STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
CA 13-888
CONNIE EVANS, ET AL.
VERSUS
RANDY BORDELON, ET AL.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 11-C-5409-B HONORABLE ELLIS J. DAIGLE, DISTRICT JUDGE
JOHN E. CONERY JUDGE
Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Marc T. Amy, Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy H. Ezell, and John E. Conery, Judges.
Ezell, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
Pickett, J., dissents, and would affirm based on the evidence properly before the court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED. Brian M. Caubarreaux Emily G. Meche Derrick G. Earles Robert M. Marionneaux, Jr. Brian Caubarreaux & Associates Post Office Box 129 Marksville, Louisiana 71351 (318) 253-0900 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS: Connie Evans Coral Evans
James P. Doherty, III Frederick & Doherty Post Ofice Box 52880 Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-2880 (337) 269-5143 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: Randy Bordelon, individually and d/b/a Bordelon’s CB & Audio Employers Mutual Casualty Company CONERY, Judge.
Connie Evans appeals the decision of the trial court below granting the
motion for summary judgment filed by Randy Bordelon d/b/a Bordelon’s CB &
Audio (hereinafter Bordelon’s). For the following reasons, we reverse the decision
of the trial court and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings in
accordance with this court’s ruling.
Mrs. Evans claims that on January 7, 2011, she tripped on a concrete landing
that she alleges was obscured by grass as she entered Bordelon’s. The fall caused
serious injury to her arm. Bordelon’s filed a motion for summary judgment, which
was granted after Mrs. Evans failed to introduce any evidence at the hearing on
that motion. From that decision, Mrs. Evans appeals.
Mrs. Evans asserts two assignments of error on appeal. Fist she claims that
the trial court improperly interpreted La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(F)(2), and second she
claims that the trial court erroneously granted Bordelon’s motion for summary
judgment in the face of contradictory evidence. Because our discussions
concerning the assignments of error overlap, we will address them as one.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is favored in Louisiana and “is designed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action[.]” La.Code Civ.P. art.
966(A)(2). Summary judgment shall be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any,
admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, show that there is no
genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B)(2). A trial court’s judgment granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Bernard v. Ellis,
11-2377 (La. 7/2/12), 111 So.3d 995. The appellate court should use the same
standard as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment is proper;
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, and whether the mover is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Arceneaux v. Arceneaux, 13-511 (La.App. 3 Cir.
11/6/13), 127 So.3d 61, writ denied, 13-2827 (La. 2/14/14), ___ So.3d ___.
At the time of the hearing on the motion, La.Code Civ.P. art. 966 mandated
that only evidence formally admitted during the summary judgment hearing could
be considered by the trial court. Marengo v. Harding, 13-47 (La.App. 5 Cir.
5/16/13), 118 So.3d 1200. In Marengo, the court stated:
As of August 15, 2012, the effective date of the 2012 amendments, LSA-C.C.P. art. 966 mandates that only evidence formally admitted into evidence during the summary judgment hearing can be considered by the trial court. Evidence physically attached to the motion or placed in the record cannot be considered unless it is properly introduced and admitted into evidence at the hearing.
Id. at 1202.
The evidence attached to the opposition memorandum by Mrs. Evans was
not formally introduced into evidence at the hearing held on April 18, 2013. The
only evidence introduced at the hearing was introduced by Bordelon’s. Therefore,
at the time the trial court made its ruling, it was technically correct.
However, recently the Louisiana Legislature again amended the law on
summary judgment procedure to no longer require the filing of exhibits into the
record, provided the exhibits are attached to a motion for summary judgment or
memorandum. In Midland Funding, LLC v. Urrutia, 13-459, p. 2 (La. App. 5 Cir.
12/19/13), ___So.3d ___, ___ n.1 (emphasis ours, alteration in original), the fifth
2 circuit interpreted the amendment to be procedural and hence to be applied
retroactively:
La. C.C.P. art. 966 was amended effective August 1, 2013 to remove the requirement of formal introduction of evidence at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The article now states, in subparagraph F(2), in pertinent part, that “[e]vidence cited in and attached to the motion for summary judgment or memorandum filed by an adverse party is deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment unless excluded in response to an objection made in accordance with Subparagraph (3) of this Paragraph.” Subparagraph F(3) of this article states that “[o]bjections to evidence in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be raised in memorandum or written motion to strike stating the specific grounds therefor.”
“This amendment to Article 966 is procedural and therefore applies retroactively.”
Id.
We agree with our brethren on the fifth circuit. Since there is no longer a
requirement to formally admit the evidence at the hearing, we will consider all
evidence attached to plaintiff’s memorandum.
Further complicating this case is the fact that there were two separate
motions for summary judgment. The first motion for summary judgment (first
motion) was filed by Bordelon on November 14, 2012. The exhibits attached to
the motion and memorandum included photographs taken by Aaron Owens, the
affidavits of Raynell Joseph Charles, Vanessa Bordelon, Randy Bordelon, plus two
documents entitled “Fire Marshal Report” and “BECC Enterprises LLC estimate.”
Mrs. Evan’s opposition to Bordelon’s first motion for summary judgment
had two exhibits attached, the July 30, 2012 deposition of Mrs. Evans and the
November 30, 2012 affidavit of Mrs. Evans’ safety expert, Phillip Beard, P.E.,
which contained his expert report. Mr. Beard’s submission included the following
attachments: “Photographs taken by Phillip Beard, P.E. numbered P-1-P-15,
3 Existing Entrance Landing Drawing CP1, Contractor’s estimate for landing repair,
Curriculum Vitae, Methodology and Litigation Log.”
The first motion for summary judgment was heard by the trial court on
December 10, 2012, and there is no record of the transcript of the hearing in this
appellate record. The trial court denied Bordelon’s first motion for summary
judgment on January 23, 2013, because discovery was not complete. The trial
court also ruled that Bordelon’s motion for summary judgment could be re-urged
once discovery was complete.
Bordelon’s re-urged its motion for summary judgment on April 3, 2013,
(second motion) which was heard by the trial court on April 18, 2013. At the
hearing, Bordelon’s requested that all exhibits attached to the first motion for
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
CA 13-888
CONNIE EVANS, ET AL.
VERSUS
RANDY BORDELON, ET AL.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 11-C-5409-B HONORABLE ELLIS J. DAIGLE, DISTRICT JUDGE
JOHN E. CONERY JUDGE
Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Marc T. Amy, Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy H. Ezell, and John E. Conery, Judges.
Ezell, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
Pickett, J., dissents, and would affirm based on the evidence properly before the court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED. Brian M. Caubarreaux Emily G. Meche Derrick G. Earles Robert M. Marionneaux, Jr. Brian Caubarreaux & Associates Post Office Box 129 Marksville, Louisiana 71351 (318) 253-0900 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS: Connie Evans Coral Evans
James P. Doherty, III Frederick & Doherty Post Ofice Box 52880 Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-2880 (337) 269-5143 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: Randy Bordelon, individually and d/b/a Bordelon’s CB & Audio Employers Mutual Casualty Company CONERY, Judge.
Connie Evans appeals the decision of the trial court below granting the
motion for summary judgment filed by Randy Bordelon d/b/a Bordelon’s CB &
Audio (hereinafter Bordelon’s). For the following reasons, we reverse the decision
of the trial court and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings in
accordance with this court’s ruling.
Mrs. Evans claims that on January 7, 2011, she tripped on a concrete landing
that she alleges was obscured by grass as she entered Bordelon’s. The fall caused
serious injury to her arm. Bordelon’s filed a motion for summary judgment, which
was granted after Mrs. Evans failed to introduce any evidence at the hearing on
that motion. From that decision, Mrs. Evans appeals.
Mrs. Evans asserts two assignments of error on appeal. Fist she claims that
the trial court improperly interpreted La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(F)(2), and second she
claims that the trial court erroneously granted Bordelon’s motion for summary
judgment in the face of contradictory evidence. Because our discussions
concerning the assignments of error overlap, we will address them as one.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is favored in Louisiana and “is designed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action[.]” La.Code Civ.P. art.
966(A)(2). Summary judgment shall be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any,
admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, show that there is no
genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B)(2). A trial court’s judgment granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Bernard v. Ellis,
11-2377 (La. 7/2/12), 111 So.3d 995. The appellate court should use the same
standard as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment is proper;
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, and whether the mover is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Arceneaux v. Arceneaux, 13-511 (La.App. 3 Cir.
11/6/13), 127 So.3d 61, writ denied, 13-2827 (La. 2/14/14), ___ So.3d ___.
At the time of the hearing on the motion, La.Code Civ.P. art. 966 mandated
that only evidence formally admitted during the summary judgment hearing could
be considered by the trial court. Marengo v. Harding, 13-47 (La.App. 5 Cir.
5/16/13), 118 So.3d 1200. In Marengo, the court stated:
As of August 15, 2012, the effective date of the 2012 amendments, LSA-C.C.P. art. 966 mandates that only evidence formally admitted into evidence during the summary judgment hearing can be considered by the trial court. Evidence physically attached to the motion or placed in the record cannot be considered unless it is properly introduced and admitted into evidence at the hearing.
Id. at 1202.
The evidence attached to the opposition memorandum by Mrs. Evans was
not formally introduced into evidence at the hearing held on April 18, 2013. The
only evidence introduced at the hearing was introduced by Bordelon’s. Therefore,
at the time the trial court made its ruling, it was technically correct.
However, recently the Louisiana Legislature again amended the law on
summary judgment procedure to no longer require the filing of exhibits into the
record, provided the exhibits are attached to a motion for summary judgment or
memorandum. In Midland Funding, LLC v. Urrutia, 13-459, p. 2 (La. App. 5 Cir.
12/19/13), ___So.3d ___, ___ n.1 (emphasis ours, alteration in original), the fifth
2 circuit interpreted the amendment to be procedural and hence to be applied
retroactively:
La. C.C.P. art. 966 was amended effective August 1, 2013 to remove the requirement of formal introduction of evidence at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The article now states, in subparagraph F(2), in pertinent part, that “[e]vidence cited in and attached to the motion for summary judgment or memorandum filed by an adverse party is deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment unless excluded in response to an objection made in accordance with Subparagraph (3) of this Paragraph.” Subparagraph F(3) of this article states that “[o]bjections to evidence in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be raised in memorandum or written motion to strike stating the specific grounds therefor.”
“This amendment to Article 966 is procedural and therefore applies retroactively.”
Id.
We agree with our brethren on the fifth circuit. Since there is no longer a
requirement to formally admit the evidence at the hearing, we will consider all
evidence attached to plaintiff’s memorandum.
Further complicating this case is the fact that there were two separate
motions for summary judgment. The first motion for summary judgment (first
motion) was filed by Bordelon on November 14, 2012. The exhibits attached to
the motion and memorandum included photographs taken by Aaron Owens, the
affidavits of Raynell Joseph Charles, Vanessa Bordelon, Randy Bordelon, plus two
documents entitled “Fire Marshal Report” and “BECC Enterprises LLC estimate.”
Mrs. Evan’s opposition to Bordelon’s first motion for summary judgment
had two exhibits attached, the July 30, 2012 deposition of Mrs. Evans and the
November 30, 2012 affidavit of Mrs. Evans’ safety expert, Phillip Beard, P.E.,
which contained his expert report. Mr. Beard’s submission included the following
attachments: “Photographs taken by Phillip Beard, P.E. numbered P-1-P-15,
3 Existing Entrance Landing Drawing CP1, Contractor’s estimate for landing repair,
Curriculum Vitae, Methodology and Litigation Log.”
The first motion for summary judgment was heard by the trial court on
December 10, 2012, and there is no record of the transcript of the hearing in this
appellate record. The trial court denied Bordelon’s first motion for summary
judgment on January 23, 2013, because discovery was not complete. The trial
court also ruled that Bordelon’s motion for summary judgment could be re-urged
once discovery was complete.
Bordelon’s re-urged its motion for summary judgment on April 3, 2013,
(second motion) which was heard by the trial court on April 18, 2013. At the
hearing, Bordelon’s requested that all exhibits attached to the first motion for
summary judgment as well as the exhibits attached to its second motion for
summary judgment be admitted into evidence. The exhibits attached to Bordelon’s
second motion for summary judgment included information on Dan Oas, D.O., an
“Orthopaedic Trauma & Reconstructive Specialist,” and the Curriculum Vitae and
the Methodology and Litigation Log of Phillip Beard, P.E.
Attached to Mrs. Evans’ opposition to Bordelon’s second motion for
summary judgment was a supplemental affidavit from her safety expert, Phillip
Beard, P.E., a 2001 letter from the Louisiana State Fire Marshal, and the
depositions of Eddie Stagg, Sr. (a Bordelon’s employee), Randall Bordelon, and
Wendell Bordelon.
A de novo review of the transcript of the April 18, 2013 hearing leads us to
the conclusion that the trial court had reviewed the original affidavit of Phillip
Beard, P.E. and the exhibits attached, filed in connection with Bordelon’s first
motion for summary judgment. The original affidavit of Mr. Beard was attached
4 as Exhibit B to Mrs. Evan’s memorandum in opposition to Bordelon’s first motion
for summary judgment.
However, the trial court, after a discussion on the record with counsel,
applied the requirements of the then applicable version of La.Code Civ.P. art. 966,
and excluded from evidence all documentation not formally submitted into
evidence at the hearing, stating “At trial, unless it’s offered, it is not evidence.
That’s what the code says and I have to follow it.”
The trial court then ruled as follows:
Okay. So considering the evidence as presented today, and the evidence that I have in front of me dealing with, particularly, the photographs, and dealing with the other motions for summary judgment in which the affidavit of Mr. Beard was presented, the Court has to grant this motion for summary judgment on the basis that it finds no unreasonably hazardous condition on the premises.
(Emphasis added.)
This court has determined the supplemental affidavit of Mr. Beard
submitted as Exhibit A by Mrs. Evans in connection with her opposition to
Bordelon’s second motion for summary judgment must be considered as a part of
the record on appeal. The supplemental affidavit contains language that refers to
and specifically adopts Mr. Beard’s original affidavit dated November 30, 2012,
and states in pertinent part, “That a previous affidavit dated November 30, 2012
has been issued by me in this case and all the facts, opinions and/or conclusions in
that affidavit remain valid. Additional information has been provided subsequent
to the November 30, 2012 affidavit and said information has bearing in this
matter.”
In his supplemental affidavit, Mr. Beard defends his use of the Life Safety
Code as a basis for his original conclusion in his November 30, 2012 original
5 affidavit that a three-inch variance is unreasonable under that Code. Mr. Beard
also supports his application of the Life Safety Code in his original affidavit based
on a recently discovered review letter from the Fire Marshal pertaining to
Bordelon’s property at issue.
Mr. Beard’s supplemental affidavit quotes portions of the Fire Marshal’s
letter at number six, which states, “101:5-2.1.3 Provide landings outside exterior
doors level with the floor.” Based on the requirement cited in the review letter, Mr.
Beard concludes:
However, because the landing is indeed part of the entry as addressed by the review letter, the opinions (original affidavit) remain valid in using the Code as a reasonable standard. If the ¾ inch variation at the door is considered hazardous by the Code, then it is logical to conclude that the 3 inch change of elevation at the outside edge of the landing is also dangerous. Obscuring the change of elevation by the grass exacerbates the dangerous condition.
The situation surrounding the documentation in the record is further
exacerbated by the trial court’s exclusion from the record of the photographs
attached to Mr. Beard’s November 30, 2012 original affidavit. According to Mr.
Beard, the photographs depict the slab and support his opinion that the “3 inch
change of elevation at the outside edge of the landing is also dangerous. Obscuring
the change of elevation by the grass exacerbates the dangerous condition.” The
photographs and deposition of Mrs. Evans were clearly considered by Mr. Beard
when he executed his second affidavit and are proper evidence for an expert to
consider regardless of whether the actual pictures were filed in evidence at the
hearing. We find that Mr. Beard’s supplemental affidavit must be considered and
that it creates a genuine issue of material fact.
6 For the forgoing reasons, the decision of the trial court below is reversed and
the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with
this court’s ruling. Costs of this appeal are hereby assessed against Randy
Bordelon, individually and d/b/a Bordelon’s CB & Audio and Employers Mutual
Casualty Company.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
7 STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
13-888
EZELL, Judge, dissenting
I dissent in this matter to bring to the attention of attorneys and the
legislature the mess that has been clogging up the legal system and clogging up the
minds of those that have to deal with this inept statute.
The plaintiff’s injury occurred prior to the last amendment to La.Code.Civ.P.
art. 966, which became effective on August 2013. The only evidence that could be
relied upon in a motion for summary judgment was the evidence formally admitted
during the summary judgment hearing.
In this instance, the testimony of plaintiff was not properly admitted for her
motion for summary judgment. In fact, no testimony from the plaintiff was
admitted for the purposes of this motion for summary judgment because none was
introduced at the hearing or attached to her opposition memorandum.
Thus, based on the evidence properly before this court, I would agree with
the trial court’s decision in this matter.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent in this matter.