Conrad Robert Maghirang v. Bio-Medical Applications of California, Inc., a Delaware corporation; and Does 1–50

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 CONRAD ROBERT MAGHIRANG, Case No.: 25-CV-3081 JLS (BJW) individually, 12 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT 14

v. 15 (ECF No. 4)

16 CALIFORNIA, INC., a Delaware 18 corporation; and DOES 1–50, 19 Defendants. 20

21 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Conrad Robert Maghirang’s (“Plaintiff”) 22 Motion to Remand to State Court (“Mot.,” ECF No. 4). Also before the Court are 23 Defendant Bio-Medical Applications of California, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Opposition to 24 Plaintiff’s Motion (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 7), and Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of his Motion 25 (“Reply,” ECF No. 9). The Court took these matters under submission without oral 26 argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 8. Having considered 27 Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendant’s Notice of Removal (“Notice,” ECF No. 1), Plaintiff’s 28 Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1-3), the Parties’ arguments, the evidence, and the law, the 1 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand (ECF No. 4) for the reasons that follow. 3 Plaintiff Conrad Robert Maghirang, a resident of the State of California, was 4 employed by Defendant Bio-Medical Applications of California, Inc. as a Patient Care 5 Technician beginning in April 2024. Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that throughout his 6 employment, Defendant failed to provide him with proper meal and rest periods, required 7 him to perform work off the clock without compensation, and failed to furnish accurate 8 itemized wage statements. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. Plaintiff further alleges that after he took 9 qualifying medical leave, Defendant demanded he return to work despite his persisting 10 medical condition. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that in April and May 2025, Defendant 11 subjected him to a skills assessment as a pretext for termination, despite Plaintiff achieving 12 a passing score of 81% on his April 11, 2025, evaluation. Id. ¶ 19. On May 31, 2025, 13 Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that his 14 termination was in retaliation for his complaints regarding Defendant’s wage and hour 15 violations and his exercise of medical leave rights. Id. ¶ 20. 16 Plaintiff filed this action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of 17 San Diego, on September 18, 2025, alleging causes of actions for: (1) Unfair Business 18 Practices – Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200; (2) Recovery 19 of Unpaid Wages and Penalties – California Labor Code §§ 204, 510, 1194, and 1198; (3) 20 Waiting Time Penalties – California Labor Code §§ 200, 201, 202 and 203; (4) Failure to 21 Pay Meal and Rest Period Premiums at the Proper Regular Rate – California Labor Code 22 § 226.7 and 512; (5) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements – California 23 Labor Code § 226; (6) Failure to Provide Meal Periods – California Labor Code § 226.7 24 and 512; (7) Failure to Authorize or Permit Rest Periods – California Labor Code § 226.7 25 (8) Failure to Reimburse Expenses – California Labor Code § 2802; (9) Retaliation – 26 California Labor Code – 1102.5; and (10) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public 27 Policy. See generally Notice; Compl. Plaintiff did not specify a damages amount in his 28 Complaint. See Compl. Defendant timely removed the action to this Court on November 1 10, 2025, on the basis that there exists complete diversity of citizenship between Plaintiff 2 and Defendant and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Notice. Plaintiff filed 3 the instant Motion to Remand on December 10, 2025, on the basis that the amount in 4 controversy requirement is not met. See generally Mot. 6 I. Legal Standard 7 A defendant may remove an action to federal court “brought in a State court of which 8 the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 9 Section 1441 provides two bases for removal: diversity jurisdiction and federal question 10 jurisdiction. Here, Defendant asserts jurisdiction is based on diversity. See generally 11 Notice. Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy exceeds 12 . . . $75,000.00” and the parties are of diverse state citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 13 The party invoking the removal statute bears the burden of establishing that federal 14 subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th 15 Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Moreover, courts “strictly construe the removal statute 16 against removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (first 17 citing Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988); then citing Takeda v. Nw. Nat’l 18 Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1985)). Therefore, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must 19 be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Id. at 566 20 (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)). 21 II. Analysis 22 Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s removal on the basis that the amount in controversy 23 requirement for diversity jurisdiction is not met. See generally Mot. Plaintiff contends 24 that Defendant’s removal was improper because Defendant failed to proffer sufficient 25 evidence to meet its burden of establishing the amount in controversy. Id. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 A. Diversity of Citizenship 2 The Parties do not dispute that complete diversity of citizenship exists between them. 3 The Court is satisfied that complete diversity exists, as Plaintiff is a citizen of California, 4 Compl. ¶ 1, and Defendant is a corporation incorporated in Delaware with its principal 5 place of business in Waltham, Massachusetts, ECF No. 1-2 (“Jacobs Decl.”) ¶ 4. See 28 6 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). The citizenship of 7 fictitious Doe defendants is disregarded for purposes of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 8 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to the extent it challenges diversity of 9 citizenship. 10 B. Amount in Controversy 11 The Parties dispute whether the amount at stake in this litigation meets the $75,000 12 jurisdictional threshold. See Mot. at 1; Opp’n at 1. In its Notice of Removal, Defendant 13 alleged an amount in controversy of $255,000. Notice ¶ 17. Plaintiff contests this figure 14 and argues Defendant’s calculations are speculative and unsupported. Mot. at 2–5. 15 Defendant maintains that back pay, front pay, attorney’s fees, and punitive damages 16 collectively establish the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence. Opp’n 17 at 2–9. 18 “In determining the amount in controversy, courts first look to the complaint.” 19 Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). Because Plaintiff’s 20 Complaint does not specify a damages amount, Defendant bears the burden of proving by 21 a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Sanchez 22 v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). When assessing the 23 amount in controversy, the Court considers the “amount at stake in the underlying 24 litigation.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 2018). The 25 Court addresses each category of damages in turn. 26 1. Back Pay and Front Pay 27 Plaintiff’s Prayer for Relief expressly seeks back pay and front pay. Compl. at 13. 28 Lost wages, both past and future, are properly included in the amount in controversy. 1 Chavez, 888 F.3d at 415–18. The amount in controversy is not limited to damages accrued 2 before removal; it encompasses all relief the Court may award if Plaintiff prevails on the 3 operative complaint. Id. at 414–15. 4 Defendant calculated Plaintiff’s lost wages based on the Declaration of Melissa 5 Jacobs, who attested, from a review of Plaintiff’s actual personnel and payroll records, that 6 Plaintiff’s base earnings were $52,000 per year, or $1,000 per week. Jacobs Decl. ¶ 6. 7 Back pay from the date of termination (May 31, 2025) through the date of removal 8 (November 10, 2025), a period of approximately 23 weeks, amounts to $23,000. Notice ¶ 9 17(a)–(c). Front pay through a conservative trial estimate of one year from removal adds 10 $52,000. Id. ¶ 17(d)–(e); see also Reese v. Daikin Comfort Techs. Distrib., Inc., 729 F. 11 Supp. 3d 980, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (one year from removal is a conservative and well- 12 accepted estimate where no trial date is set). The combined back pay and front pay amounts 13 to $75,000. 14 Plaintiff argues that his back pay and front pay figures should be reduced to account 15 for his 36-hour workweek and offset by his post-termination earnings. Mot. at 4. The 16 Court is unpersuaded on both grounds. First, Defendant’s calculation was grounded in 17 Plaintiff’s actual annual salary of $52,000, derived from payroll records, rather than any 18 assumed number of hours per week. Jacobs Decl. ¶ 6. Second, and more fundamentally, 19 mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense that goes to ultimate recovery, not to the 20 amount placed in controversy at the time of removal. Greene v. Harley-Davidson, 965 21 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that affirmative defenses such as mitigation do not 22 reduce the amount in controversy). To deduct Plaintiff’s post-termination earnings at the 23 jurisdictional stage would require the Court to resolve the merits of an affirmative defense 24 before determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, a result the Ninth Circuit has 25 squarely rejected. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 26 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the Court finds that the combined back pay and 27 front pay places at least $75,000 in controversy. 28 / / / 1 2. Attorney’s Fees 2 Attorney’s fees authorized by statute are properly included in the amount in 3 controversy, and a court must include future attorney’s fees recoverable by statute when 4 assessing the jurisdictional threshold. Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 5 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff's claims arise under the California Labor Code, which 6 expressly authorizes fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 218.5, 7 1102.5(j), 1194(a). Plaintiff does not dispute that attorney’s fees must be included; he 8 disputes only the amount. See Reply at 3–4. 9 Defendant estimated attorney’s fees at $30,000, based on a rate of $300 per hour 10 multiplied by a “conservative” 100 hours of attorney work. Notice ¶ 17(k); Opp’n at 6–7. 11 Plaintiff challenges this figure as speculative but offers no evidence of a different billing 12 rate or a lower hourly estimate. See Reply at 3–4. The Court finds Defendant’s 13 methodology reasonable. Courts within the Ninth Circuit have credited identical estimates 14 in similar employment cases. See, e.g., Sasso v. Noble Utah Long Beach, LLC, No. CV 15 14-09154-AB AJWX, 2015 WL 898468, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2015) (finding a 16 $30,000 fee estimate reasonable and conservative to conduct an employment trial). 17 Although attorney’s fees in wrongful termination and wage-and-hour cases routinely 18 exceed this figure by a substantial margin, the Court adopts the conservative $30,000 19 estimate for purposes of the amount-in-controversy analysis. See id. at *6 (explaining that 20 a $30,000 estimate is highly conservative because a review of similar wrongful termination 21 and wage-and-hour cases shows that total fee awards routinely and significantly exceed 22 that amount). 23 3. Punitive Damages 24 The Court also may consider punitive damages in determining the amount in 25 controversy. Davenport v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, 325 F.2d 785, 787 26 (9th Cir. 1963). Punitive damages are at stake here because Plaintiff expressly seeks them 27 in his Prayer for Relief, Compl. at 14, and they are recoverable on his retaliation and 28 wrongful termination claims. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a); see also Compl. ¶¶ 76, 81. 1 Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s punitive damages estimate is speculative because 2 Defendant relies on FEHA cases that are not factually analogous to the Labor Code 3 retaliation and wrongful termination claims at issue here. Reply at 4–5. The Court 4 acknowledges that the cases cited by Defendant predominantly arise under FEHA rather 5 than Labor Code § 1102.5. However, district courts do not require factually identical cases, 6 only sufficiently analogous ones, before considering punitive damages in the amount in 7 controversy analysis. Avila v. Kiewit Corp., No. CV 19-5740-MWF-JPR, 2019 WL 8 4729641, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2019). Retaliation claims under Labor Code 9 § 1102.5 and wrongful termination in violation of public policy are sufficiently similar to 10 employment retaliation claims under FEHA to permit comparison for this limited purpose. 11 See id. 12 Defendant calculated punitive damages by applying a 2:1 ratio to its compensatory 13 damages estimate of $75,000, yielding $150,000. Notice ¶ 17(h); see State Farm Mut. 14 Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (single-digit multipliers comport with 15 due process). Plaintiff offers no alternative figure and does not disclaim seeking punitive 16 damages. The Court need not determine an exact punitive damages amount, only that a 17 substantial award is plausibly at stake if Plaintiff prevails. Avila, 2019 WL 4729641, at *5. 18 The Court finds that Defendant has made a sufficient showing. 19 4. Conclusion 20 Considering Defendant’s conservative estimates of $23,000 in back pay, $52,000 in 21 front pay, $30,000 in attorney’s fees, and $150,000 in punitive damages, the amount at 22 stake in the underlying action is at least $255,000—far exceeding the $75,000 jurisdictional 23 minimum. Critically, even excluding punitive damages entirely, the combined back pay, 24 front pay, and attorney’s fees total $105,000, which independently satisfies the threshold. 25 Defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in 26 controversy requirement is met. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Accordingly, the Court finds that diversity jurisdiction exists and DENIES 2 || Plaintiff's Motion. 4 In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Remand (ECF 5 4). Defendant SHALL RESPOND to the Complaint within thirty (30) days of the 6 || electronic docketing of this Order. 8 Dated: June 11, 2026 ul be ? on. Janis L. Sammartino 10 United States District Judge 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28