Conley v. Department of Health, Division of Health Financing

2012 UT App 274, 287 P.3d 452, 718 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2012 WL 4450154, 2012 Utah App. LEXIS 274
CourtCourt of Appeals of Utah
DecidedSeptember 27, 2012
Docket20100496-CA
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2012 UT App 274 (Conley v. Department of Health, Division of Health Financing) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conley v. Department of Health, Division of Health Financing, 2012 UT App 274, 287 P.3d 452, 718 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2012 WL 4450154, 2012 Utah App. LEXIS 274 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

OPINION

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

{1 Petitioners Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin seek judicial review of the Final Agency Order of respondent Department of Health, Division of Medicaid and Health Financing (the Division), which denied Petitioners' Medicaid benefits for speech augmentative communication devices (SACDs). 1 We determine that the Agency abused its discretion in determining that the Division is not *455 required to provide coverage of SACDs to non-pregnant individuals age twenty-one and older under the Utah Medicaid Program.

BACKGROUND

12 The underlying facts in this case are undisputed. Conley, who was twenty-two years old in 2010 when the Division denied his request for an SACD, suffers from spastic quadriplegia related to cerebral palsy. According to the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) finding, Conley "is not able to produce any intelligible words due to motor difficulties secondary to his medical diagnosis and he uses an [augmentative speech device] to communicate." Conley's SACD is more than seven years old, is not functioning properly, and has a recent history of needing repairs. Because the cost of repairing the device far exceeds the cost of a new device, Conley's medical providers recommended that Conley receive a new SACD to "meet [his] communication needs." Conley requested prior authorization for the purchase of a new SACD, which the Division denied.

13 Olguin, who was thirty-eight in 2010 when the Division denied her request for an SACD, was diagnosed with multiple selerosis as a child. As the ALJ found, "in 2002, [Olguin] suffered a stroke during a surgical operation to her leg which caused severe dysarthia, a motor speech disorder resulting from a neurological injury." Olguin's medical providers determined that an SACD is "necessary to meet her functional communication needs." Olguin also requested prior authorization for an SACD, which the Division likewise denied.

1 4 The Division's explanation for the denial of both Petitioners' requests was that the "[slervices requested are not a covered benefit." Petitioners sought further agency action from the Division and later agreed to have their cases consolidated. In her recommended decision, the ALJ concluded that the Division's denial of SACD benefits to Petitioners met the reasonable standards requirement under the Medicaid Act, which requires that all Medicaid recipients be treated equally and under reasonable, non-discriminatory standards, see 42 U.S.C. § 18396a(a)(17) (2012) 2 ("A State plan for medical assistance must ... include reasonable standards."). The ALJ also concluded that the Utah Medicaid Program, which covers SACDs only for pregnant individuals and for individuals under the age of twenty-one, does not violate the Medicaid Act. The ALJ reasoned that the Medicaid Act and the federal regulations implementing the Act do not specifically mention SACDs as a mandatory benefit. Additionally, the ALJ concluded that the provision of the Utah Medicaid Program allowing SACDs as early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services to pregnant women and individuals under the age of twenty-one, effectively nullifies the inclusion of SACDs within any other more general provision. The ALJ explained that both federal regulations and case law allow the Division discretion to employ a "utilization control procedure" in order to deny coverage of SACDs to non-pregnant individuals age twenty-one and older. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (2012); Hern v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906, 910 (10th Cir.1995).

5 In its Final Ageney Order, the Division Director (the Agency) adopted the ALJ's ree-ommended decision in its entirety, and this petition for review followed.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

T6 For purposes of this appeal, the Division does not dispute that Petitioners are eligible Medicaid recipients 3 The Division *456 also does not dispute that SACDs are medically necessary for Petitioners. Thus, the only issue before us is whether the Agency abused its discretion in determining that the Division is not required under the Utah Medicaid Program to provide coverage of SACDs to non-pregnant individuals age twenty-one and older. This issue requires us to resolve the related question of whether the Division's policy denying such coverage to non-pregnant individuals age twenty-one and older violates the Medicaid Act. 4 Because the Agency interpreted and applied both state and federal law, we review the Final Agency Action under multiple standards.

17 We start by reviewing the Agency action pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) and "shall grant relief [to Petitioners] only if" we conclude, to the extent relevant here, that they have been "substantially prejudiced" "by the [Agency's] erroneous[ ] interpret[ation] or applifeation of] the law," or "the [AlJgency action is ... arbitrary or capricious." Utah Code Ann. § 638G-4-408(4)(d), (h)(Gv) (2011). In making that determination, we generally interpret questions of law for correctness. See id. § 63G-4-408(4)(d); see also Murray v. Labor Comm'n, 2012 UT App 33, ¶ 12, 271 P.3d 192, cert. granted, 280 P.8d 421 (Utah 2012). Similarly, the Agency's interpretation of the federal and state statutes and regulations that govern Utah's Medicaid Program are questions of law that we review "for correctness," according "no particular deference to the agency decision." Bleazard v. Utah Dept. of Health, 861 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[Gleneral questions of law include constitutional questions, rulings concerning an [administrative] agency's jurisdiction or authority, interpretations of common law principles, and interpretations of statutes unrelated to the agency." Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, ¶ 18, 38 P.3d 291 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991). Further, a "state agency's determination of procedural and substantive compliance with federal law is not entitled to the deference afforded a federal agency." Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. State of Colo. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 796 (10th Cir.1989); see also Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado Dep't of Soc. Servs., 842 F.2d 1158, 1164 (10th Cir.1988) (determining that the court's review of whether the State of Colorado's decision to amend its Medicaid Plan violated federal law is limited and stating, "Our task is only to determine whether the agency conformed with controlling statutes.

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Bluebook (online)
2012 UT App 274, 287 P.3d 452, 718 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2012 WL 4450154, 2012 Utah App. LEXIS 274, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conley-v-department-of-health-division-of-health-financing-utahctapp-2012.