CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION, INC. v. Patrick

767 F. Supp. 2d 260, 41 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20153, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40569, 2011 WL 1428221
District Court, D. Massachusetts·Decided April 14, 2011·No. Civil Action 06-11295-WGY·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case has been pending in this Court since July 2006. In May 2008, after a six-day bench trial, this Court found the Massachusetts Department of Transportation (“MassDOT”) to be in violation of a number of provisions of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System General Permit for Storm Water Discharges from Small Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (the “Permit”). Specifically, the Court found that MassDOT was “contributing to discharges that cause on occasion instream exceedance of water quality standards” at three specific sites. Findings & Rulings Tr. 5:6-11, May 30, 2008, ECF No. 144-1. The Court also found that Mass-DOT’s Storm Water Management Plan did not comply with the Permit’s requirements, id. 7:13-16, and that MassDOT was not adequately assessing the sufficiency of discharge control measures being taken, id. 9:2-8. At that time, however, the Court explicitly declined to generalize from the proven violations to the conclusion that MassDOT was contributing to water quality standard violations throughout the Boston metropolitan area. Id. 5:11-16.

Despite finding these violations, the Court in May 2008 was satisfied with the representations of MassDOT that it would take appropriate remedial steps and declined to enter an injunction. Id. 10:18-21. MassDOT failed to carry out those representations. 1 As a result, on May 11, 2010, this Court issued an injunction ordering MassDOT immediately to begin remedial construction at the three sites at which it was found in violation. The Court also ordered MassDOT to comply with three modifications to its Storm Water Management Plan identified by the Environmental Protection Agency: (1) to describe control measures and best management practices for impaired waters without Total Maximum Daily Load restrictions, (2) to assess within five years all waters with Total Maximum Daily Load restrictions, and (3) to propose schedules for the implementation of required best management practices as they are identified and to implement these best management practices within five years. See Tr., May 11, 2010, ECF No. 103; Letter from United States Environmental Protection Agency to Massachusetts Department of Transportation 4-5, Apr. 22, 2010, ECF No. 101-1.

Since the issuance of that injunction, MassDOT has taken positive steps to comply with the Court’s order. MassDOT has submitted reports detailing its compliance with the E.P.A. requirements. See Supplemental Response, ECF No. 111; Second Supplemental Response, ECF No. 126. MassDOT also submitted, and this Court approved, a remedial plan for the identified three sites and a revised Storm *262 Water Management Plan. See Order, July 26, 2010, ECF No. 128. MassDOT subsequently submitted additional reports concerning construction at the three sites as requested by this Court, the last such submission having taken place in January 2011. See Response, ECF No. 130; Supplemental Response, ECF No. 136; Second Supplemental Response, ECF No. 145.

In January 2011, MassDOT moved for the entry of judgment. ECF No. 141. The Conversation Law Foundation (“CLF”) has opposed this motion and moved for additional injunctive relief. ECF No. 148. The Court hereby allows MassDOT’s motion for judgment and denies CLF’s motion for additional injunctive relief.

II. ANALYSIS

Once a court has resolved all disputes concerning the merits of a case-—-including both liability and remedies—it must enter judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. CLF argues that disputes regarding the appropriate remedies still exist and that the Court ought further enjoin MassDOT, thus rendering the entry of judgment premature.

In order to obtain injunctive relief, CLF must satisfy the four-factor test set out by the Supreme Court. It must show: “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law ... are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 2756, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006)). Here, CLF’s request for further injunctive relief fails because it has not demonstrated that it has suffered any injury—irreparable or otherwise—that demands the issuance of another injunction.

At the close of the bench trial in this case, this Court found that MassDOT had committed two general categories of Permit violations: it had caused instream ex-ceedances of water quality standards at three specific sites, and numerous deficiencies existed in its Storm Water Management Plan. The Court explicitly stated that it would not infer from these violations that MassDOT was responsible for broader violations of water quality standards throughout the urban area. The Permit violations found were addressed in the Court’s subsequent remedial order of May 11, 2010.

Since the issuance of that order, Mass-DOT has complied with the Court’s instructions: It submitted an engineering plan for the three specific violative sites and began construction to remedy those sites. It further submitted—and this Court approved—a revised Storm Water Management Plan. CLF argues that these steps taken by MassDOT are inadequate because it is not implementing the revised plan in good faith, citing a number of technical disagreements with the manner of implementation. See Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Entry J. 10-18, ECF No. 148.

The Court declines to engage in ongoing supervision of the technical aspects of MassDOT’s activities, as such activities lie properly within the professional judgment of MassDOT and outside the expertise of this Court. Moreover, such ongoing supervision would be unduly intrusive, burdening both this Court and MassDOT. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 193, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).

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CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION, INC. v. Patrick, 767 F. Supp. 2d 260, 41 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20153, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40569, 2011 WL 1428221 (D. Mass. 2011).

767 F. Supp. 2d 260 (CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION, INC. v. Patrick) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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