Conklin v. Hancock

334 F. Supp. 1119, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10534
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedDecember 3, 1971
DocketCiv. A. 3447
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 334 F. Supp. 1119 (Conklin v. Hancock) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conklin v. Hancock, 334 F. Supp. 1119, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10534 (D.N.H. 1971).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDERS

BOWNES, District Judge.

Petitioner in this Civil Rights action is being held in a New Hampshire State Prison pending trial on a charge of first degree murder of a guard at the Rockingham County Jail. He was at the Rockingham County Jail awaiting trial on a firearms charge and, after the alleged murder, was transferred to the New Hampshire State Prison in Concord for security reasons.

Plaintiff’s pro se complaint alleges deprivation of his constitutional rights. He specifically charges that he is being denied the equal protection of the law *1120 which other inmates receive and that he is being discriminated against because he is being held in solitary confinement. Plaintiff further alleges that his treatment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Other allegations are: the denial and curtailment of mail privileges, the denial of church attendance, the denial of fresh air exercise, the denial of library privileges, the denial of television viewing, and interference with and denial of conferences with his attorney and possible witnesses at his trial, who are also inmates, and complaints about the quality and quantity of the food.

By order of this court dated October 21, 1971, petitioner’s .letter stating his grievances was construed as a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and 42 U. S.C. § 1983.

A hearing on the petition was held on November 19, 1971. The petitioner testified to the following effect. He is locked in a cell continuously except for brief periods of exercise, not exceeding thirty minutes a day, in a corridor in front of his cell. He has a red tag on the door of his cell which means that he is being held in solitary confinement and cannot talk to any other inmates. He is given clean clothes and a shower only once a week while the other inmates are allowed to shower every day. His confinement to a cell means that he is denied vocational rehabilitation, participation in any sports program, and any contact with the other inmates. He has been prevented from conferring with his attorney and with other inmates who might be witnesses at his trial. Copies of requests to the Warden which were denied were received in evidence. (PI. Ex. D). Those requests were for an exercise period, use of a typewriter, use of a television set, full mail privileges, treatment as an ordinary inmate, attendance at church, permission to talk to other inmates, a light in his cell for reading, school attendance, and document notorization. Four letters were received in evidence which petitioner claims were not mailed. They are: a letter to a professor of pharmacology, concerning a possible defense to the charges against petitioner (Pl. Ex. A) ; a letter to this court concerning the subject matter of the instant case (Pl. Ex. B); a letter to a newspaper reporter concerning the crime allegedly committed by petitioner (Pl. Ex. C); and a letter to the Governor of New Hampshire criticizing the Warden (Deft. Ex. I). Plaintiff also testified that letters to his attorney were not mailed.

On cross-examination petitioner stated that he does not contest the validity of his pretrial detention, that he does not seek a writ of habeas corpus, and is not seeking damages from the defendant. But he does complain about the conditions under which he must live while waiting trial. He admitted that he has a criminal record, that he has participated in escape attempts from other prisons, that he has been an uncooperative prisoner in the past, and that he once assaulted a prison officer. His F. B. I. “rap sheet” and progress reports from the United States penitentiaries to which he had been confined make it clear that the petitioner has reacted violently in the past to confinement. In fact, the present murder charge ■' against him is alleged to have resulted from an attempt to escape from the Rockingham County Jail. Based upon his past record, it is not unfair to characterize the petitioner as a high security risk. 1

Mr. Dowd, Deputy Warden and Chief Custodial Officer of the State Prison, testified on behalf of the defendant. He stated that petitioner’s classification and progress reports from the Federal Bureau of Prisons show conclusively that petitioner is a very bad custodial risk since he has an adverse psychological evaluation and has been involved in prior escape attempts from other institutions. He stated that the pending charge *1121 against a prisoner is given very little consideration in determining the manner and conditions of confinement. While this may generally be true, I cannot believe that the present charges against the petitioner are not a factor in the conditions of his confinement.

Dowd explained the color tagging system. An ordinary inmate has a small white tag outside of his cell, a prisoner who is idle for medical reasons has a green tag, and the red tag is used for serious cases. The red tag means that a guard cannot open the prisoner’s cell door without the Warden’s permission, and it amounts to punishment in that red tagged prisoners are isolated from the general prison population and cannot communicate with them. Dowd admitted that the petitioner has not violated any prison rules, but was red tagged because of his past record and his attitude.

Dowd also testified as to the prison mail regulations. Inmates are allowed to write only to their immediate families without permission. All other letters are restricted to those on an approved list. Letters to the Governor, Govern- or’s Council, the courts, prison trustees, and attorneys are not censored and do not require special permission. All other mail is usually censored. The letter to the professor of pharmacology and the letter to the newspaper reporter were not sent because the addressees were not on the approved list. He did not know why the letter to this court- was not sent and stated that he had never seen it.

Dowd testified on cross-examination that the petitioner does not get an outdoor fresh air period for security reasons, stating: “It is my best judgment that you should be exercised as you are being exercised.” The petitioner is given an opportunity to exercise each day outside of his cell for about thirty minutes. A detailed breakdown of petitioner's exercise periods was admitted in evidence showing that he has refused to take advantage of his exercise period on eighteen occasions. The Deputy Warden denied that the petitioner was prevented from conferring with his attorney privately. He admitted that the petitioner was being held in what amounts to solitary confinement, that he is fed in his cell, and that he is allowed a bath only once a week.

The essential facts are not in dispute. The issue is whether the conditions of petitioner’s confinement result in “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

RULINGS

.1. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Petitioner is a pretrial detainee and not a convict.

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Bluebook (online)
334 F. Supp. 1119, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10534, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conklin-v-hancock-nhd-1971.