Condec Corp. v. United States

197 Ct. Cl. 368, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 32, 1972 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 22, 1972 WL 20790
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedFebruary 18, 1972
DocketNo. 254-62
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 197 Ct. Cl. 368 (Condec Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Condec Corp. v. United States, 197 Ct. Cl. 368, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 32, 1972 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 22, 1972 WL 20790 (cc 1972).

Opinion

Per Curiam::

This case was referred to Trial Commissioner David Schwartz with directions to make findings of fact and recommendation for conclusions of law under the order of reference and Bule 134-(h). The commissioner has done so in an opinion and report filed on August 16, 1971. No exceptions to or brief on the commissioner’s report have been filed by the parties and the times for so filing pursuant to the rules of the court have expired. On December 8,1971, defendant filed a motion requesting that the court adopt the commissioner’s opinion, findings of fact and recommended [370]*370conclusions of law as the basis for its judgment in this case. Plaintiff has filed no response, the time for so filing has expired and the case has been submitted to the court without oral argument.

Since the court agrees with the commissioner’s opinion, findings of fact and recommended conclusion of law, as hereinafter set forth, it hereby, granting defendant’s motion, adopts the same as the basis for its judgment in this case. Therefore, it is concluded that plaintiff is not entitled to recover and the petition is dismissed.

OPINION OP COMMISSIONER

Schwartz, Oormvissioner: This is a suit brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 for damages for an alleged wrongful taking, appropriation or disclosure by the Government of proprietary information or trade secrets of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff claims that in connection with, its proposals on and its performance of contracts with the Government, the latter learned in confidence certain trade secrets or proprietary data concerning a “wheel mover” for B-52 aircraft which had been developed by plaintiff, and that the information was thereafter publicly disclosed.

A wheel mover is a vehicle, in physical appearance somewhat resembling a tractor, whose function it is to move large aircraft on the ground by the application of power directly to the aircraft’s wheels. The plaintiff’s wheel mover couples to the aircraft by a ring-gear system operably connected to the rim of the aircraft wheels, and hydraulic-power means supply torque through the ring gear to turn the wheels of the aircraft. By the use of a wheel mover the aircraft’s own weight helps to move it without operation of its engine. The primary value of a wheel mover is added maneuverability of the aircraft over low-friction surfaces such as snow or ice-covered runways. Wheel movers have not come into general use. Less than 100 were ever acquired by the Government and there is no evidence of any production for non-Government use.

Plaintiff’s claim is that eleven stated trade secrets or items of proprietary information owned by it were publicly dis[371]*371closed (a) in a Government procurement specification, MIU-W-27199, for a wheel mover; (b) by the Government having made available to bidders, for inspection and study, a prototype wheel mover which plaintiff had previously built under contract with the Government; and (c) in certain restricted drawings of the ring gears of the plaintiff’s wheel mover, attached to the mentioned specification.

None of these contentions is borne out by the facts, found after trial and set out in the accompanying detailed findings of fact. Assuming that plaintiff possessed the trade secrets or proprietary information alleged, the offending specification (apart from the ring-gear drawing, discussed below) was a performance specification. It did not tell or prescribe how to accomplish the results it called for and thus it did not disclose any of plaintiff’s secrets. Moreover, the genesis of the concepts and such data as did appear in the allegedly offending portions of the specification was information which at the time the specification was issued was either within the Air Force experience or in the public domain. The public knowledge of plaintiff’s wheel mover came from magazine articles, a brochure describing plaintiff’s wheel mover in detail, distributed by plaintiff at the time it was tested, and from public displays of plaintiff’s wheel mover during testing. Plaintiff seems to have made no effort to conceal any of the features of its wheel mover. To the contrary, it seems deliberately to have publicized the details of its device, apparently relying on its know-how and on the virtues of its product to insure that it became the sole source of supply for users, including the Government. Ultimately, the Government sought competitive bids on a wheel mover to be freshly designed to performance specifications, and a manufacturer of a different type of wheel mover was awarded a contract for the very few wheel movers produced.

As to the prototype wheel mover, no proof was presented that the Government actually made it available for study and inspection by bidders. If, however, it was in fact made available, the Government was within its rights. An earlier, unrestricted sale of the vehicle by the plaintiff to the Government had extinguished plaintiff’s rights. Cf. Sears, Roebuck [372]*372& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) ; United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1967).

Finally, there are the ring-gear drawings, which were plaintiff’s, and were published by the Government (and, incidentally, not used by the successful bidder). I find that plaintiff authorized the Government’s use of the drawings in connection with the issuance of the specifications, No. MIL-W-27199. This finding embodies a decision on the credibility of witnesses who gave conflicting testimony at the trial. Little purpose would be served by stating the testimony in detail. It is enough to say that a Government officer and the then representative of the plaintiff testified that the officer requested authorization and that the representative gave it, after clearance by one of two officers of the plaintiff, and that the two officers of the plaintiff testified, directly to the contrary, that no such clearance had been asked for and none had been given.1 The conclusion that permission was given is consistent with the plaintiff’s free disclosure of the technical details of its wheel mover.

Plaintiff has failed on the facts to make out a case of unauthorized publication of any secrets. There is no need, therefore, to discuss either plaintiff’s various theories of action, based on contract and constitutional taking, or defendant’s defenses, relating to jurisdiction, the authority of Government servants and the alleged confidential relationship between the parties.

The petition should be dismissed.

FindiNGS oe Fact

L This is a suit by a domestic corporation, Condec Corporation (herein “Con Diesel” or “CDEC”), formerly known as Consolidated Diesel Electric Corporation, brought under [373]*373Title 28 U.S.C. § 1491 for damages for an allegedly wrongful taking, appropriation or disclosure of proprietary information and secret data owned by the plaintiff and obtained by the Government from plaintiff in the course of contractual relations.

Early Development of the Wheel Mover

2.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Sciences Corp.
400 N.E.2d 1274 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1980)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
197 Ct. Cl. 368, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 32, 1972 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 22, 1972 WL 20790, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/condec-corp-v-united-states-cc-1972.