Conomy v. Conomy

2026 Ohio 82

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 12, 2026
• Docket: 25 CAF 06 0047
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Conomy v. Conomy, 2026-Ohio-82.]

COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MOLLY J. CONOMY Case No. 25 CAF 06 0047

Plaintiff - Appellee Mother Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, CHRISTOPHER F. CONOMY, Case No. 23 DR A 10 0625

Defendant - Appellant Father Judgment: Dismissed

and Date of Judgment Entry: January 12, 2026

KATHERINE A. DISCH

Third-party Defendant - Appellee Grandmother

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Andrew J. King; Robert G. Montgomery, Judges

APPEARANCES: MOLLY J. CONOMY, Pro Se, for Plaintiff - Appellee Mother; CHRISTOPHER P. CONOMY, Pro Se, for Defendant - Appellant Father; REBECCA J. STUMLER, for KATHERINE A. DISCH, Third-party Defendant - Appellee Grandmother.

Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} The appellant, Christopher P. Conomy, appeals from the trial court’s May

23, 2025, and June 18, 2025, Judgment Entries. The appellees are Molly J. Conomy, the

appellant’s wife; and, Katherine A. Disch, Molly J. Conomy’s mother, who currently has

temporary custody of the Conomy’s children pursuant to an Agreed Temporary Order. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} The parties herein have previously been before this Court on a number of

different appellate cases, including both appeals and mandamus actions. The case of

State on the Rel. of Christopher P. Conomy v. Fuller, 2024-Ohio-5771, (5th Dist.)

succinctly summarized the factual background as follows:

[Christopher P. Conomy] is the father of two minor children. He is a

defendant in a divorce case in Delaware County. Custody of the two minor

children is a contested issue in the divorce. Judge Fuller serves as the

presiding judge. Katharine [sic] Disch, Ms. Conomy's mother, is also a party

in the domestic case related to the custody issues.

On October 26, 2023, Ms. Disch filed an emergency ex parte motion

for an order awarding temporary custody of Conomy's children to her. Via

his attorney, Conomy agreed to the order and allowed his children to be

placed in the temporary custody of Ms. Disch. The domestic relations court

subsequently granted Ms. Disch temporary, legal custody of both children

and provided supervised parenting time to Conomy and Molly Conomy. The

order also directed both children to begin counseling. Judge Fuller also

appointed a guardian ad litem for the children.

Thereafter, Conomy sought extended visitation rights with the

children, which the presiding magistrate denied. On May 30, 2024,

Relator filed an "Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Change of Custody and

Emergency Request for Judicial Hearing in Front of Someone Who Would

Rather Not Have a Dead Child on Their Hands." In his motion, Conomy argued he should be given custody of both children. Judge Fuller denied

Conomy's motion on June 4, 2024.

Conomy appealed to this Court. We dismissed Conomy's appeal on

August 19, 2024, finding Judge Fuller's decision was not a final, appealable

order. Conomy filed this original action on August 30, 2024. The Delaware

County Prosecutor's Office, on behalf of Judge Fuller, filed a Motion to

Dismiss on September 27, 2024. Conomy filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Respondent Fuller's Motion to Dismiss on October 14, 2024.

Judge Fuller filed a Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss on October 18,

2024.

On October 23, 2024, Conomy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

with Request for Expedited Consideration. On November 7, 2024, Judge

Fuller filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary

Judgment. Conomy's summary judgment motion addresses the same

arguments raised in his Memorandum in Opposition to Judge Fuller's

Motion to Dismiss.

Id. at ¶¶ 4-8. The appellant had also filed appeals with the Ohio Supreme Court, which

have also been dismissed.

{¶3} The appellant's current appeal arises from the trial court's Judgment Entries

filed June 18, 2025, which denied four of the appellant's Motions related to custody and

parenting time, as well as his Motion to Disqualify Magistrate and for Sanctions; and, filed

on May 23, 2025, requiring the appellant to submit to a psychological evaluation.

{¶4} The trial court's June 18, 2025, Judgment Entry includes a detailed

summary of the procedural history up to that point, which appellant did not dispute, and attached to his appellate brief filed September 2, 2025. The appellant now seeks to

reassert some of those same issues raised in his first appeal, including temporary custody

modification and replacement of the current magistrate and guardian ad litem.

{¶5} The appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on June 20, 2025, and sets forth

the following six assignments of error:

{¶6} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

REFUSING TO RETURN THE CHILDREN TO FATHER'S CUSTODY.”

{¶7} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

BY IGNORING THE WELL-BEING OF THE CHILDREN.”

{¶8} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

IN REFUSING TO CONDUCT HEARINGS IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH

THE CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS OF OHIO AND THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA.”

{¶9} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

IN ORDERING FATHER TO SUBMIT TO A MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION

AND PRODUCE PRIVILEGED RECORDS AFTER RULING THAT SUCH

EVIDENCE IS IRRELEVANT AND INADMISSIBLE, WHILE NEITHER THE

LITIGANTS NOR THE COURT HAVE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH.”

{¶10} “V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

IN REFUSING TO REMOVE MAGISTRATE TERRIE L. CLINGER AND

GUARDIAN AD LITEM RYAN M. SCOTT FROM THIS CASE.”

{¶11} “VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

IN REFUSING TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AND REFER THE MATTER FOR AN

INVESTIGATION BY DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL AND THE PROSECUTOR.” {¶12} We find that the judgment entries from which the appellant has appealed

are not final appealable orders, and his appeal must therefore be dismissed.

FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER ANALYSIS

{¶13} Appellate courts have jurisdiction to review only final orders. Ohio Const.,

Art. IV, § 3(B)(2). Thus, the initial question in any appeal is whether the trial court's order

is final and appealable. If the trial court’s order is not final and appealable, the appeal

must be dismissed. General Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 44 Ohio St.3d 17,

20 (1989); State ex rel. White v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 79 Ohio St.3d 543, 544

(1997). “Even if a party does not raise the issue, this court must address, sua sponte,

whether there is a final appealable order ripe for review. Id.” Passwaters v. Novaria, 2025-

Ohio-1533, ¶ 12 (5th Dist.). Accordingly, we must first determine whether the trial court’s

May 23, 2025, and June 18, 2025, Judgment Entries are final, appealable orders capable

of invoking this Court's jurisdiction.

{¶14} In order to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction to review the merits

of this case, we must determine whether the requirements of R.C. § 2505.02 and Civ.R.

54(B) have been satisfied. Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 88

(1989). R.C. 2505.02 addresses final orders, and states in pertinent part:

(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified,

or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in

effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;

(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special

proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment; (3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a

new trial;

(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to

which both of the following apply:

(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the

provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the

appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.

(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or

effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings,

issues, claims, and parties in the action.

(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be

maintained as a class action;

(6) An order determining the constitutionality of any changes to

the Revised Code made by Am. Sub. S.B. 281 of the 124th general

assembly, including the amendment of sections 1751.67, 2117.06, 2305.11,

2305.15, 2305.234, 2317.02, 2317.54, 2323.56, 2711.21, 2711.22,

2711.23, 2711.24, 2743.02, 2743.43, 2919.16, 3923.63, 3923.64, 4705.15,

and 5111.018 (renumbered as 5164.07 by H.B. 59 of the 130th general

assembly, including the amendment of sections 2125.02, 2305.10,

2305.131, 2315.18, 2315.19, and 2315.21 of the Revised Code;

(7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be appealed

pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the Revised Code;

(8) An order restraining or restricting enforcement, whether on a

temporary, preliminary, or permanent basis, in whole or in part, facially or as applied, of any state statute or regulation, including, but not limited to,

orders in the form of injunctions, declaratory judgments, or writs;

(9) An order that denies a motion for expedited relief pursuant to

section 2747.04 of the Revised Code.

In addition, when multiple claims or parties are involved, a trial court's order must also

meet Civ.R. 54(B)’s requirements in order to be final and appealable. Chef Italiano at 88.

Civ.R. 54(B) states:

(B) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties.

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether as a

claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and whether arising

out of the same or separate transactions, or when multiple parties are

involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer

than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that

there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there

is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, however

designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and

liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to

any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject

to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the

claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

Thus, according to Civ.R. 54(B), a judgment that does not dispose of all claims is not final

unless it includes express language stating “there is no just reason for delay.” In the case

sub judice, the trial court's decisions do not dispose of the issues between the parties with

finality, and lacks the mandatory Civ.R. 54(B) “no just reason for delay” language. {¶15} The appellant groups assignments of error numbers one, two, and three

together, arguing that the trial court erred and abused its discretion when it refused to

return the appellant’s children to him and ignored their well-being, and when it failed to

conduct hearings in compliance with State and Federal laws. He focuses his arguments

on these three assignments of error on the temporary custody issues and his fundamental

rights as a parent. However, the appellant’s parenting rights have not been permanently

determined, and temporary orders regarding the custody of children are not final

appealable orders. As set forth by this Court in Fritz v. Burch, 2009-Ohio-4004, (5th Dist.):

"Temporary * * * child custody orders have been held not final and

appealable because of their interlocutory nature." Shear v. Shear (Mar. 31,

1994), 8th Dist. No. 65339, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1382 at *4.; Williams v.

Williams 2004 Ohio 3992.

In the case sub judice, the custody of the minor child was not

permanently resolved; rather, Appellee's motion for a final determination of

parentage remains pending before the court. By its own terms, the order

designating Appellee as custodian is temporary. A temporary order is

interlocutory in nature. Because such orders are subject to modification by

the trial court, interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable. Brooks

v. Brooks (1996), 117 Ohio App.3d 19, 21, 689 N.E.2d 987. Therefore, we

find the trial court's November 18, 2008 Judgment Entry awarding Appellee

temporary custody of the minor child an interim interlocutory order which is

not final and appealable. The within appeal is hereby dismissed for want of

jurisdiction. Id. at ¶20-21. In this case, the parties entered into an Agreed Temporary Order on

October 30, 2023, in which appellee Disch was granted temporary legal custody of the

minor children until further order of the trial court. The order designating Disch temporary

legal custodian is, by its own terms, temporary and, therefore, interlocutory. Because the

trial court’s decisions on temporary custody of the minor children are interlocutory in

nature, and therefore subject to modification by the trial court, they are not final

appealable orders.

{¶16} The appellant submits in assignment of error number four that the trial court

erred and abused its discretion when it ordered the appellant to submit to a mental health

evaluation in connection with the divorce proceedings and parenting issues therein. The

October 23, 2024, Magistrate’s Order ordered the parties to “cooperate with Dr. Allison

Houle for a full evaluation or comprehensive investigation and assessment of the best

interest of the children pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(C) and Sup0.R. 90.04.” The trial court

overruled the appellant’s motion to set aside the Magistrate’s Order. This, too, is not a

final appealable order. As set forth in Tassone v. Tassone, 2021-Ohio-4063, (10th Dist.):

Here, the trial court ordered Matthew to undergo a diagnostic

psychological evaluation under R.C. 3109.04(C), which permits a court

tasked with allocating parental rights and responsibilities to "order the

parents * * * to submit to medical, psychological, and psychiatric

examinations." Thus, to the extent that a common-law right against

psychological examination existed, R.C. 3109.04(C) abrogated it where

allocation of custody is at issue. See Myers at ¶ 20 ("At least between

plaintiff and defendant there does not appear to be a common-law right against medical examination, and even if there was a common-law right it

has been abrogated by [Civ.R. 35].").

A parent in a divorce action, therefore, does not have a substantial

right to prevent a court from ordering a psychological examination.

Accordingly, a court order requiring a parent to submit to a psychological

examination does not affect a substantial right. See In re B.M., 9th Dist. No.

12CA0009, 2012-Ohio-4093, ¶ 24; Prakash v. Prakash, 181 Ohio App.3d

584, 2009-Ohio-1324, ¶ 14-17, 910 N.E.2d 30 (10th Dist.). Because

Matthew cannot satisfy all the criteria of R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), the part of the

August 14, 2020 order mandating he undergo a diagnostic psychological

evaluation is not final and appealable under that provision.

Id. at ¶14-15. We agree with the reasoning set forth in Tassone. The trial court’s order

that the appellant undergo a mental health evaluation is not a final appealable order.

{¶17} The appellant argues in his fifth assignment of error that the trial court erred

in refusing to remove the magistrate and the guardian ad litem from the case. This, too,

is not a final appealable order. As set forth by this Court in In re J.P., 2021-Ohio-2240

(5th Dist.):

The Supreme Court of Ohio has determined proceedings in the

juvenile division are special statutory proceedings within the meaning of

R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) and parental rights qualify as “substantial rights” for

purposes of R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). State ex rel. Fowler v. Smith, 68 Ohio St.3d

357, 360, 1994- Ohio 302, 626 N.E.2d 950 (1994). “An order which affects

a substantial right has been perceived to be one which, if not immediately

appealable, would foreclose appropriate relief in the future.” Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 616 N.E.2d 181 (1993). However, a number

of appellate districts, including this one, have found a trial court’s order

denying a party’s motion to disqualify the magistrate is not a final appealable

order, concluding such does not affect a substantial right when other issues

remain pending. See, Tassone v. Tassone, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-

810, 2019-Ohio-1018; Dunham v. Ervin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-79,

2017-Ohio-7616; Aloi v. Enervest, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2011-P-0023,

2011-Ohio-5112; Robinson v. Prudential Ins., 5th Dist. Tusc. No.

1998CA00058 (Jan. 19, 1999).

Id. at ¶12. In this case, the trial court’s decision denying the appellant’s motion to

disqualify or remove the magistrate and the guardian ad litem is not a final appealable

order.

{¶18} Finally, the appellant submits that the trial court erred in “refusing to impose

sanctions and refer the matter for an investigation by disciplinary counsel and the

prosecutor.” Again, this is not a final appealable order. The court in Peck v. Tokar, 2016-

Ohio-8112, (11th Dist.) addressed a similar case in which the appellant appealed from

the trial court’s refusal to impose sanctions. The Peck court stated:

Appellants subsequently moved for sanctions, pursuant to Civ.R. 11

and R.C. 2323.51, against appellees seeking attorney fees, costs, and

expenses associated with defending the case. The trial court denied that

motion. Again, no Civ.R. 54(B) language was affixed to that judgment.

Appellants filed the instant appeal as a result.

* * * R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) and (2) require the order to affect a "substantial

right." An order affects a substantial right only if "an immediate appeal is

necessary to protect the right effectively." Wilhelm-Kissinger v. Kissinger,

129 Ohio St.3d 90, 92, 2011 Ohio 2317, 950 N.E.2d 516. Here, we fail to

see how an immediate review of the underlying judgment denying

appellants' motion for sanctions is necessary to protect their rights.

Appellants will have an opportunity to advance their arguments, whether

through a direct appeal or cross-appeal, upon resolution of all claims in the

underlying case. We therefore discern no need for immediate review.

Similarly, since appellants will have a meaningful or effective remedy

through an appeal following a final judgment as to all proceedings, R.C.

2505.02(B)(4) is inapplicable.

Further, even if the order met the elements of R.C. 2505.02(B), it

would still, under these circumstances, remain interlocutory. An appellate

court may not review an order disposing of fewer than all claims when Civ.R.

54(B) language is necessary. Kopp v. Associated Estates Realty Corp.,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-819, 2009-Ohio-2595, ¶10. See also VanDyke

v. City of Columbus, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-1114, 2007-Ohio-2088.

Id. at ¶¶ 3, 6-8. In the case sub judice, the trial court denied the appellant's request for

sanctions. However, the underlying divorce action remains pending, and the rights of the

parties have not yet been finally determined. An entry adjudicating the issue of sanctions

does not terminate the parties' divorce action, and such the issue is subject to revision at

any time before the final entry adjudicating their divorce. See, Civ.R. 54(B). Thus, the trial

court's decision to not impose sanctions is not a final, appealable order. CONCLUSION

{¶19} Based upon the foregoing, we find that neither of the Judgment Entries from

which the appellant has appealed are final appealable orders. Accordingly, this Court

lacks jurisdiction in this matter and must therefore dismiss the appeal. Therefore, the

appellant’s appeal from the judgments of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas,

Domestic Relations Division, are hereby dismissed for want of a final appealable order.

{¶20} Costs to appellant.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

King, J. and

Montgomery, J. concur.