buffalo Cleburne, Texas 76033
Patrick G. Barkman Trial Attorney for Appellant 13 N. Main Cleburne, Texas 76033
Lane E. Rugeley Appellate Attorney for Appellant 16 N. Caddo St. Cleburne, Texas 76031
2 TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUBJECT PAGE
Identities of Parties and Counsel…………………………………… 2
Table of Contents…………………………………………………… 3
Index of Authorities…………..…………………………………….. 4
Statement of Case…………………………………………………… 10
ISSUE ONE:
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DELIVER – 4 TO 200 GRAMS IN COUNT ONE?
ISSUE TWO:
WHETHER THE COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY DENYING DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL BASED ON THE TRIAL JUDGE’S CONDUCT IN BECOMING AND ADVOCATE OR PROSECUTOR BY INSTRUCTING THE PROSECUTOR TO RECALL A WITNESS AND ASK CERTAIN QUESTIONS BEFORE RELEASING THE WITNESS?
ISSUE THREE:
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL?
ISSUE FOUR:
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS?
3 Statement of Facts………………………………………………… 11
Summary of Argument……………………………………………. 13
Argument and Authorities ………………………………………… 14
Prayer………………...……………………………………………. 34
Certificate of Service……………………………………………… 34
Certificate of Compliance…………………………………………. 35
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Arizona v. Fulminante…………………………………………………. 22 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed.2d 302 (1991)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli…………………………………………………. .. 22 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973)
Jackson v. Virginia…………………………………………………… 15 & 16 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. 560 (1979)
Riley v. California…………………………………………………….. 31 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473,____ L.Ed.___ (2014)
TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
Adelman v. State……………………………………………………… 21 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)
Blue v. State …………………………………………………………. 22 41 S.W.3d 129, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. – 2000),
4 Brown v. State…………………………………………………….. 22 122 S.W.3d 794, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)
Brumit v. State…………………………………………………….. 22 206 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
Cain v. State……………………………………………………… 22 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. – 1999)
Combs v. State……………………………………………………. 15 643 S.W.2d 709, 716-717 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982)
Curry v. State……………………………………………………. 15 30 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
Dickey v. State…………………………………………………… 19 693 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
Dubry v. State……………………………………………………. 17, 18 & 20 582 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)
Foster v. State……………………………………………………. 15 635 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)
Garza v. State……………………………………………………...15 715 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)
Gauldin v. State………………………………………………….. 30 683 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
Gill v. State………………………………………………………. 29 625 S.W.2d 307, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) opinion on rehearing overruled on other grounds, 726 S.W. 2d 107(Tex. Crim. App 1987)
Gold v. State……………………………………………………. … 16 & 21 736 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
5 Gollihar v. State……………………………………………………. 16 & 21 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001)
Hausman v. State…………………………………………………… 20 480 S.W.2d 721, 723-724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)
Houston v. State……………………………………………………..15 663 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
Humason v. State……………………………………………………17, 19 & 20 728 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
Kelly v. State…………………………………………………………26 & 27 204 S.W.3d 808 818-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
McFarland v. State…………………………………………………..15 930 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)
Melton v. State………………………………………………………16 120 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Moberg v. State…………………………………………………….. 29 810 S.W. 2d 190, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
Ocon v. State………………………………………………………. 26 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
Ortiz v. State……………………………………………………. ……15 577 S.W. 2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)
Ward v. State…………………………………………………………29 659 S.W. 2d 643, 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983);
Washington v. State…………………………………………………..18 660 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)
Wiede v. State…………………………………………………………26 214 S.W. 3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
6 TEXAS COURTS OF APPEAL PAGE
Abdygapparova v. State……………………………………………… 22 243 S.W.3d 191, 209 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2007)
Carver v. State……………………………………………………….. 30 746 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1988 pet. ref.)
Hernandez v. State………………………………………………… 20 739 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1987, pet. ref.)
Jones v. State………………………………………………………. 16 945 S.W.2d 852 (Tex.App-Waco 1997, affirmed)
McCarty v. State……………………………………………………. 19 788 S.W.2d 213, 216-217 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1990, pet. granted)
Nichols v. State…………………………………………………………16 52 S.W.3d 501(Tex. App. Dallas 2001, no pet.)
Pena v. State…………………………………………………………….32 226 S.W. 634, 651 (Tex. App. – Waco 2007), rev’d on other grounds 285 S,W.3d 459, 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
State v. Stauder………………………………………………………..29 264 S.W.2d 3d 360, 364 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2008)
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION PAGE
FOURTH AMENDMENT…………………………………………….. 27
FIFTH AMENDMENT ……………………………………………….. 27
SIXTH AMENDMENT ………………………………………............. 27
7 FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT………………………………………22 & 27
TEXAS CONSTITUTION PAGE
TEX. CONST. ART. I, SEC. 9………………………………………... 27
TEX. CONST. ART. I, SEC. 10………………………………………. 27
TEX. CONST. ART. I, SEC. 15………………………………………. 22
TEX. CONST. ART. I, SEC. 19……………………………………… 27& 32
STATUTORY PROVISIONS PAGE
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23………………………… 27
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.25…….…………………15
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY C. §481.002(38)……………………. 16-17
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY C. §481.481.112(d)………………… 16 & 21
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY C. §481.115(a)……………………… 16 & 21
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY C. §481.115(e)……………………… 16 & 21
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) …….…………………… …… 17
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(b) …….……………………… 17
8 NO. 06-15-00125-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT TEXARKANA, TEXAS
CONSTANTINO RIOS MORALES, APPELLANT
APPEALED FROM THE 249TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF JOHNSON COUNTY, TEXAS CAUSE NO. F48830 HON. D. WAYNE BRIDEWELL, PRESIDING
THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
CONSTANTINO RIOS MORALES, Appellant, and in appealing his
conviction of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver – 4 to
200 grams in Count One and sentenced to forty-five (45) years in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division in the above styled and
numbered cause, respectfully submits this brief in support of his appeal:
9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A Johnson County Grand Jury returned a true bill of indictment on
September 22, 2014 against Appellant charging him with one count, Count One –
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver – 4 to 200 grams. The
Appellant pled “not guilty” to Count One on October 15, 2014. A jury trial
commenced in this case on April 13, 2015. After the presentation of the evidence,
the jury found Appellant guilty. The jury assessed a sentence of 45 years in the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice and assessed a $10,000.00 fine on Count
One. The trial Court entered judgment on April 17, 2015. The Trial Court’s
Certification of Defendant’s Right to Appeal was signed and filed on April 17,
2015. A Motion for New Trial and Motion in Arrest of Judgment was filed on
May 15, 2015. A Notice of Appeal was timely filed on June 30, 2015.
ISSUES PRESENTED:
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DELIVER – 4 TO 200 GRAMS IN COUNT ONE?
WHETHER THE COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY DENYING DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL BASED ON THE TRIAL JUDGE’S CONDUCT IN BECOMING AND ADVOCATE OR PROSECUTOR BY
10 INSTRUCTING THE PROSECUTOR TO RECALL A WITNESS AND ASK CERTAIN QUESTIONS BEFORE RELEASING THE WITNESS?
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL?
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 31, 2014, Officer Eric Alexander was on patrol. (11 R.R. at 109)
Officer Alexander came up behind a tan Chevrolet Silverado stopped at the light at
S. Main and Chambers. (11 R.R. at 110) Officer Alexander claimed that one of
the tail lights was out. (11 R.R. at 110) At this time, Officer Alexander was
approaching Henderson while traveling south on Main. (11 R.R. at 110) As
Officer Alexander got closer, he claimed that the Chevrolet Silverado did not have
red reflectors on the rear. (11 R.R. at 110) At this point, Officer Alexander made
the decision to stop the Chevrolet Silverado. (11 R.R. at 110) Officer Alexander
testified that he stopped the Chevrolet Silverado because of the red reflectors. (11
R.R. at 111) Officer Alexander went on to testify that the Chevrolet Silverado
crossed on to the improved shoulder. (11 R.R. at 111) Officer Alexander made
his report on September 1, 2014 while the incident was fresh in his mind. (11 R.R.
11 at 147) However, Officer Alexander failed to note the crossing on to the improved
shoulder in his report. (11 R.R. at 147) Officer Alexander did not issue any
citations for Appellant’s alleged transportation code violations. (11 R.R. at 147)
Officer Alexander believed the stop was a routine traffic stop. (11 R.R. at
117) Officer Alexander stopped the Chevrolet Silverado to notify the driver about
his lights. (11 R.R. at 117) Officer Alexander identified Appellant Constantino
Rios Morales as the driver. (11 R.R. at 117) Officer Alexander fails to testify how
an investigative stop turned into an arrest and an inventory search. (11 R.R. at 104
– 161)
Officer Alexander and Officer Wickson conduct an inventory search of
Appellant’s vehicle. (11 R.R. at 118) The initial inventory search reveals 3
electronic tablets in the trucks console. (11 R.R. at 118) Two of the tablets had
dead batteries. Officer Wickson access one of the tablets and discovers a name.
(11 R.R. at 119) Officers Alexander and Wickson continue the inventory search of
the console by removing the tablets and removing a cup holder. (11 R.R. at 123)
The cup holder had snaps. (11 R.R. at 158) Under the cup holder was a cubby hole
that goes back towards the rear of the truck. (11 R.R. at 123) The area under the
cup holder was an air vent that goes to the back of the truck. (11 R.R. at 159) It
was part of the equipment of the truck. (11 R.R. at 159)
12 Officer Alexander found a greenish grey pouch in the air vent under the
snapped cup holder. (11 R.R. at 124) He opened the pouch and discovered drugs.
(11 R.R. at 124) The pouch also contained a glass pipe, and a one inch square
baggy. (11 R.R. at 124) Officer Wickson located a digital scale in the air vent
under the snapped cup holder in the console. (11 R.R. at 178)
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from Appellants
vehicle and all testimony related to the improperly seized rvidence. (1 C.R. at 80)
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. (11 R.R. at 85)
After the presentation of the evidence, the jury found Appellant guilty on
Count One – Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver – 4 to
200 grams. The jury assessed punishment at 45 years in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice and assessed a $10,000.00 fine.
The Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right to Appeal was signed
and filed on April 17, 2015. (1 C.R. at 162) A Motion for New Trial and Motion
in Arrest of Judgment was filed on May 15, 2015. (1 C.R. at 169) A Notice of
Appeal was timely filed on June 30, 2015. (1 C.R. at 172)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant presents four issues in this Brief. First, Appellant will show that
evidence presented at trial is legally insufficient to support a conviction for
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver – 4 to 200 grams.
13 There was no evidence that the Appellant knowingly possessed a controlled
substance. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Appellant possessed a
controlled substance with intent to distribute that controlled substance.
Additionally, Appellant will show that the Court violated Appellant’s due
process rights to a fair trial by improperly becoming an advocate or prosecutor for
the State. Therefore, the Appellate Court should reverse the judgment of
conviction in Count One and grant Appellant a new trial. The Court erred in
denying Appellant’s motion for mistrial related to the Judge’s misconduct in
becoming an advocate for the State and denying Appellant a fair trial.
Additionally, the Appellant will show that the Court erred by denying
Appellant’s motion to suppress. The State failed to establish that a proper
inventory search of Appellant’s vehicle was conducted and failed to show probable
cause for the warrantless search. Therefore, the Appellate Court should reverse the
judgment of conviction for Counts One and an acquittal or grant Appellant a new
trial.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
ISSUE ONE (Restated):
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DELIVER – 4 TO 200 GRAMS IN COUNT ONE.
14 A. Standard of Review - Legal Insufficiency
An appellate court may reverse a criminal conviction based upon the law
and facts. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.25 (O’Conner’s Criminal
Codes Plus 2013-2014). An appellate court must always address challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence. Garza v. State, 715 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986). Such a review must be conducted when a legal sufficiency challenge is
raised, even if the conviction must be reversed on other grounds, because a finding
that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction prevents a retrial
under double jeopardy law. McFarland v. State, 930 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996). Foster v. State, 635 S.W.2d 710, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Ortiz
v. State, 577 S.W. 2d 249, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
In reviewing claims of legally insufficient evidence, the Court must
determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406
(Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed. 560 (1979). Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709, 716-717
(Tex.Crim.App. 1982). This standard is used whether the case was proven by
direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Houston v. State, 663 S.W.2d 455, 456
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
15 Evidence is sufficient only if the state has affirmatively proven each of the
essential elements of the offense. Gold v. State, 736 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987). Evidence is insufficient to uphold a conviction when the record contains no
evidence, or merely a “modicum” of evidence, probative of an element of the
offense. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 320 (“Any evidence that is relevant could
be deemed a ‘mere modicum’ of evidence. But a ‘modicum’ of evidence by itself
[cannot] rationally support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt”). A finding of
legally insufficient evidence on appeal entitles Appellant to an acquittal. Gollihar
v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243,246 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Jones v. State, 945 S.W.2d
852, 854 (Tex. App-Waco 1997, affirmed).
B. Law and Analysis in this Case.
Count One— Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver
A person commits the offense of possession of a controlled substance more
than 4 grams but less than 200 grams if the person knowingly or intentionally
possesses methamphetamine in a quantity of more than 4 grams but less than 200
grams. Tex. Health & Safety C. § 481.112 (d) (Penalty Group 1); Tex. Health &
Safety C. §§ 481.115(a) & (e); Nichols v. State, 52 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. App. Dallas
2001, no pet.); Melton v. State, 120 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Possession is defined in the Texas Controlled Substances Act as the actual care,
custody, control or management of the drug. Tex. Health & Safety C. §
16 481.002(38). The definition of possession provided in Texas Health and Safety
Code Section 481.002(38) is the only definition that may be used by any court.
See Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 363, 365 n. 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (Court of
Criminal Appeals disapproves all cases that use a different definition of
“possession.”).
In order to establish unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the state
must show that the defendant knowingly or intentionally exercised care, custody,
control, or management over it knowing that it was a controlled substance
(emphasis added). Dubry v. State, 582 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
In Texas, a person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire
to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Tex. Pen. Code. § 6.03(a). A person
acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or that the circumstances exist. Tex. Pen. Code. § 6.03(b). A person acts
knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Tex. Pen. Code. §
6.03(b). Therefore, in order to sustain the conviction in this case, the State must
have proven at trial one of the following: (1) that Appellant’s conscious objective
or desire was to possess the methamphetamine; or (2) that Appellant knew that the
17 methamphetamine was in the air vent under the snapped shut cup holder in the
console or that by his conduct, it was reasonably certain that the methamphetamine
would be in the air vent under the snapped shut cup holder in the console. As the
following analysis will show, Appellant believes that the State has failed to meet
its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly or
intentionally exercised care, custody, control, or management over the
methamphetamine, or even knew that there was a controlled substance in the tan
Chevrolet Silverado’s air vent system.
If the prosecution shows possession, the burden shifts to the defendant to
show lawful possession, such as showing that the drugs were possessed pursuant to
a valid prescription. Washington v. State, 660 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tex. Crim. App.
1983). In the instant case, because a person is not allowed to possess any amounts
of methamphetamine, with or without a valid prescription, the emphasis in this
analysis turns to whether Appellant intentionally or knowingly possessed the
methamphetamine.
In order to obtain a conviction for possession of an illegal substance, the
State must produce evidence that affirmatively links the defendant to the substance
to such an extent that a reasonable inference may arise that the defendant knew of
its existence and exercised control over it. Dubry v. State, 582 S.W.2d at 843.
This “affirmative link” is established by showing facts and circumstances that
18 indicate the defendant’s knowledge of and control over the substance, so mere
conjecture on the part of the State is not sufficient evidence. Dickey v. State, 693
S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In this case, Appellant will show that
there is insufficient evidence affirmatively linking him to the methamphetamine.
The mere fact that a person was the sole individual in the vicinity of a
controlled substance does not amount to sufficient evidence that the person
knowingly or intentionally was in possession of the controlled substance.
Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Further, merely
because a controlled substance is found near a defendant or near a place where a
defendant has access to does not necessarily amount to the defendant knowingly or
intentionally possessing the controlled substance. For instance, a controlled
substance that is found with the defendant’s clothes in a hamper next to a bathroom
that is accessed through the defendant’s room does not amount to the defendant
knowingly or intentionally possessing the controlled substance because the State
failed to exclude a reasonable hypothesis that the defendant’s roommate could
have placed controlled substance there. McCarty v. State, 788 S.W.2d 213, 216-
217 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1990, pet. granted). In this case, the only evidence
linking Appellant to the controlled substance was the fact that it was in a air vent
duct system in a vehicle that Appellant was driving. This evidence, by itself, is
insufficient to prove Appellant’s guilt. The State never proved the ownership of the
19 1999 tan Chevrolet Silverado. A prior driver or owner of the vehicle could have
placed the methamphetamines in that location.
The defendant’s awareness of the whereabouts of the controlled
substance is an essential ingredient to prove that the defendant knowingly or
intentionally possessed the controlled substance. Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d
363, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Evidence that only gives rise to a strong
suspicion of the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance
is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Dubry v. State, 582 S.W.2d 841, 843-844
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Again, merely because the defendant was “close” to the
controlled substance does not necessarily constitute a sufficient affirmative link to
support a finding of knowing possession. Hausman v. State, 480 S.W.2d 721, 723-
724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (Defendant slept within one foot of controlled
substance at a campsite with several other people); Hernandez v. State, 739 S.W.2d
957, 958 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1987, pet. ref.) (The State’s sole evidence of
intentional or knowing possession was that the defendant was lying unconscious on
the ground and the controlled substance was within inches of defendant’s hand).
In this case, the fact that the controlled substance was found inside an air vent
under the snapped shut cup holder in the console does not necessarily constitute a
sufficient affirmative link to support a finding of knowing possession.
20 This Court of Appeals has the power to reverse this conviction because the
verdict is clearly contrary to the evidence presented at trial. Code Crim. Proc. Art.
44.25. Even when reviewing this case in the light most favorable to the jury’s
verdict, this Court should find that no rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Adelman v. State, 828
S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) The reason for this conclusion is
because the State failed to affirmatively prove each of the essential elements of the
offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver more than
four grams but less than 200 grams. Gold v. State, 736 S.W.2d 685; Tex. Health &
Safety C. § 481.112 (d) (Penalty Group 1); Tex. Health & Safety C. §§ 481.115(a)
& (e).
Further, the State failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt because
there is a material variance between the indictment allegations and the proof at
trial. Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 247. Appellant was indicted for intentionally or
knowingly possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (1 C.R. at 14)
The evidence presented at trial and the facts and circumstances of this case clearly
do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly or
intentionally possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver. As a result,
this Court of Appeals should reverse Appellant’s conviction and enter a judgment
of acquittal on Count One.
21 ISSUE TWO:
WHETHER THE COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY DENYING DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL BASED ON THE TRIAL JUDGE’S CONDUCT IN BECOMING AND ADVOCATE OR PROSECUTOR BY INSTRUCTING THE PROSECUTOR TO RECALL A WITNESS AND ASK CERTAIN QUESTIONS BEFORE RELEASING THE WITNESS?
An accused is entitled to a fair trial. U.S. Const. Fourteenth Amendment;
Tex. Const. Art. I, Sec. 15. Further, due process requires a neutral and detached
judge. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656
(1973) Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) The judge should
always act as a neutral arbiter between the advocates: the judge is not the
prosecutor or involved in the fray. Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 797 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003)
No matter what the evidence is against a defendant, the United States
Constitution guarantees the defendant the right to an impartial judge. Blue v. State
41 S.W.3d 129, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. – 2000), Abdygapparova v. State, 243
S.W.3d 191, 209 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2007) The United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that a violation of the right to an impartial judge is a
structural error that defies harm analysis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
309, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed.2d 302 (1991), Cain v. State , 947 S.W.2d 262,
264 (Tex. Crim. App. – 1999)
22 In our case, the prosecution called James Milam, a forensic scientist from
the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Lab in Waco, Texas as an expert
witness. (12 R.R. at 12) Mr. Milam testifies to the analysis of State’s Exhibit 19
and identifies it as methamphetamines. (12 R.R. at 15) The States only chain of
custody evidence related to Exhibit 19 is that Exhibit 19 had Milam’s identifying
marks on it. (12 R.R. at 12-20) Milam testifies as to his report, Exhibit 20, related
to his analysis of Exhibit 19. (12 R.R. at 16 - 17) The State passed the witness.
(12 R.R. at 18) Appellant’s attorney cross examined Milam. (12 R.R. at 18) The
State and Defense counsel inform the trial court that there is no objection to Milam
being excused. (12 R.R. at 18 – 19) The trial judge excuses the jury and instructs
the witness to remain seated on the witness stand. (12 R.R. at 19)
At this point, the trial judge becomes an advocate for the State and a
discussion takes place as follows:
THE COURT: One question I have before Mr. Milam leaves, as I understand the law, and I learn something new every day, but when you have an exhibit that can be altered, the State would be required to prove the chain of custody from the Cleburne Police Department to the DPS lab in Waco. And if you don’t, then that can be raised on appeal. And they are going to be grading everybody’s paper –
MS. LERMANN: Okay.
THE COURT: -- up here on appeal. So I think that’s something before he leaves that, you know, State can try your own case, but if you don’t prove that up, then there are people that’s going to be questioning not only what you do but what the Defense lawyer does as well as the judge so… If y’all want to check that out, I just want to kind of – this man’s
23 fixing to leave and go out of town, so I just want to be sure if there’s some additional things that need to be proven up, that y’all do that.
MR. BUFKIN: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: I think it’s a legal issue y’all need to address and check into, but I’m going to be here all day, but I this man’s going to leave here and –
MR. BARKMAN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: -- going somewhere else. Let y’all check that out and just – then we’ll take a break and when you’re ready to proceed we will.
MS. LEHRMANN: Thank you.
THE COURT: Y’all might want to talk to Mr. Hanna about that. We’ll be recessed for about fifteen minutes.
Appellant’s attorney, Patrick Barkman, objects to the chain of custody not
being met related to Ex. 19. (12 R.R. at 21) He also objects to the trial court’s
comment on the weight of the evidence and improper advice to the prosecution
related to the chain of custody. (12 R.R. at 21) Appellant requests a mistrial. (12
R.R. at 21) The trial court overrules the objection. (12 R.R. at 22) The trial court
denies the mistrial request. (12 R.R. at 23)
The jury is called back in the court room. (12 R.R. at 23) The trial court
asks if there are any additional questions of Mr. Milam. (12 R.R. at 23) The State
proves up the chain of custody from the Cleburne Police Department to the DPS
Waco lab. (12 R.R. at 24-26)
24 The trial court refused to release the witness Milam, instructed the State
that the chain of custody had not been properly proved up, instructed the State
what needed to be proved up and instructed the State to check with the District
Attorney Dale Hanna. The trial court brought the jury back in the courtroom and
asked the parties if they had any additional questions of Mr. Milam and the State
said yes and asked questions to prove up the chain of custody as previously
directed by the trial court. Obviously, the trial judge failed to remain a neutral
arbiter between the advocates and became a prosecutor involved in the fray. The
trial court’s conduct was improper and denied Appellant his due process rights to a
fair trial with a neutral and detached judge that is not an advocate for the State.
The Court should reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case
for a new trial.
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL?
Appellant incorporates the authorities and analysis in Issue Two into this
issue by reference. The trial judge abused his discretion by denying Appellant’s
request for a mistrial based on the trial court’s comment on the evidence and
improper conduct in instructing the State on what questions should be asked of an
expert witness.
25 A mistrial is an appropriate remedy in extreme circumstances and for a class
of highly prejudicial and incurable errors. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) At trial court’s denial of a mistrial is reviewed on the
bases of abuse of discretion. Ocon at 884
The Court should reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS?
On August 31, 2014, the Cleburne Police violated Appellant’s Constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Appellant filed a motion to
suppress the evidence seized from Appellant’s vehicle. (1 C.R. at 80) The trial
court denied the motion to suppress. (11 R.R. at 85) The trial court entered written
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (1 C.R. at 137)
When reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, the
appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Wiede v. State 214 S.W. 3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) When
the trial court makes explicit findings, the appellate court determines whether the
evidence, when reviewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
supports those findings. Kelly v. State 204 S.W.3d 808 818-19 (Tex. Crim. App.
26 2006) The appellate court then reviews the trial court’s legal ruling de novo, unless
its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the
legal ruling. Kelly at 819
The motion to suppress alleged that the Cleburne Police Department violated
the constitutional and statutory right of the Defendant under the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9
of the Texas Constitution and under Art. 38.23 Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
(1 C.R. at 80) The motion to suppress further alleged that any tangible evidence
seized in connection with a 1999 Tan Chevrolet VIN# 2GCEK19VXX1261302,
Plate # DNZ7036 was seized without probable cause or other lawful authority in
violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 9, 10 and 19 of the Texas Constitution. (1 C.R.
at 80)
The motion to suppress requested the trial court to suppress any and all
tangible evidence seized by law enforcement officers or others in connection with
the detention and arrest of Constantino Morales in this case or in the investigation
of this case, including but not limited to any items seized from a 1999 Tan
Chevrolet VIN# 2GCEK19VXX1261302, Plate # DNZ7036 and any testimony by
the Cleburne Police Department or any other law enforcement officers or others
27 concerning such evidence. (1 C.R. at 80-81) Any other matters that the Court finds
should be suppressed upon hearing of this motion. (1 C.R. at 81)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Cleburne Police Officer Eric
Alexander testified about the traffic stop conducted on August 31, 2014. (11 R.R.
at 12) He testified that he stopped a vehicle being driven by Constantino Morales.
(11 R.R. at 23) Officer Alexander testified that he conducted an inventory search.
(11 R.R. at 24) Officer Alexander never testified as to why he conducted an
inventory search. (11 R.R. at 11-53) Officer Alexander never testified that
Constantino Morales was under arrest when Officer Alexander conducted the
inventory search. (11 R.R. at 11-53) Officer Alexander never testified about the
inventory search procedures of the Cleburne Police Department. (11 R.R. at 11-53)
Officer Alexander never testified that he was using an inventory sheet during his
alleged inventory search. (11 R.R. at 11-53)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Wickson never testified as
to how and investigative stop turned into an arrest of Constantino Morales and an
inventory search of his vehicle resulting in the discovery of drugs. (11 R.R. at 53-
71) Officer Wickson never testified that Constantino Morales was under arrest
when Officer Wickson conducted the inventory search. (11 R.R. at 53-71) Officer
Wickson never testified about the inventory search procedures of the Cleburne
Police Department. (11 R.R. at 53-71) Officer Wickson never testified that he was
28 using an inventory sheet during his alleged inventory search. (11 R.R. at 53-71)
Officer Wickson never testified as to how and investigative stop turned into an
arrest of Constantino Morales and an inventory search of his vehicle resulting in
the discovery of drugs. (11 R.R. at 53-71)
Officer Wickson testified that he had to turn the I-Pad Mini on and search
through a series of screens and settings in order to discover the name of Daniel
Martinez in the I-Pad Mini. ( 11 R.R. at 68) and determined the I-Pad Mini was
stolen. Officer Wickson testified that he did not have a warrant to search the I-pad
mini found in the console of the tan Chevrolet Silverado. ( 11 R.R. at 68)
A true inventory search is one conducted by an officer or his agent, using a
standard inventory form prepared pursuant to standard procedures. Gill v. State,
625 S.W.2d 307, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) opinion on rehearing overruled on
other grounds, 726 S.W. 2d 107(Tex. Crim. App 1987) An inventory is lawfully
done when it is conducted in accordance with standard police procedure. The
burden is on the State to show compliance with standard procedure. Ward v. State
, 659 S.W. 2d 643, 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Moberg v. State 810 S.W. 2d 190,
195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) Suppression of evidence upheld because contraband
discovered in an inventory search not performed according to standardized
procedures memorialized in written policy of the police department. State v.
Stauder, 264 S.W.2d 3d 360, 364 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2008) The failure to
29 provide evidence that an inventory search was conducted pursuant to a standard
procedure invalidates the search even if the authority to inventory existed. Gauldin
v. State 683 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) Further, the State has the
initial burden of asserting the inventory exception to the warrant requirement; the
appellate court will not apply it sua sponte if it is not raised in the trial court.
Carver v. State, 746 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1988 pet.
ref.)
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. (11 R.R. at 85) The trial court
entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law. (1 C.R. at 137)
The trial court erred in finding 6. that Constantino Morales had outstanding
warrants and was arrested. Officer Alexander did not testify at the motion
suppress hearing that Constanino Morales had two outstanding warrants and was
arrested the night of August 31, 2015. (11 R.R. at 11-53) Officer Wickson did not
testify, at the motion suppress hearing, that Constanino Morales had two
outstanding warrants and was arrested the night of August 31, 2015. (11 R.R. at
53-71)
The trial court erred in finding 7. that the Cleburne Police Department was
lawfully inventorying the vehicle at the time the methamphetamine was located.
Officer Alexander never testified about the inventory search procedures of the
Cleburne Police Department. (11 R.R. at 11-53) Officer Alexander never testified
30 that he was using an inventory sheet during his alleged inventory search. (11 R.R.
at 11-53) Officer Alexander never testified as to how and investigative stop turned
into an arrest of Constantino Morales and an inventory search of his vehicle
resulting in the discovery of drugs. (11 R.R. at 11-53)
Officer Wickson never testified as to how and investigative stop turned into
an arrest of Constantino Morales and an inventory search of his vehicle resulting in
the discovery of drugs. (11 R.R. at 53-71) Officer Wickson never testified that
Constantino Morales was under arrest when Officer Wickson conducted the
inventory search. (11 R.R. at 53-71) Officer Wickson never testified about the
inventory search procedures of the Cleburne Police Department. (11 R.R. at 53-71)
Officer Wickson never testified that he was using an inventory sheet during his
alleged inventory search. (11 R.R. at 53-71) Officer Wickson never testified as to
how and investigative stop turned into an arrest of Constantino Morales and an
inventory search of his vehicle resulting in the discovery of drugs. (11 R.R. at 53-
71)
The trial court erred in finding 8 that the Cleburne Police Department had
probable cause to search the vehicle. Officer Wickson searched an electronic
device (I-Pad Mini) without a warrant in violation of Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, ___L.Ed.___ (2014) The I-Pad Mini and all testimony
related thereto should have been suppressed. The officers did not testify to
31 anything else that could constitute probable cause to search the tan Chevrolet
Silverado.
The trial court did not make a finding that the inventory was conducted in
accordance with written policies and procedures of the Cleburne Police
Department. (1 C.R. at 137-140)
Further, the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress due
to the State failing to properly preserve evidence, the tan Chevrolet Silverado
thereby preventing Appellant from reviewing the vehicle for exculpatory evidence
such as finger prints. Under the due course of law provision of Art. 1, Section 19
of the Texas Constitution. The State has the duty to preserve material evidence
which has apparent exculpatory value, encompassing both exculpatory evidence
and evidence that is potentially useful to the defense regardless of whether bad
faith was involved in the loss or destruction of the evidence. Pena v. State, 226
S.W. 634, 651 (Tex. App. – Waco 2007), rev’d on other grounds 285 S,W.3d 459,
465 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) The due course of law provision of Art. 1, Section 19
of the Texas Constitution provides greater protection than the federal due process
clause. Pena at 651-53
The court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. The motion
should have been granted and the methamphetime evidence suppressed. Without
the methamphetamine evidence the jury could not have convicted Appellant of
32 County One - possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver more than
4 grams but less than 200 grams.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, The evidence presented at trial is legally insufficient to
support a conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver
more than 4 grams but less than 200 grams.
The Court erred in in denying Appellant’s due process rights to a fair trial in
front of a neutral and detached judge. The trial judge became an advocate of the
State.
The Court erred by denying Appellant’s motion for mistrial.
The Court erred in in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. The
methamphetamine should have been suppressed. Without the methamphetamine
evidence, Appellant could not have been found guilty of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver more than 4 grams but less than 200 grams.
The Court showed reverse the judgment of conviction and acquit Appellant
or remand the case for a new trial.
33 PRAYER
WHEREFORE, for the above and foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully
prays that upon appellate review, the Court of Appeals reverse the judgment of
conviction and render an acquittal or remand the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Rugeley & Associates, P.C. Attorneys At Law 16 N. Caddo Cleburne, TX 76033 Tel: (817) 641-4055 Fax: (817) 641-0003
By: /s/ Lane E. Rugeley State Bar No. 24003995 Email: laner@rugeleylaw.com Attorney for Constantino Rios Morales
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on September 28, 2015 a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Appellate Brief was served on the Johnson County District
Attorney's Office, 204 South Buffalo Ave., Cleburne, Texas 76033, by e-mail and
to Constantino Rios Morales by Certified Mail/RRR.
/s/ Lane E. Rugeley
34 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
At the request of the Court, I certify that this submitted email attachment complies with the following requests of the Court:
1. This filing is labeled with or accompanied by the following information:
a. Case Name: Constantino Rios Morales v State b. The Docket Number: 06-15-00125-CR c. The Type of Brief: Brief of Appellant d. The Word Processing Software and Version Used to prepare the filing: Microsoft Word 2010 converted to PDF by Adobe XI Standard
2. This email attachment contains only an electronic copy of the submitted filing and does not contain any appendices, any portion of the appellate record (other than a portion contained in the text of the filing) hypertext links to other material, or any document that is not included in the filing.
The document contains 7136 words and complies with TRAP 9.4 3. The electronic filing is free of viruses or any other files that would be disruptive to the Court’s computer system. The following software, if any, was used to ensure the filing is virus-free: Norton.
4. I understand that a copy of this filing will be posted on the Court’s web site and becomes part of the Court’s record.
5. Copies have been sent to all parties associated with this case.
/s/ Lane E. Rugeley September 28, 2015 ____________________________________________ ____________________ (Signature of filing party) Date Lane E. Rugeley Rugeley & Associates, P.C. Attorneys at Law 16 N. Caddo Cleburne, Texas 76031