Conley v. Central Mortgage Co. (In Re Conley)

414 B.R. 157, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70002, 2009 WL 2498022
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedAugust 11, 2009
Docket08-CV-13432
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 414 B.R. 157 (Conley v. Central Mortgage Co. (In Re Conley)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conley v. Central Mortgage Co. (In Re Conley), 414 B.R. 157, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70002, 2009 WL 2498022 (E.D. Mich. 2009).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT’S APPEAL AND REVERSING BANKRUPTCY COURT’S DECISION

JOHN CORBETT O’MEARA, District Judge.

This matter came before the court on appellants Lawrence Conley and Stephanie K. Conley’s August 22, 2008 appeal of the bankruptcy court’s Order Granting Motion to Quash “Qualified Written Request,” issued May 6, 2008. Appellee filed its brief November 12, 2008. Appellants filed a reply brief on November 24, 2008. No oral argument was heard.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) is a federal consumer protection act enacted in 1974. RESPA requires any servicer of a federally related mortgage loan to respond to a Qualified Written Request (“QWR”) for information by a borrower concerning the servicing of a loan. A QWR is “a written correspondence, other than notice on a payment coupon or other payment medium supplied by the servicer that (1) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify the name and account of the borrower; and (2) includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the extent applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other information sought by the borrower.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1) (B). Under RESPA, a servicer of a federally related mortgage loan must provide a written response acknowledging receipt of a QWR within twenty days. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A). The servicer then has sixty days in which to make appropriate corrections and notify the borrower of those corrections, conduct an investigation and provide a written statement of the reasons the servicer believes the account is correct, or conduct an investigation and provide a written statement including information requested by the borrower or the reasons that information is unavailable. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (2).

The Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a claim may be filed and is deemed allowed (11 U.S.C. § 502(a)) unless a party objects (11 U.S.C. § 502(b)). A party may file an objection to a claim under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 3007. However, “there must be some evidence *159 present in order to overcome the prima facie case established by a proof of claim executed and filed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.” Figard v. PHH Mortgage Corp. (In re Figard), 382 B.R. 695, 711 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2008). Moreover, a party who objects to a properly filed proof of claim without any evidence may face sanctions. F.R. Bankr.P. 9011(c); In re Figard, 382 B.R. at 711. If there is an existing adversary proceeding, a party may obtain information through the discovery provisions of Rule 7000. Parts of the discovery process under Rule 7000 are applicable in contested matters under Rule 9014. If a party requires more information and there is no existing adversary proceeding or contested matter, the court may order the examination of any entity on motion of any party in interest. F.R. Bankr.P. Rule 2004.

This Chapter 13 bankruptcy action was filed by Appellants on August 28, 2007. On January 3, 2008, Appellee filed an Objection to Confirmation, alleging that Appellants were two months in arrears on their mortgage payments. In response, on January 10, 2008, Appellants filed a Response to Objections to Confirmation Filed by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. In addition, on January 15, 2008, Appellants sent to Appellee a QWR pursuant to RESPA. Appellee filed a Motion to Quash “Qualified Written Request” on February 19, 2008. Following oral arguments on April 15, 2008, the bankruptcy court issued an Order Granting Motion to Quash “Qualified Written Request” on May 6, 2008.

Appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration (To Alter or Amend the Judgment Under Rule 9023) was denied on July 14, 2008. Appellants subsequently filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A district court reviewing a bankruptcy court’s decision in a ‘core proceeding’ functions as an appellate court, applying the standards of review normally applied by federal appellate courts.” In re H.J. Scheirich Co., 982 F.2d 945, 949 (6th Cir.1993). The bankruptcy court’s findings of fact “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Id. at 949. However, a district court reviews the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo. Longo v. McLaren, 3 F.3d 958 (6th Cir.1993); White v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 392 B.R. 308 (E.D.Mich.2008).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The bankruptcy court quashed Appellants’ QWR because the court found that Appellants are able to obtain the same information through the Bankruptcy Code. Proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code would allow the court to supervise the process and, if necessary, impose stronger sanctions than RESPA allows. The court relied on Ameriquest Mortgage Co. v. Nosek (In re Nosek), 354 B.R. 331, 339 (D.Mass.2006), which held that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure preempt RE SPA when the same result is sought through conflicting remedial vehicles.

At the outset, this court notes that federal statutes do not preempt other federal statutes. The preemption doctrine, which is based on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, applies where there are conflicting federal and state statutes. L.A. Public Serv. Com. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986) (“Pre-emption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to pre-empt state law.”) (quoted in Norfolk W.R. Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 926 F.2d 567, 570 (6th Cir.1991)). Because RESPA and the Bankruptcy Code are both federal statutes, one will not preempt the other. To the extent that In re Nosek improperly *160 applies a preemption analysis, this court declines to rely upon it.

The proper question is whether the Bankruptcy Code implicitly repeals RESPA. See Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726

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Bluebook (online)
414 B.R. 157, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70002, 2009 WL 2498022, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conley-v-central-mortgage-co-in-re-conley-mied-2009.