Conroy v. ASG- Allsaints Hospital

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJanuary 24, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-01325
StatusUnknown

This text of Conroy v. ASG- Allsaints Hospital (Conroy v. ASG- Allsaints Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conroy v. ASG- Allsaints Hospital, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

GLENN E. CONROY, JR., Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 21-C-1325

ASC—ALLSAINTS HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER Plaintiff Glenn E. Conroy, Jr., an inmate confined at the Racine County Jail, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants failed to provide him medical treatment. This order resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Under the PLRA, the initial partial filing fee is twenty percent of the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff=s account or average monthly balance in his prison account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint, whichever is greater. Id. He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On December 15, 2021, I ordered the plaintiff to file by January 15, 2022, a certified copy of his institutional trust account statement for the six months before he filed this lawsuit. ECF No. 4. I warned the plaintiff that if he failed to comply with the order, I may dismiss this case for failure to prosecute. Id. at 2. The January 15, 2022 deadline has passed, and the plaintiff has not complied with the previous order. But the plaintiff filed a copy of his trust account statement in his other case pending before me, 20-C-1261, ECF

No. 3. A review of that information reveals that the plaintiff has a negative balance of over $1300 and a single credit to his account of $31.49. He states in his motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee that he “owe[s] obligations” of $1500 to the Racine County Jail and between $700 and $800 to the Department of Corrections. ECF No. 2 at 4. I have the authority to waive a plaintiff’s initial partial filing fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) if he lacks both the “assets” and the “means” to pay it. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained that “[i]t is not enough that the prisoner lack assets on the date he files.” Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 628–29 (7th Cir. 2000), and Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000). If that were the case, prisoners could

easily avoid paying the initial partial filing fee by spending what is in his trust account before filing his lawsuit. Therefore, a prisoner’s “means” is construed broadly. A prisoner may lack “assets” but still have “means” to pay the fee. The plaintiff’s motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and his trust account statement show he has no assets and no means to pay an initial partial filing fee. I therefore will not require him to pay one. I will waive the plaintiff’s obligation to pay an initial partial filing fee and grant his motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. That does not mean the plaintiff is exempt from paying the full $350 filing fee. He must pay the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, I must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). I must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, I apply the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, “accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan– Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). I construe pro se complaints liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that he has repeatedly complained to staff at the Jail about pain in his “upper right quadrant,” which worsens when he eats or takes his medication. ECF No. 1 at 2. He says he also has been defecating blood, which leads him to believe his liver is “malfun[c]tioning.” Id. He alleges that Nurses Latisha, Denise, Megan and Allizabeth told him that the Jail’s medical unit “does not plan to do nothing [sic] about the pain.” Id. (capitalization omitted).

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Conroy v. ASG- Allsaints Hospital, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conroy-v-asg-allsaints-hospital-wied-2022.