Consolidated Pecan Sales Company v. Savannah Bank & Trust Company

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Consolidated Pecan Sales Company v. Savannah Bank & Trust Company

172 S.E.2d 487, 121 Ga. App. 40, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1093

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJanuary 21, 1970

Docket44932

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 172 S.E.2d 487 (Consolidated Pecan Sales Company v. Savannah Bank & Trust Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Consolidated Pecan Sales Company v. Savannah Bank & Trust Company, 172 S.E.2d 487, 121 Ga. App. 40, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1093 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970).

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Opinion

Hall, Presiding Judge.

Suit was filed by two banks against Consolidated Pecan on September 16, 1963, for a debt claimed due and also asking for a receivership. In June 1969, the defendant moved for a dismissal of the suit on indebtedness on the ground that the lapse of five years would work an automatic dismissal under former Code Ann. § 3-512 (Code Ann. § 81A-141 (e)). While there were no orders within this period of time directly concerning the debt action itself, the defendant concedes there were a multitude of orders dealing with the receivership. The defendant filed a notice of appeal from the order of the superior court overruling its motion to dismiss the suit upon the indebtedness. There is no certificate by the trial court for an immediate appeal of this pretrial order. The appeal is therefore premature and must be dismissed. See Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 (163 SE2d 758).

An able jurist, Justice Sam Erwin of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, later elected to the United States Senate, equates the mandate of the Magna Carta, “To no one will we deny justice, to no one will we delay it” with the law’s policy against piecemeal appellate review: “There is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court piecemeal *41 through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate orders.” Veasey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 363 (57 SE2d 377).

Submitted January 12, 1970 Decided January 21, 1970. Smith, Gardner, Wiggins, Geer & Brimberry, Jerry W. Brim-berry, for appellant. Divine, Busbee & Wilkin, George D. Busbee, Perry, Walters, Langstaff, Lippitt ■& Campbell, Jesse W. Walters, for appellees.

We note from the record that this case is now over six years old, and we readily agree with the appellant that it should quickly be brought to a final determination. It was not the law, but the “law’s delay” that Hamlet urged as a reason for suicide.

Appeal dismissed.

Deen and Evans, JJ., concur.

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Hall, Presiding Judge.

Suit was filed by two banks against Consolidated Pecan on September 16, 1963, for a debt claimed due and also asking for a receivership. In June 1969, the defendant moved for a dismissal of the suit on indebtedness on the ground that the lapse of five years would work an automatic dismissal under former Code Ann. § 3-512 (Code Ann. § 81A-141 (e)). While there were no orders within this period of time directly concerning the debt action itself, the defendant concedes there were a multitude of orders dealing with the receivership. The defendant filed a notice of appeal from the order of the superior court overruling its motion to dismiss the suit upon the indebtedness. There is no certificate by the trial court for an immediate appeal of this pretrial order. The appeal is therefore premature and must be dismissed. See Rockmart Finance Co. v. High, 118 Ga. App. 351 (163 SE2d 758).

An able jurist, Justice Sam Erwin of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, later elected to the United States Senate, equates the mandate of the Magna Carta, “To no one will we deny justice, to no one will we delay it” with the law’s policy against piecemeal appellate review: “There is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court piecemeal *41 through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate orders.” Veasey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 363 (57 SE2d 377).

Submitted January 12, 1970 Decided January 21, 1970. Smith, Gardner, Wiggins, Geer & Brimberry, Jerry W. Brim-berry, for appellant. Divine, Busbee & Wilkin, George D. Busbee, Perry, Walters, Langstaff, Lippitt ■& Campbell, Jesse W. Walters, for appellees.

We note from the record that this case is now over six years old, and we readily agree with the appellant that it should quickly be brought to a final determination. It was not the law, but the “law’s delay” that Hamlet urged as a reason for suicide.

Appeal dismissed.

Deen and Evans, JJ., concur.

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172 S.E.2d 487, 121 Ga. App. 40, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1093, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/consolidated-pecan-sales-company-v-savannah-bank-trust-company-gactapp-1970.

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