Condra v. Reckson Operating Partnership, LP

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Condra v. Reckson Operating Partnership, LP

6 A.D.3d 483, 774 N.Y.S.2d 414

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 12, 2004

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 6 A.D.3d 483 (Condra v. Reckson Operating Partnership, LP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Condra v. Reckson Operating Partnership, LP, 6 A.D.3d 483, 774 N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Airborne Express appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Dunn, J.), entered April 18, 2003, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the cross motion is granted, the complaint and all cross claims are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice near the appellant’s vehicle which was parked in a lot. Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the appellant demonstrated its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting proof that the position of its vehicle was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries (see Sheehan v City of [484]*484New York, 40 NY2d 496, 503 [1976]; Haylett v New York City Tr. Auth., 251 AD2d 373, 374 [1998]; Ely v Pierce, 302 AD2d 489 [2003]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the appellant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it should have been granted (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Altman, J.P., Florio, Smith and Rivera, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Airborne Express appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Dunn, J.), entered April 18, 2003, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the cross motion is granted, the complaint and all cross claims are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice near the appellant’s vehicle which was parked in a lot. Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the appellant demonstrated its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting proof that the position of its vehicle was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries (see Sheehan v City of [484]*484New York, 40 NY2d 496, 503 [1976]; Haylett v New York City Tr. Auth., 251 AD2d 373, 374 [1998]; Ely v Pierce, 302 AD2d 489 [2003]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the appellant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it should have been granted (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Altman, J.P., Florio, Smith and Rivera, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

6 A.D.3d 483, 774 N.Y.S.2d 414, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/condra-v-reckson-operating-partnership-lp-nyappdiv-2004.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack