Concrete Cutting Co. v. Clevenger

81 P.3d 723, 191 Or. App. 157, 2003 Ore. App. LEXIS 1722
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedDecember 10, 2003
Docket01-08644, 01-08647; A119486
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 81 P.3d 723 (Concrete Cutting Co. v. Clevenger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Concrete Cutting Co. v. Clevenger, 81 P.3d 723, 191 Or. App. 157, 2003 Ore. App. LEXIS 1722 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

*159 EDMONDS, P. J.

In this workers’ compensation case, employer seeks review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board (the board) affirming an order of the administrative law judge (ALJ). The issue on review concerns how temporary disability benefits are to be calculated under OAR 436-060-0025. 1 Reviewing for errors of law, ORS 183.482(8)(a), we reverse and remand.

The salient facts of the case are uncontested. Claimant, a concrete cutter, was hired by employer in 1986, at which time claimant was not a union member. In 1993, employer signed a union contract covering its concrete cutters, and claimant, accordingly, became a member of Laborers’ Union Local 335. The local operates a call board through which unemployed union members may place their names on a list for referral on a rotating basis to potential employers. Claimant, however, has never personally used the call board service. He continued to work for employer up to the time of his work-related injury in March 2000. As a *160 result of his injury, claimant received temporary disability benefits that employer calculated by multiplying his hourly wage rate by 40 hours per week.

Thereafter, employer realized that claimant’s actual work hours had not consistently amounted to 40 hours per week during the months preceding his injury, and employer, accordingly, recalculated the temporary disability payments on the basis of an average of the wages received by claimant during the 12 weeks immediately before his injury. Based on those calculations, employer determined that there had been an overpayment of $12,017 in temporary disability benefits. Employer notified claimant that it would offset the overpayment against a permanent disability award on another work-related claim and that it would deduct the remainder of the overpayment from future benefits accruing on the March 2000 claim.

In arguments at hearing, claimant challenged the determination that there had been an overpayment. He asserted that he was “employed through union hall call board” for the purposes of OAR 436-060-0025(3)(b). That rule provides:

“For workers employed through union hall call board insurers shall compute the rate of compensation on the basis of a five-day work week at 40 hours a week, regardless of the number of days actually worked per week.”

(Emphasis added.) Claimant maintained that, pursuant to the rule, his wages should be computed on the basis of a 40 hour work week, regardless of the number of days or hours he actually worked per week. The board agreed with claimant’s argument. On review, employer assigns as error the board’s determination that claimant’s wage at the time of injury is to be calculated under the “union hall call board” formula of OAR 436-060-0025(3)(b).

Employer argues that the computation of time loss benefits for claimant should be based only on the replacement of his actual wages at the time of injury rather than on an artificial basis as a worker employed through the union hall call board. Employer points to the fact that claimant did not actually obtain his employment by use of the call board *161 process and that his employment continued in its original status up to the time of his injury. Employer stresses the fact that claimant has never used a union call board in his employment relationship with employer. Alternatively, employer argues that the call board provision was not intended to be applied to workers, like claimant, who are “regularly employed.”

In contrast to employer’s position, claimant interprets the phrase “employed through” to refer to the underlying conditions of the employment relationship. In particular, he points out that employer is obligated by its collective bargaining contract to hire its concrete workers from the union hall call list. Even though claimant was not originally hired pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement and the call list, he believes the controlling fact is that his employment relationship at the time of injury was defined by the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, it follows, according to claimant, that OAR, 436-060-0025(3)(b) governs the determination of his temporary time loss.

In construing an administrative rule, we apply the same analytical framework made applicable to the construction of statutes by PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). Alanis v. Barrett Business Services, 179 Or App 79, 82, 39 P3d 880 (2002). Our first obligation is to examine the rule’s text, along with its context, which includes other provisions of the same rule, other related rules, and other related statutes, to ascertain the intent underlying the rule.

Both employer and claimant offer plausible textual interpretations of the phrase “employed through union hall call board.” Participial adjective phrases such as the one at issue here are, by nature, temporally ambiguous. 2 The words “employed through” could mean “obtained employment by means of,” or they could mean “subject to employment through.” As we cannot choose between the two proffered constructions on the basis of text and grammatical rules, we turn next to the context of OAR 436-060-0025.

*162 OAR 436-060-0025 was enacted pursuant to ORS 656.210, 3 which governs temporary total disability payments. Subparagraph (2)(d)(A) of that statute provides that the “benefits of a worker who incurs an injury shall be based on the wages of the worker at the time of injury” (Emphasis added.) OAR 436-060-0025(1) likewise provides that, with certain exceptions, “[t]he rate of compensation [for temporary disability] shall be based on the wage of the worker at the time of injury” (Emphasis added.) Based on the statute’s direction, we conclude that the underlying purpose of OAR 436-060-0025 is to determine or approximate, to the extent possible, the worker’s wage at the time of injury based on existing employment circumstances.

In examining the context for OAR 436-060-0025(3), we also look at the entirety of OAR 436-060-0025, the rule of which it is a part. As we have said, subsection (1) of that rule sets out a general principle that will control in the absence of recognized exceptional circumstances. For workers whose benefits are governed solely by subsection (1), the wage in question on which time loss is calculated is the actual, regular contractual wage. Subsection (2) of the rule pertains to self-insured employees and is not applicable here. Paragraph (3)(b), as already noted, applies to “regularly employed” workers who are “employed through union hall call board.” To satisfy the definition of “regularly employed,” workers may be either “actually employed” or available for employment. OAR 436-060-0025(3); see also

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
81 P.3d 723, 191 Or. App. 157, 2003 Ore. App. LEXIS 1722, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/concrete-cutting-co-v-clevenger-orctapp-2003.