Conner v. Barbour County Board of Education

489 S.E.2d 787, 200 W. Va. 405, 1997 W. Va. LEXIS 163
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 14, 1997
Docket23882
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 489 S.E.2d 787 (Conner v. Barbour County Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conner v. Barbour County Board of Education, 489 S.E.2d 787, 200 W. Va. 405, 1997 W. Va. LEXIS 163 (W. Va. 1997).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal by Karen Sue Conner (hereinafter “Appellant”) from a April 19, 1996, order of the Circuit Court of Barbour County terminating her employment as a bus operator for the Barbour County Board of Education (hereinafter “the Board”). The Appellant asserts that the lower court erred in terminating' her employment. We affirm the decision of the lower court.

I.

The Appellant was employed by the Board as a school bus operator from 1978 to January 1995. From 1985 to 1992, she was certified and employed as an instructor of bus operators. As such, she was provided with instructional programs dealing with accidents and emergencies. On December 12, 1994, while the Appellant was transporting forty-six elementary, middle school, and high school children home on her evening route, she collided with another vehicle on a one lane bridge. The road on which the accident occurred was narrow with steep banks on each side.

The Appellant stopped the bus and turned on the hazard flashers. She did not place reflective triangles on the road due to lack of room and her determination that the triangles were not required due to the peculiar circumstances of the accident scene. She asked the students if there were any injuries. 1 Upon learning that no one had been injured, she permitted the students to exit the bus and use a nearby phone to contact someone to pick them up. Some of the children went home with parents, two children attempted the eight-mile walk home, and the Appellant permitted three girls to ride home with a boyfriend. Fourteen children were transported home in one minivan. When the Superintendent and the Transportation Director arrived approximately thirty minutes after the accident, only four students remained at the accident scene.

Upon review of the Appellant’s behavior, the Superintendent recommended dismissal of the Appellant based upon the following omissions:

1. Failure to locate warning device.
2. Failure to properly notify school officials.
3. Failure to request back up transportation.
4. Failure to secure proper releases from students re physical condition.
5. Permitting various students to exit the bus and leave the scene without knowledge of their destination and the person with whom they left.

On January 23, 1995, the Board voted to terminate the Appellant’s employment. 2 On *407 May 17 and 18, 1995, evidentiary hearings were conducted before an administrative law judge with the West Virginia Education and State Employees Grievance Board (hereinafter “ALJ”). By order dated September 29, 1995, the ALJ found that the Board had proven the Appellant’s failure to maintain proper control over the students and had permitted them to go home with persons other than their parents without permission slips and at a spot other than their designated bus stop. However, the ALJ reduced the penalty from termination to suspension without pay from January 23,1995, through September 30,1995.

The Appellant and the Board appealed to the lower court. In its April 19,1996, order, the lower court affirmed the ALJ’s findings of fact but reversed the determination regarding suspension. Instead, the lower court upheld the Board’s original termination of the Appellant. The Appellant now appeals to this Court.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In syllabus point one of Randolph County Board of Education v. Scalia, 182 W.Va. 289, 387 S.E.2d 524 (1989), we explained that “[a] final order of the hearing examiner for the West Virginia Educational Employees Grievance Board, made pursuant to W.Va.Code, 18-29-1, et seq. (1985), and based upon findings of fact, should not be reversed unless clearly wrong.” See also Hare v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 183 W.Va. 436, 396 S.E.2d 203 (1990). In the present ease, the lower court affirmed the ALJ’s findings of fact but reversed his determination regarding appropriate discipline by reasoning that the ALJ’s decision to simply suspend the Appellant was not supported by the factual findings and was therefore an abuse of discretion, .in excess of her statutory authority and clearly wrong as a matter of law. 3

West Virginia Code § 18-29-7 (1985), in pertinent part, provides:

The decision of the hearing examiner shall be final upon the parties and shall be enforceable in circuit court: Provided, That either party may appeal to the circuit court of the county in which the grievance occurred on the grounds that the hearing examiner’s decision (1) was contrary to law or lawfully adopted rule, regulation or written policy of the chief administrator or governing board, (2) exceeded the hearing examiner’s statutory authority, (3) was the result of fraud or deceit, (4) was clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record, or (5) was arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

In Martin v. Randolph County Board of Education, 195 W.Va. 297, 465 S.E.2d 399 (1995), we clarified that we review appeals from the West Virginia Educational Employees Grievance Board under section 18-29-7. “The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow, and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing examiner.” 195 W.Va. at 305, 465 S.E.2d at 406. Likewise, when this Court is called upon to review an ALJ’s decision which was affirmed by the lower court, “[w]e must uphold any of the ALJ’s factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, and we owe substantial deference to inferences drawn from these *408 facts.” Id. at 305, 465 S.E.2d at 406. However, “conclusions of law and application of law to the facts” are reviewed de novo. Id.

The Appellant contends that the Board did not adequately prove its assertion that the Appellant failed to maintain proper control of the students. With regard to the appropriate reaction to an emergency situation such as that encountered by the Appellant, the Board introduced testimony from other bus drivers regarding rules and regulations followed by the drivers. Pursuant to the rules and regulations 4 as presented, students are to remain on a bus unless a hazardous situation requires evacuation of the students. Moreover, the driver is responsible for the safety of the children. The Appellant permitted children to freely exit the bus and stand outside the bus with no supervision, and she was unaware that two girls began an eight-mile walk home and were later picked up by the Superintendent on his way to the accident scene.

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Bluebook (online)
489 S.E.2d 787, 200 W. Va. 405, 1997 W. Va. LEXIS 163, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conner-v-barbour-county-board-of-education-wva-1997.