Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Refining Co. v. Dill

188 S.W. 439, 1916 Tex. App. LEXIS 898
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 16, 1916
DocketNo. 592.
StatusPublished

This text of 188 S.W. 439 (Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Refining Co. v. Dill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Refining Co. v. Dill, 188 S.W. 439, 1916 Tex. App. LEXIS 898 (Tex. Ct. App. 1916).

Opinion

WALTHALL, J.

This is a suit for damages for personal injuries. On or about the 9th day of May, 1914, appellee, T. E. Dill, was in the employ of appellant, Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Refining Company, in the capacity of general carpenter. Appellant was a corporation and employs, and for several years past has employed, more than five employés. Appellee alleged that appellant caused him to enter and work in a reverberatory furnace, setting up forms therein before said furnace had been cooled after said furnace had been used, and while same was in a dangerous condition from extreme heat and the presence of dangerous fumes and gases. The negligence charged is: First, that appellee did not know of the dangerous condition of the furnace as a result of its extreme heat and the presence of dangerous fumes and gases, and that appellant failed to warn him of the danger of working therein; second, failure to furnish appellee a safe place in which to work. Appellee alleged that while working in the furnace he sustained the injuries of which he complains and some of which he alleged to be permanent, and that he suffered mental anguish.

Appellant answered by general demurrer and general denial; specially denied the alleged acts of negligence; pleaded contributory negligence, that any person of ordinary observation could see and perceive the condition of the furnace as to heat, fumes, and gases, and that, if appellee subjected himself thereto in the performance of said work and wa)s injured, such injuries resulted through appellee’s negligence.

The case was submitted to the jury on special issues, and on the jury’s findings the court entered judgment for appellee for $8,« 000.

The issues made-by the pleadings and on which evidence was offered are reflected by the questions submitted to the jury and their answers, which we here give:

“No. 1: Please answer whether or not the defendant, its agents, servants, or employés, caused the plaintiff to enter and work in a re-verberatory furnace on or about May 9, 1914, setting up forms therein before said furnace had been cooled, and after said furnace had been used, and while said furnace was in a dan* gerous condition as a result of its extreme heat, and the presence of dangerous fumes and gases. *441 Answer this question ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Answer: Yes.
“No. 2: If you answer the previous question in the affirmative, then answer the following question ‘Yes’ or ‘No’: Did the defendant fail to use ordinary care to. make and to have said furnace an ordinarily safe place in which to work? Answer: Yes.
“No. S: If you have answered the foregoing question in the affirmative, then state whether or not such failure to use such ordinary care was a proximate cause of the injury, if any, complained of in his petition. Answer this question ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Answer: Yes.
“No. 4: If you have answered the foregoing question in the affirmative, please state what sum of money, if paid in cash now, would be a reasonable compensation to plaintiff for the injuries he alleges, which he has sustained, that were proximately caused by the negligence, if any, of defendant, alleged by him. Answer: Yes, $8,000. In estimating the plaintiff’s damage, if you find any, you may take into consideration the mental and physical pain, if any, heretofore suffered by plaintiff in consequence of his injury, if any, and his diminished capacity to labor and earn money in the future, if any. If you believe from the evidence that he will suffer mental and physical pain in the future, in consequence of his injuries, if any, you will take that into consideration in estimating his damages. However, if you find that plaintiff himself was guilty of contributory negligence proximately causing the injuries, if any, to himself, the damages to be found by you under the foregoing part of this paragraph should be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to plaintiff. In this connection you will answer the following question:
“No. 5: Was the plaintiff himself guilty of contributory negligence proximately causing or contributing to cause his injuries, if any? Answer this question ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Answer: No.”

In addition to the above, without stating the questions and answers formally, the jury found in answer to questions submitted by the defendant: That the plaintiff was injured on the 9th day of May, 1914, on account of going into a reverberatory furnace; that the furnace was in a dangerous condition as a result of its extreme heat; that it was in a dangerous condition as the result of the presence therein of dangerous fumes and gases; that he was injured on account of such fumes and gases; that he was caused to go into the furnace by his foreman, or some one in, control; that it was defendant's duty to have warned plaintiff of the danger of working in such furnace; that plaintiff was without negligence, in that he did not know and could not have known by ordinary care of the dangerous condition of the furnace; that there were hidden or latent dangers in the furnace of which plaintiff did not know, and could not be appreciated by a person of ordinary intelligence; that the condition of the furnace as to heat and fumes was not as was ordinary in the case of such furnaces when in course of repairs; that the witness Davie did not enter the furnace before plaintiff was told to work upon it; that witness Whitmore did not enter the furnace at a time plaintiff was present in company with witness Boyd; that plaintiff did not thereafter return to the smelter and work one day; that plaintiff did not after laying off four days return and work as carpenter four days before he was discharged; in arriving at its verdict, the jury did not award damages on account of insanity nor on account of scalelike substance forming over his body, resulting from defendant’s negligence; the jury awarded damages resulting from injuries to plaintiff’s sight, to his back, spine, and legs; that plaintiff is incapacitated from ever resuming his vocation as a carpenter and performing manual labor; that his earning capacity is wholly destroyed.

Appellant, claiming that the evidence does not support the finding by the jury that “the furnace was in a dangerous condition as the result of its extreme heat,” requested a peremptory charge in its favor and the refusal to give it is its first assigned error.

The second assignment complains of the refusal to give a peremptory charge in appellant’s favor, on the ground that the proof failed to show negligence.

T. E. Dill testified:

“I am 54 years old. * * * In May I went and did some work in one of the reverberatory furnaces putting up forms. They used the re-verberatory furnace for burning ore, 1 suppose. I was building forms in that furnace; I do not know exactly how many hours I worked; it was in the afternoon. I went into the furnace in the afternoon and finished it. A negro by the name of Boyd went into the furnace with me. * * * We, went in there and put up the forms, iand then wo went out; it got too hot one time, and we came out and cooled off. I threw up. I threw up once in there, and came out and sat down and cooled off. We went back and finished up the work. I had never worked in that reverberatory furnace before that time, or in any of them. There was a difference in the heat that time and other times; there was to me.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
188 S.W. 439, 1916 Tex. App. LEXIS 898, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/consolidated-kansas-city-smelting-refining-co-v-dill-texapp-1916.