Consolidated Rail Corp. v. State of Mich.

976 F. Supp. 1085, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19331, 1996 WL 924587
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedNovember 27, 1996
Docket1:96-cv-00788
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 976 F. Supp. 1085 (Consolidated Rail Corp. v. State of Mich.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. State of Mich., 976 F. Supp. 1085, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19331, 1996 WL 924587 (W.D. Mich. 1996).

Opinion

OPINION

QUIST, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction. In its complaint, Plaintiff seeks to quiet title to certain real property located in Lansing, Michigan. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant County of Ingham failed to give pre-sale and post-sale notice of the tax sale of the property as required under Michigan law. Therefore, Plaintiff contends that its constitutional right to due process has been violated and institutes this action to quiet title and obtain injunctive relief.

Facts

Plaintiff, Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Conrail”), claims to own real property located at 635 East Grand River Avenue, Lansing, Michigan. The property contains a structure that houses electrical equipment *1087 that controls relay mechanisms for an intersection where several sets of railroad tracks converge.

From 1990 to 1993, employees of the City of Lansing entered the property to clean up trash, cut weeds, and pave the sidewalk. Subsequently, the City of Lansing assessed special assessments against Plaintiff for the clean up, cutting, and paving. Plaintiff claims never to have received notice of the special assessments. In May of 1993, the County of Ingham put the property up for sale to pay for the delinquent taxes. Eventually the property was bid off to the State of Michigan. On April 5, 1996, the State of Michigan sold the property to Henry Hill and Hot Light Productions. Defendants Henry Hill and Hot Light Productions notified Plaintiff that, unless Plaintiff paid rent, they would shut off the power to the property and demolish the structure that houses the electrical equipment. Additionally, Defendants Henry Hill and Hot Light Productions allegedly denied Plaintiff unrestricted access to the property.

This Court held a hearing on November 21, 1996, wherein it heard testimony and issued an Opinion from the bench indicating that a Preliminary Injunction would issue with a bond of $5,000. At that time, this Court said that it would take a closer look at the arguments regarding Plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits. The Court has had the opportunity to review the arguments, case law, and evidence, and now renders this Opinion.

Discussion

A district court should address the following factors in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction: 1) the likelihood that the party seeking the preliminary injunction will succeed on the merits of the claim, 2) whether the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm without the grant of the extraordinary relief, 3) the probability that granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others, and 4) whether the public interest is advanced by the issuance of the injunction. Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d 1474, 1480 (6th Cir.1995) (citing Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1421, 134 L.Ed.2d 545 (1996)). These factors are “to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met. Accordingly, the degree of likelihood of success required may depend on the strength of the other factors.” Id. (quoting In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir.1985)).

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the sale of the property violated Plaintiffs due process rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff first alleges that it was not properly notified of the delinquent real property taxes or the scheduled tax sale as required under Michigan law. A county treasurer must notify a property owner, by first-class mail to the last known address of the property owner, of delinquent real property taxes and the scheduled tax sale at least thirty (30) days prior to the sale. M.C.L. § 211.61a. Notice of delinquent taxes and notice by publication are not enough to satisfy due process requirements in tax sale proceedings. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799-800, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 2711-12, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983).

Under M.C.L. § 211.61a, failure of actual notice does not invalidate tax sale proceedings; however, the state must exert reasonable efforts to provide notice. Dow v. State of Michigan, 396 Mich. 192, 211, 240 N.W.2d 450, 459 (1976). In fact, the Supreme Court of Michigan stated that “[mjailed notice must be directed to an address reasonably calculated to reach the person entitled to notice ____ [i]f the state exerts reasonable efforts, then failure to effectuate actual notice would not preclude foreclosure of the statutory lien and indefeasible vesting of title on expiration of the redemption period.” Id. If tax bills are returned, it would be reasonable to expect a county to obtain the correct address of the property owner. See City of Grand Rapids v. Green, 187 Mich.App. 131, 136-37, 466 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1991) (city assessor testifying that the city does everything possible to locate the owner of property when a tax bill is returned).

*1088 Defendants Henry Hill and Hot Light Productions produced evidence that notices were sent to Plaintiff at several addresses. However, all but two of these notices had been returned by the post office. The regional Director of Operations for Conrail testified that the post office box address that these two unreturned notices were sent to was the incorrect post office box address for tax notices. The Chief Deputy Treasurer of Ingham County testified that she did not know who obtained the post office box address or how, where or from whom it was obtained.

Plaintiff next alleges that it was not notified of the expiration of the first redemption period. Under M.C.L. § 211.74(1), a property owner may redeem land that was sold pursuant to a tax sale “at any time before the first Tuesday of May in the year following the sale.” When lands subject to a tax sale are bid off to the state, M.C.L. § 211.73c requires that 120 days prior to the expiration of the redemption period the county treasurer must notify the property owner of the expiration “by certified mail with return receipt demanded, with postage fully prepaid.” Once this redemption period expires, the title to the property vests in the state.

Defendants provided evidence of notice by certified mail to the Plaintiff of the expiration of the first redemption period. However, there was no acknowledgment of receipt as required by statute. Moreover, the Chief Deputy Treasurer of Ingham County admitted that she did not know if Plaintiff received this notice.

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Bluebook (online)
976 F. Supp. 1085, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19331, 1996 WL 924587, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/consolidated-rail-corp-v-state-of-mich-miwd-1996.