Connolly v. Nina

2024 NY Slip Op 51422(U)
New York Supreme Court, Kings County·Decided October 15, 2024·No. Index No. 526/2024·Unpublished·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

Connolly v Nina (2024 NY Slip Op 51422(U)) [*1]
Connolly v Nina
2024 NY Slip Op 51422(U)
Decided on October 15, 2024
Supreme Court, Kings County
Maslow, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected in part through October 21, 2024; it will not be published in the printed Offical Reports.


Decided on October 15, 2024
Supreme Court, Kings County


Debrasue Connolly, Plaintiff,

against

Venessa Nina, Defendant.




Index No. 526/2024

Debrasue Connolly, plaintiff pro se.

Venessa Nina, defendant pro se.
Aaron D. Maslow, J.

Papers used on this motion: order to show case, petition with verification, affidavit of emergency, Part 130 certification, affidavit in support of notification, and attached exhibits; request for judicial intervention; poor person order and affidavit in support; interim orders; plaintiff's and defendant's hearing exhibits; transcripts, July 5, 2024, July 12, 2024, July 18, 2024.

Introduction

This case involves a dispute over the ownership and custody of two dogs, Mary Alice, an approximately 12-year-old tan puggle,[FN1] and Henry, a five-year-old white chihuahua with patches of black, who are depicted at https://nycourts.gov/reporter/webdocs/ConnollyvNina_Image1.pdf.[FN2]

Plaintiff and Defendant both assert strong claims to the dogs, citing ownership, emotional bonds, financial contributions, and caregiving responsibilities. In adjudicating this matter, this Court applies the "best for all concerned" standard established in Raymond v Lachmann (264 AD2d 340, 341 [1st Dept 1999] [cat to remain where he lived, prospered, loved, and was loved given his age and limited life expectancy], a seminal appellate decision not applying pure ownership as the standard for custody of a pet).

Plaintiff Debrasue Connolly adopted Mary Alice in September 2019 (see July 12, 2024 tr at 6, lines 18-20; plaintiff's exhibit 7) and Henry in 2020 (see plaintiff's exhibit 6). Over the last [*2]few years, on various occasions, including when Plaintiff has been hospitalized, she entrusted the dogs to Defendant Venessa Nina, a professional pet caretaker (see July 5, 2024 tr at 6, line 1; 12, lines 13-15; 14, lines 24, through 15, line 8; 14, line 24, through 15, line 8; 19, line 19, through 20, line 2; 23, lines 11-18; July 12, 2024 tr at 37, lines 3-5; 30, lines 22-23). She first engaged Defendant, an animal caregiver who offers dog walking, boarding, and training services, as a pet sitter in May 2020 (see July 5, 2024 tr at 9, lines 17-18) or "toward the end of 2019 or the beginning of 2020" (id. at 14, line 25, through 15, line 1). Defendant has a New York City Department of Health dog handler certification and received a qualifying certificate of animal care and handling also (see July 18, 2024 tr at 28, lines 2-6).

On October 14, 2023, with Mary Alice and Henry accompanying her, Plaintiff trekked out from Manhattan to the beach in Long Beach, Long Island, fell asleep there, and awoke to find her pocketbook and phone gone as well as Henry being in the custody of the local animal control. Animal control called Defendant — not Plaintiff — to retrieve Henry and Mary Alice because Defendant's information was linked to the implanted microchips. Defendant alleged that the microchips were in her name by request due to the frequency of Plaintiff's unanticipated hospitalizations, leading to the dogs' being sent to the pound each time. On previous occasions, Defendant returned the dogs to Plaintiff after having taken care of them for her. Following this incident, however, Defendant elected to maintain custody of the dogs after the shelter allegedly informed her that she would be charged with animal neglect and cruelty should she again yield possession of them to Plaintiff. Plaintiff consequently commenced a pro se suit against Defendant to recover custody of the dogs. (See generally July 5, 2024 tr at 2-15.)

Plaintiff seeks the return of both dogs but would be amenable to the return of Mary Alice only as she feels she is best suited to care for Mary Alice's conditions, including "cherry eye," as well as from bowleggedness. Although Plaintiff claims lawful ownership, she focused on Mary Alice's safety, arguing that Defendant's care was wholly inadequate. Plaintiff asserted Defendant was abusing Mary Alice by taking her on long walks as she has little stamina, bringing her to dog parks as Mary Alice allegedly cannot be around big dogs, allowing Mary Alice to be around Defendant's cats, administering home remedies for Mary Alice's cherry eye condition, and harming Mary Alice with CBD biscuits. Defendant, however, argued that the dogs should not be returned due to unsanitary living conditions in Plaintiff's apartment, the dogs being filthy when living with Plaintiff, the frequency of Plaintiff's sudden absences, the length of these absences, concerns for the safety of the dogs as Plaintiff heavily relied on Defendant to care for them during the absences, Plaintiff's failure to socialize the dogs, Defendant's exposure to prosecution by animal care and control officials if she released the dogs to Plaintiff, and the dogs being microchipped to Defendant. In any event, the dogs are bonded and should not be separated, maintained Defendant. (See generally id. at 13-27.)

The parties attended three evidentiary hearings, on July 5, 12, and 18 of 2024, during which they both provided testimony and documentary evidence regarding their relationship with the dogs. Evidence presented included, among other things, dog licensing documents, microchip confirmations, veterinary records, letters of reference from acquaintances, text messages between Defendant and animal rescue center staff, voicemails Plaintiff sent to Defendant, personal financial records, and photos.[FN3]



Procedural Background

This action was commenced by a pro se Plaintiff against a pro se Defendant. Plaintiff's [*3]documents did not properly commence the action under New York law, as Plaintiff initiated this matter by filing an order to show cause dated June 27, 2024, a petition, an affidavit of emergency, and various exhibits.[FN4] In New York, an action can be commenced in one of three ways: (1) by filing a summons and complaint; (2) by filing a summons with notice; or (3) by filing a summons with notice of motion for summary judgment and supporting papers in lieu of a complaint (see CPLR 304, 3213). Plaintiff did not utilize any of these methods. Additionally, Plaintiff did not cite any statutory provision that would allow her to bring a claim for the return of her dogs within a special proceeding, which is a type of expedited lawsuit commenced with a petition (see CPLR 103 [b], 402).

There was no question regarding jurisdiction as Defendant was properly served. Defendant appeared and contested Plaintiff's claim on the merits.

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