Concord R. Corp. v. Topliff

6 F. Cas. 262, 21 Int. Rev. Rec. 74
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of New Hampshire
DecidedOctober 15, 1874
StatusPublished

This text of 6 F. Cas. 262 (Concord R. Corp. v. Topliff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Concord R. Corp. v. Topliff, 6 F. Cas. 262, 21 Int. Rev. Rec. 74 (circtdnh 1874).

Opinion

SHEPLEY, Circuit Judge, and CLARK. District Judge.

Assumpsit to recover back from the defendant, who is internal revenue collector for the second district of New Hampshire, the sum of $4,351.28, alleged to have been illegally collected of the plaintiffs by the defendant. Plea, general issue, with brief statement. The hearing was had [263]*263upon a case agreed: “That the plaintiffs, a railroad corporation organized under a charter from the legislature of New Hampshire, on the 22d day of April, 1870, declared a dividend of $78,047.37 out of the net earnings for the sis months ending March 31, 1870, inclusive of the tax thereon, payable to the stockholders May 2, 1870. The profits over the dividend for the same period were $3,934.13. On the 7th day of June, 1S70, the plaintiffs made return to the assistant assessor of the seventh division of said district of the dividends declared upon the earnings for the said period, and of the profits over the dividend. On the 15th day of June, 1870, the assistant assessor of the seventh division of said district assessed against the plaintiffs a tax of 5 per cent, on said sum of $78,947.37, amounting to $3,947.37, and a tax of 5 per cent, on said sum of $3,947.37, amounting to $196.70, making a total of tax of $4,144.07, and returned the same to the assessor for said district, who, on the 20th day of June, 1870, committed the same, with his list of taxes for that month, to the defendant, who was the collector for said district. Said sum of $4,144.07, upon the demand of the defendant, and upon his threat to distrain upon the property of the plaintiffs if payment should be refused, the plaintiffs paid to said defendant on the 30th day of July, 1S70, with 5 per cent, additional, to wit, $207.20, as penalty exacted by the defendant for non-payment of said tax in the month of June, 1870, making a total of $4,351.2S so paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant, and which was paid by them under protest, in writing, that they were not liable to pay the same, nor any part thereof, and which was delivered to the defendant at the time of payment. April 18, 1S71, the plaintiffs appealed from said assessment and collection, to the commissioner of internal revenue, according to the provisions of law in that regard and the regulations of the treasury established in pursuance thereof, and praying for the refunding of the several sums paid as aforesaid; and the decision of the commissioner was had thereon June 14, 1S71, rejecting the claim of the plaintiffs for refunding the several sums aforesaid. On the 20th day of September, 1S71, the day before this suit was brought, the plaintiffs demanded the repayment of said several sums, which was refused.” It was also agreed “that if the court shall be of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover of the defendant, judgment shall be rendered for the plaintiffs for such sum as the court shall find to be due, and costs; otherwise judgment shall be rendered for the defendant for his costs.”

The question here is, were these taxes legally assessed and collected of the plaintiffs? The earnings of the plaintiffs’ corporation, upon which the tax was laid, and out of ¡ which it was collected, accrued in the six months from October 1, 1SG9, to March 31, ' 1870. It does not appear precisely how much was earned in the last three months of 1869, nor how much in the first three months of 1870; but if the monthly earnings were uniform one-half of the sum of $78,947.37, to wit, $39,473.63, was earned in 1869. As to this one-half, it is not now contended that it was not subject to taxation. Since this suit was brought, in September, 1S71, the cases of Barnes v. The Railroads, 17 Wall. [84 U. S.] 294, have been decided by the supreme court at Washington, and are so far decisive of this case. But as to the other one-half of the earnings, to wit, the sum of $39,473.68, accruing in the year 1870, the plaintiffs contend that the tax was illegal and without authority; that although, as decided in Barnes v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. (Dec. Term, 1872) 17 Wall. [84 U. S.] 294, a tax of 5 per cent, might be assessed upon dividends declared subsequent to December 31, 1869, upon net earnings prior to that date, yet there is no authority by law for assessing taxes upon dividends declared out of earnings that accrued subsequent to that date, on which the tax was not assessed by the 1st day of March, 1870. Such was his position on the argument of the case, and he relied upon the act of March 2, 1S67 (14 Stat. 4S0). “That the taxes on incomes herein imposed shall be levied on the 1st day of March, and be due and payable on or before the 30th day of April in each year, until the year 1870, and no longer.” But if the position of the plaintiffs is correct, that this tax was illegal because it was not assessed until after March 1, 1870, then it is difficult to see — though not so claimed by plaintiffs — how the tax on the earnings of the last three months of 1869 was legal, because the dividend on the whole six months’ earnings was not declared until the 22d day of April, 1870, and the tax was not assessed on any portion thereof until the 17th of June following. All the earnings of the road, in that particular, are in the same category. Since the argument in this case, the supreme court has decided in the Stockdale Cases [Stockdale v. Doswell, 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 156; Same v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 323] that the income of corporations, accruing between the first day of January, 1870, and the 1st day of July of the same year, is liable to taxation; and they based their decision upon the 17th section of the act of July 14, 1870, which is as follows, so far as it is material to this case: “And be it further enacted, that sections one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of the act of June 30, 1SG4, entitled ‘An act to provide internal revenue to support tlie government, to pay interest on the public debt, and for other purposes,’ as amended by the act of July 13, 1SGG, and the act of March 2, 1SG7. shall be construed to impose the taxes therein mentioned to the [264]*264first day of August, 1870, but after that date no further taxes shall be levied or assessed under said sections.” This act was passed July 14, 1870, and the report of the Stock-dale Cases [supra] is silent as to the time the taxes under consideration therein were assessed, whether before or after the passage of the act. But in this case it is agreed that the tax was assessed on the 10th day of June, 1870, which was before that act was passed; and so the assessment of the tax cannot be supported under it, as the act provides distinctly that it “shall not be construed to affect any act done, right accrued or penalty incurred under former acts; but every such right is hereby saved.”

Now, it is very manifest that if this assessment was not legal before that act, — if there was no authority for it, — then it was not legal afterwards, because, being made before the act passed, it was, by expressed terms, not to be affected by it This tax, then, so far as laid upon the earnings of the road accruing, subsequently to Dec. 31st, 1869, if supported at all, must be upon different grounds from those on which were placed the Stockdale Cases, by a majority of the court, and we think it may be so supported; and in the Stockdale Cases two of the judges (Bradley and Chief Justice), while concurring in the opinion of a majority of the court, did so expressly upon, to them, the more satisfactory ground that the 120th and 122d sections of the statute of 1864 (13 Stat. 283, 284), amended by the act of 1866, had not been repealed or limited in duration by the 119th section of the same act, as amended by the act of 1867 (14 Stat.

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Bluebook (online)
6 F. Cas. 262, 21 Int. Rev. Rec. 74, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/concord-r-corp-v-topliff-circtdnh-1874.