Compton v. Oregon State Highway Commission

571 P.2d 1271, 31 Or. App. 919, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2861
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedDecember 5, 1977
DocketNo. 417-068, CA 8248
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 571 P.2d 1271 (Compton v. Oregon State Highway Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Compton v. Oregon State Highway Commission, 571 P.2d 1271, 31 Or. App. 919, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2861 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinion

LEE, J.

This case steins from an eminent domain case tried in June, 1970, in which plaintiffs contended that by reason of acts that occurred prior to and during that trial they were denied just compensation. In that 1970 case plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought a new trial based upon alleged irregularities and false testimony. In the present case, which raises essentially the same issues1 as those urged in support of plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial in the 1970 case, defendants moved for summary judgment and the trial court found that there was "no genuine issue as to any material fact”2 and granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ action.3 At the argument on defendants’ motion for summary judgment plaintiff, Richard N. Compton, admitted that following the denial of the motion for a new trial in 1970 he learned of the alleged conspiracy "[a]bout a year or so afterwards.” The issue is whether as a matter of law the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ alleged cause of action thereby eliminating any material issue of fact. We hold that the statute of [[922]]*[922]limitations is controlling and therefore the summary judgment was properly granted.

Plaintiffs filed this action on June 9, 1975, charging the defendants with "conspiracy and fraud in the controlling of appraisal values of their property” and with "presenting perjurious testimony.” In Oregon conspiracy has not been recognized as an independent tort. Bliss v. Southern Pacific Co. et al, 212 Or 634, 642, 321 P2d 324, 332 (1958). Assuming, arguendo, that "conspiracy to commit fraud” was the cause of action plaintiffs sought to allege, there are two different effective times when the statute of limitations commences to run. An action for conspiracy must be commenced within two years from the last overt act4 whereas the statute of limitations for fraud commences only upon "discovery” of the fraud.5 Thus the question of law is, when does the statute of limitations for "conspiracy to commit fraud” commence to run? The answer becomes apparent upon analyzing the nature of fraud. Since fraud requires that plaintiffs justifiably rely upon defendant’s representations, any further acts by defendants after discovery of the fraud by plaintiffs would not be actionable. Therefore, for purposes of the statute of limitations the last overt act in furtherance of the alleged fraud must have occurred prior to discovery of that fraud.

We conclude that as a matter of law plaintiffs discovered the alleged fraud in August, 1970, when they made their motion for a new trial urging procedural irregularities and false testimony. In any event, plaintiffs’ admission in open court that they knew of the alleged conspiracy "[a]bout a year or so” [[923]]*[923]after the motion for the new trial had been denied in August, 1970, confirms that the statute of limitations had run before the filing of the complaint herein on June 9, 1975. Accordingly, the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Affirmed.

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Related

Melgard v. Hanna
607 P.2d 795 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1980)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
571 P.2d 1271, 31 Or. App. 919, 1977 Ore. App. LEXIS 2861, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/compton-v-oregon-state-highway-commission-orctapp-1977.