Condon v. Hathaway

191 Misc. 2d 235, 740 N.Y.S.2d 600, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 197
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 19, 2002
StatusPublished

This text of 191 Misc. 2d 235 (Condon v. Hathaway) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Condon v. Hathaway, 191 Misc. 2d 235, 740 N.Y.S.2d 600, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 197 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2002).

Opinion

[236]*236OPINION OF THE COURT

William F. O’Brien, III, J.

Defendant Dorothy S. Hathaway now seeks postverdict relief in the above-entitled matter. In particular, she seeks to have this court offset, pursuant to CPLR 4545, plaintiff’s recovery by jury verdict for future medical expenses and/or lost wages to the extent of optional basic economic loss coverage in the amount of $25,000 available under a policy of automobile insurance issued to defendant Lois Pondolflno in whose automobile plaintiff was a passenger at the time she sustained injuries in the subject accident. Defendant Hathaway asserts that she is entitled to the same offset under CPLR 4545 with respect to the optional basic economic loss coverage as she is with the basic economic loss coverage.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, opposes defendant’s postverdict motion asserting that since the basic personal injury protection coverage is mandatory and the additional coverage is optional, and for which a fee is paid reducing plaintiff’s jury verdict recovery by the amount of the optional basic economic loss, would result in unjust enrichment to the defendant tortfeasor and a punishment to the plaintiff victim of such wrongdoing. Plaintiff also asserts that there is no guaranty that she will ever recover under the provisions of the optional basic loss coverage.

Statement of Facts

Plaintiff sustained personal injuries in a two-car motor vehicle accident which took place on April 13, 1999, in the County of Otsego, New York. Plaintiffs action for damages was tried before a jury in Otsego County for four days (Sept. 17, 2001-Sept. 20, 2001). A trial jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff awarding $50,000 for past pain and suffering; $100,000 for future pain and suffering, including the permanency of the injury; $100,000 for future medical expenses; and $25,000 for future lost earnings (from age 56 to age 65). Plaintiff was age 39 at the time of the jury verdict.

Both parties earlier moved for certain relief from various aspects of this jury verdict. This court, by its written decision of October 26, 2001, denied postverdict relief to each party.

In connection with the offsets required by CPLR 4545 (c), these parties have agreed that the remaining balance of the applicable basic no-fault economic loss coverage be applied to reduce the plaintiffs recovery by jury verdict. Plaintiff had [237]*237received $13,327 for basic economic loss sustained prior to the jury verdict. There then remained, at the time of the jury’s verdict, basic economic loss coverage of $36,673. The parties have now agreed that plaintiffs future basic economic loss recovery by jury verdict be reduced by the remaining coverage available under the basic economic loss coverage.

What remains at issue between these parties concerns the question of whether the optional basic economic loss coverage purchased by defendant Pondolfino and in effect at the time of the accident in question covering plaintiff since she was a passenger in defendant Pondolfino’s car should be applied to offset plaintiffs future damage recovery.

Relevant Law/Analysis

For decades, New York, like most jurisdictions, embraced the common-law collateral source rule. The theory of the collateral source rule is that it was simply not fair for a negligent defendant to be permitted to reduce its liability in damages by showing that the plaintiff was already entitled to be reimbursed for such items as medical expenses and lost wages by a separate contract or other type of agreement. (Kish v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 76 NY2d 379, 384 [1990].) The so-called collateral source rule, by application, permitted a double recovery for a plaintiff.

Over time, the impact and cost associated with double recoveries led to the enactment in New York of CPLR 4545 and its predecessor statute. Actually, the erosion of the collateral source rule in New York began in 1975 with the enactment of CPLR former 4010. It was not until 1986 that New York included in an amendment to CPLR 4545 its subdivision (c) which extended the offset or reduction concept to any personal injury action.

CPLR 4545 (c) now requires the court, upon a finding that items of economic loss were or will with reasonable certainty be replaced or indemnified from any collateral source, to then reduce the amount of any award for such. The application of this so-called reduction or offset of plaintiffs recovery here has already been applied by agreement between these parties with the reduction of plaintiffs recovery by the remaining unex-pended amount of the basic personal injury protection (mandatory basic economic loss with a cap of $50,000). The question presented here is whether the defendant is entitled to have another $25,000 reduced from plaintiffs recovery due to the optional basic economic loss coverage (OREL).

[238]*238Insurance Law § 5102 (a) (5) defines basic economic loss to include an additional option to purchase for an additional premium an additional $25,000 of coverage. Defendant here argues that since she is entitled to an offset for the basic economic loss of up to $50,000, it follows that she is entitled to the same offset with respect to the additional $25,000 of basic economic loss acquired by defendant Pondolfino when she purchased the optional basic economic loss coverage.

There is no dispute between these parties that defendant Pondolfino had the mandatory basic economic loss coverage of $50,000 and an additional $25,000 basic economic loss coverage. A total then of $75,000 of basic economic loss coverage was available to a covered person under defendant Pondolfino’s automobile liability insurance policy in effect at the time of the subject accident. As such, this benefit was available to the plaintiff who, as a passenger in defendant Pondolfino’s automobile, was a covered person. This benefit is available to the plaintiff regardless of fault and is one of the major features of the so-called No-Fault Insurance Law in New York. In order to recover, plaintiff, upon sustaining such a basic economic loss as medical expenses or lost wages, need only connect such loss to injuries sustained in the subject accident. Since these benefits are available regardless of fault, there is no corresponding right of subrogation for the carrier reimbursing an injured plaintiff for items of basic economic loss.

Plaintiff argues that basic personal injury protection and the optional basic economic loss benefit are not the same since one is mandatory (basic PIP) and the other optional (OBEL). Additionally, plaintiff sees a distinction between the two types of coverages since one is mandatory (basic PIP) and the other is purchased by the payment of an additional fee. A further distinction is advanced by plaintiff concerning the right of an injured party under the optional basic economic loss endorsement to elect one of four options for such coverage. Under the mandatory basic economic loss coverage, no such options are available.

Clearly, there are some differences between the two types of benefits. On the one hand, for the payment of a fee, an insured can increase the basic economic loss coverage by an additional $25,000; and upon acquiring such a benefit, an injured party has the option to choose from among four categories of loss the item of loss to be covered. On the other hand, each type of benefit is available to an injured party regardless of fault in the underlying accident so long as the injured party is a covered [239]

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Related

Kish v. Board of Education
558 N.E.2d 1159 (New York Court of Appeals, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
191 Misc. 2d 235, 740 N.Y.S.2d 600, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/condon-v-hathaway-nysupct-2002.