Community Service Insurance v. Shears
Opinion
Defendant Rita Shears appeals from a declaratory judgment holding that a household exclusionary clause in the automobile insurance policy of defendant Richard Shears released the plaintiff insurer from any duty to defend an action brought against Richard Shears by appellant or to satisfy any judgment arising therefrom.
On September 3, 1973, Mr. Shears struck and killed his three-year-old daughter while backing his truck out of the driveway. Following a divorce, Rita Shears brought an action against her ex-husband in her own name and as special administratrix of the estate of her daughter for damages arising from the accident.
The household exclusionary clause in question states in pertinent part:
"Coverage A — Bodily Injury Liability. To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay * * * because of * * * death * * * arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.
"This policy does not apply:
:(t) under Coverage A, to bodily injury to (1) the spouse or any parent, son or daughter of the insured, or (2) the named insured.”
The validity of similar household exclusionary clauses has been considered by numerous panels of this Court. In Weisberg v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 36 Mich App 513; 194 *374 NW2d 193 (1971), a split panel 1 upheld an exclusionary clause barring a named insured from recovery. The named insured had been a passenger in his own car which was being permissibly operated by another person when an accident occurred. This same result was reached in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Peckham, 74 Mich App 551; 254 NW2d 575 (1977), wherein the Court based its decision on the Weisberg precedent.
However, other panels of this Court have declined to follow the Weisberg rationale and found such clauses to be void as against public policy. Gurwin v Alcodray, 77 Mich App 97; 257 NW2d 665 (1977), Allstate Ins Co v DeFrain, 81 Mich App 503; 265 NW2d 392 (1978), State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Traycik (After Remand), 86 Mich App 285; 272 NW2d 629 (1978).
The Michigan Supreme Court addressed the issue of household exclusionary clauses in the recently released case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Sivey, 404 Mich 51; 272 NW2d 555 (1978). The Court held that an exclusion of a named insured in an automobile insurance policy contravened public policy. The Court specifically rejected the Weisberg majority opinion and adopted Judge (now Justice) Levin’s dissent.
Plaintiff argues that the Sivey case is applicable only to accidents occurring prior to the amendment of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act and those occurring since the no-fault legislation. We cannot accept this argument. The reference to the financial responsibility act, MCL 257.520(b)(2); MSA 9.2220(b)(2), in the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, MCL 257.1102(d); MSA 9.2802(d), was replaced with a reference to MCL 500.3009(2); MSA 24.13009(2). 2
*375 The 1971 amendment has not been interpreted as working a change in the state’s public policy as set forth in the former statute. The amendment allows only a very narrow exclusion of liability *376 coverage when a vehicle is operated by a named person. The household exclusion seeks to avoid liability when certain persons are injured. The statutory exclusion is clearly inapplicable in such a situation. Citizens Mutual Ins Co v Central National Ins Co of Omaha, 65 Mich App 349, 352-354; 237 NW2d 322 (1975), Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange v Van Slyke, 82 Mich App 237; 266 NW2d 771 (1978).
The exclusionary clause in question is invalid. It is neither authorized by statute nor in harmony with the legislative purpose of comprehensive liability coverage as interpreted by the judiciary.
Reversed.
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280 N.W.2d 532 (Community Service Insurance v. Shears) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.