Conlin v. Metzger

44 N.W.2d 617, 77 N.D. 620, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 157
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 9, 1950
DocketFile 7217
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 44 N.W.2d 617 (Conlin v. Metzger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conlin v. Metzger, 44 N.W.2d 617, 77 N.D. 620, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 157 (N.D. 1950).

Opinion

Grimson, J.

The plaintiff brings this action to quiet title to the North 10 feet of Lots 7 and 8 in Block 7 of the town (now City) of Williston, Williams County, North Dakota. He claims absolute ownership. The defendants claim an easement for the use of said property as a way of access to their adjoining properties. The case was tried in District Court upon a written stipulation of facts.

It appears therefrom that on the 4th day of May 1938 the County Auditor of Williams County, upon due proceedings for the nonpayment of the real estate taxes on said North 10 feet of Lots 7 and 8 for the years 1909 to 1931 inclusive, issued a tax deed to Williams County for said property. Williams County duly sold the said property to the plaintiff on August 27, 1945. The plaintiff also obtained a quit claim deed from the former owner to fortify his title in case the tax deed should be attacked. However, no attack is made on these tax proceedings and the tax deed is concededly valid.

The stipulation further shows that this property constitutes a strip 10 feet wide across said Lots 7 and 8. The defendants *622 own the adjoining Lots 9 and 10, Block 7, town (now City) of Williston. They and their respective predecessors in interest and their respective invitees made prescriptive use over, across and upon said strip of land as a way of access to their own adjoining property, “which said prescriptive use resulted in establishing a common easement of way sometime after the year 1909 and prior to the 4th. day of May 1938, which said common easement of way also was appurtenant to their said respective real property as the dominant tenements.” Said prescriptive use has continued to the present time.

The' sole question raised upon the trial is whether under the evidence in this case the valid tax deed obtained by Williams County in 1938 destroyed the prescriptive easement for right of way obtained by the defendants. The District Court found for the defendants and plaintiff appeals.

On this question there seems to- be two lines of authority. The authorities are collected in an annotation in 168 ALR 529 and it is said that the majority of cases hold that the sale, for taxes, of land which is subject to an easement or servitude or restrictive covenant does not have the effect of extinguishing such easement or servitude.

A study of the authorities leads to the conclusion that the division is based on the question of what is included in the assessment on which the tax title is based. In both lines of authority the question is decided upon the basis of the assessment. Only the interest properly assessed can be sold. Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbruck et al. 93 Utah 561, 74 Pac2d 1184. In the majority holdings.it is pointed out that a tract of land, called the dominant tenement, (Sec.47-0503 NDBC 1943) may have an appurtenance, (Sec 47-0106 NDBC 1943), such as a right of way, over an adjoining tract which becomes a servitude or burden upon that piece of land called the servient tenement. (Sec 47-0504 NDBC 1943.) The value of the dominant teñe-. ment is increased by having this way of access to it. So the value of the servient tenement is reduced because of the burden of that way upon it. Then it is said that the value to the dominant tenement of the appurtenant right of way is added to the value of the dominant tenement itself by the assessor and in- *623 eluded in the total assessment against that dominant tenement. Likewise the assumption is made that the decrease in value of the servient tenement caused by the burden of the right of way across it is deducted from its total value so that only the remaining value of the servient tenement is assessed. Then it is held that the tax lien upon this servient tenement is only on that lessened value and the title conveyed by the tax deed is only for the servient tenement and does not include the easement for right of way across it.

As a reason for such division in the assessment of a tract of land it is argued that if a property right, such as an appurtenant right of way, belonging to and assessed with the dominant tenement, is sold and destroyed by a tax sale of the servient tenement then there would be a taking of property from the owner of the dominant tenement without due process of law. Further it is said the owner of the dominant tenement who pays the taxes on his property including the value of the appurtenant right of way would, in order to protect his easement, also have to pay taxes on the servient .tenement although the value of the easement is excluded therefrom. That, it is said, would amount to double taxation. Hays v. Gibbs, 110 Utah, 54, 169 Pac2d 781, 168 ALR 513; Jackson v. Smith, 153 App Div (NY) 724, 138 NYS 654; Tax Lien Co. v. Schultz, 213 NY 9, 106 NE 751, LRA1915D, 1115, Ann Cas 1916C, 636; Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont 289, 66 Pac2d 792; Ross v. Franko, 139 Ohio St 395, 40 NE2d 664; City of Longbranch v. Highlands, L. B. & S. B. Co., 134 NJ Eq 266, 35 A2d 22; Alamogordo Imp. Co. v. Prendergast, 43 NM 245, 91 Pac2d 428; Crawford et al v. Senosky, 128 Ore 229, 274 Pac 306, 40 ALR 1523, 110 ALR 612, 122 ALR 1285, 168 ALR 529.

On the other hand the minority cases hold that proceedings on the sale of property for nonpayment of taxes are strictly in rem; that an easement is included in the res; that the assessment is made against the land itself as an entirety and not against scattered and divided interests therein; that the purchaser of a tax title gets complete, paramount title from the sovereign state free from easements or burdens. Hill v. Williams, 104 Md 595, 65 A 413; Wolfson v. Heins, 149 Fla 499, 6 *624 So2d 858; In Henson v. Carr, 66 Wash 81, 118 Pac 927, it is held that:

“Otherwise the owner of real estate may grant an easement or leasehold and surrender possession of the real estate to such grantee, and, upon foreclosure of the tax lien by the state, the purchaser would acquire only the fee, subject to the easement or lease, which would destroy the priority of the tax lien.”

In Nedderman et al. v. City of Des Moines et al. (Beck Intervenor), 221 Iowa 1352, 268 NW 36, it is held:

“For purposes of taxation assessment of land is made against the land itself and not against divided titles.”

In Harmon v. Gould, 1 Wash2d 1, 94 Pac2d 749, it was held that the foreclosure of a tax lien being a proceeding in rem vests the. purchaser new title, superior to any possessory right however exclusive or adverse. One reason there given is that “The collection of taxes would be seriously hindered if a taxing authority be required to examine each tract of land for possible easements, based upon prescriptive or other claims not of record, concerning which it might well be exceedingly difficult to obtain information.” See also Tamblin v. Crowley, 99 Wash 133, 168 Pac 982; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Moyle, 162 Kan 133, 175 Pac2d 133; Jackson v. Ashley, 189 Miss 818, 199 So 91.

In many of the cases holding with the majority rule it appears that the easements and servitudes that were held to prevail over tax titles were established against the property prior to the assessment on which the tax title was based. This' was pointed out in Hays v. Gibbs, supra. See also Alamogordo Implement Co. v. Hennessee, 56 Pac2d 1127, 40 NM 162; N. W. Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont 289, 66 Pac2d 792, 110 ALR 605; Blenis v.

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Bluebook (online)
44 N.W.2d 617, 77 N.D. 620, 1950 N.D. LEXIS 157, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conlin-v-metzger-nd-1950.