NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-20
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
ZACHARY P. HARRIS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant was charged in District Court with negligent
operation of a motor vehicle and with a marked lanes violation.
He moved to dismiss the citation as untimely issued in violation
of the "no-fix" law, G. L. c. 90C, § 2. A judge denied the
motion after an evidentiary hearing. The defendant then entered
a conditional plea, preserving his denied motion to dismiss for
appeal. We agree with the judge that an exception to § 2
applies, and thus we affirm the order denying the motion to
dismiss.
Background. We summarize the judge's findings of fact,
which we accept absent clear error. Commonwealth v. O'Leary,
480 Mass. 67, 67 (2018). On the morning of May 12, 2023, on Route 2 in the town of Gill, the defendant was involved in a
three-car head-on accident when he took his eyes off the road
and veered into oncoming traffic. All three cars were seriously
damaged; one was smoking. The defendant and the victims in both
of the other cars were all transported to the hospital. One
victim was pregnant at the time and would be monitored going
forward; another sustained a fractured rib. A third victim was
having trouble breathing at the scene and was eventually
transferred by airlift to another hospital.
Though the accident occurred in Gill, emergency response
crews from multiple surrounding towns responded to assist at the
scene. The Gill police chief also requested State police and
crime scene services assistance to photograph and reconstruct
the scene. The collision accident reconstruction services
(CARS) unit documented where each vehicle came to rest and the
surrounding damage to the pavement to then create a digital map
of the scene.
State troopers interviewed the defendant at the hospital.
The defendant told them that he had taken his eyes off the road
to retrieve a bagel and look at his phone when he veered into
the oncoming lane, causing the accident. The defendant further
acknowledged his understanding that all three vehicles were
seriously damaged.
2 One week after the accident, the Gill police chief issued
the citation to the defendant. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss and
hold that the citation was not untimely issued in violation of
G. L. c. 90C, § 2, because the statute's third exception
applies.
Discussion. We review determinations on issues of law de
novo. Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 470 Mass. 625, 627 (2015).
Commonly known as the "no-fix" law, G. L. c. 90C, § 2, requires
that police record automobile law violations and issue a
citation "as soon as possible" after the incident, and further
provides that "failure to give a copy of the citation to the
violator at the time and place of the violation shall constitute
a defense in any court proceeding for such violation." The
statute then sets forth three main exceptions to this
requirement:
"[1] where the violator could not have been stopped or [2] where additional time was reasonably necessary to determine the nature of the violation or the identity of the violator, or [3] where the court finds that a circumstance, not inconsistent with the purpose of this section to create a uniform, simplified and non-criminal method for disposing of automobile law violations, justifies the failure."
Id. The defendant argues that the Gill police chief did not
comply with the requirements of § 2 when he issued a citation
one week after the accident. Because the defendant's identity
3 and all material facts for the citation were known to police by
the end of the day of the accident, the defendant argues that
none of the exceptions apply. Specifically, he argues that no
circumstances justified the delay in issuing the citation, and
contends that he was not on notice that charges could result at
a later date.
The Commonwealth argues that the delay was justified and
not inconsistent with the purposes of the statute, and that the
severity of the accident sufficiently put the defendant on
implicit notice that charges might result.1
1. Circumstance not inconsistent with the purpose of the
statute. We agree with the Commonwealth that a circumstance not
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute justified the
failure to issue a citation at the scene of the accident.2
We determine the applicability of the third exception with
reference to the dual purposes of § 2. The first purpose,
1 Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that the delay was reasonably necessary for the police's ongoing investigation into the nature and extent of the violation. Because we hold that the third exception applies, we need not reach this argument.
2 Although the text of the no-fix law refers to "a circumstance," the Supreme Judicial Court's cases do not appear to require the police to identify a specific circumstance which justifies the failure, apart from the seriousness of the accident or the resulting injuries. See, e.g., O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 71-73; Commonwealth v. Cameron, 416 Mass. 314, 316-318 (1993).
4 apparent from the common name of the statute, is to prevent
"manipulation or misuse of the citation process because of any
unnecessary or unreasonable delay." O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 71,
quoting Commonwealth v. Cameron, 416 Mass. 314, 316 n.2 (1993).
The second purpose is "to afford prompt and definite notice of
the nature of the alleged offense to the putative violator."
Commonwealth v. Pappas, 384 Mass. 428, 431 (1981). We also bear
in mind the principle that, under the no-fix statute, "[e]ach
case must be decided on its own peculiar facts." Commonwealth
v. Provost, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 484 (1981).
a. Preventing manipulation. The Supreme Judicial Court has
repeatedly affirmed that "serious injuries resulting from the
traffic violation . . . create[] an ineradicable record of the
event" such that "manipulation is extremely unlikely."
Commonwealth v. Carapellucci, 429 Mass. 579, 581-582 (1999).
Accord O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 73. The same is true of serious
accidents where it is "inconceivable" that responding officers
"would regard this as a minor accident in which their discretion
concerning whether to issue a citation would be absolute and
unchecked." Pappas, 384 Mass. at 431-432.
The severity of the accident is more likely to create a
sufficient basis for preventing abuse when there are multiple
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-20
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
ZACHARY P. HARRIS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant was charged in District Court with negligent
operation of a motor vehicle and with a marked lanes violation.
He moved to dismiss the citation as untimely issued in violation
of the "no-fix" law, G. L. c. 90C, § 2. A judge denied the
motion after an evidentiary hearing. The defendant then entered
a conditional plea, preserving his denied motion to dismiss for
appeal. We agree with the judge that an exception to § 2
applies, and thus we affirm the order denying the motion to
dismiss.
Background. We summarize the judge's findings of fact,
which we accept absent clear error. Commonwealth v. O'Leary,
480 Mass. 67, 67 (2018). On the morning of May 12, 2023, on Route 2 in the town of Gill, the defendant was involved in a
three-car head-on accident when he took his eyes off the road
and veered into oncoming traffic. All three cars were seriously
damaged; one was smoking. The defendant and the victims in both
of the other cars were all transported to the hospital. One
victim was pregnant at the time and would be monitored going
forward; another sustained a fractured rib. A third victim was
having trouble breathing at the scene and was eventually
transferred by airlift to another hospital.
Though the accident occurred in Gill, emergency response
crews from multiple surrounding towns responded to assist at the
scene. The Gill police chief also requested State police and
crime scene services assistance to photograph and reconstruct
the scene. The collision accident reconstruction services
(CARS) unit documented where each vehicle came to rest and the
surrounding damage to the pavement to then create a digital map
of the scene.
State troopers interviewed the defendant at the hospital.
The defendant told them that he had taken his eyes off the road
to retrieve a bagel and look at his phone when he veered into
the oncoming lane, causing the accident. The defendant further
acknowledged his understanding that all three vehicles were
seriously damaged.
2 One week after the accident, the Gill police chief issued
the citation to the defendant. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss and
hold that the citation was not untimely issued in violation of
G. L. c. 90C, § 2, because the statute's third exception
applies.
Discussion. We review determinations on issues of law de
novo. Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 470 Mass. 625, 627 (2015).
Commonly known as the "no-fix" law, G. L. c. 90C, § 2, requires
that police record automobile law violations and issue a
citation "as soon as possible" after the incident, and further
provides that "failure to give a copy of the citation to the
violator at the time and place of the violation shall constitute
a defense in any court proceeding for such violation." The
statute then sets forth three main exceptions to this
requirement:
"[1] where the violator could not have been stopped or [2] where additional time was reasonably necessary to determine the nature of the violation or the identity of the violator, or [3] where the court finds that a circumstance, not inconsistent with the purpose of this section to create a uniform, simplified and non-criminal method for disposing of automobile law violations, justifies the failure."
Id. The defendant argues that the Gill police chief did not
comply with the requirements of § 2 when he issued a citation
one week after the accident. Because the defendant's identity
3 and all material facts for the citation were known to police by
the end of the day of the accident, the defendant argues that
none of the exceptions apply. Specifically, he argues that no
circumstances justified the delay in issuing the citation, and
contends that he was not on notice that charges could result at
a later date.
The Commonwealth argues that the delay was justified and
not inconsistent with the purposes of the statute, and that the
severity of the accident sufficiently put the defendant on
implicit notice that charges might result.1
1. Circumstance not inconsistent with the purpose of the
statute. We agree with the Commonwealth that a circumstance not
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute justified the
failure to issue a citation at the scene of the accident.2
We determine the applicability of the third exception with
reference to the dual purposes of § 2. The first purpose,
1 Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that the delay was reasonably necessary for the police's ongoing investigation into the nature and extent of the violation. Because we hold that the third exception applies, we need not reach this argument.
2 Although the text of the no-fix law refers to "a circumstance," the Supreme Judicial Court's cases do not appear to require the police to identify a specific circumstance which justifies the failure, apart from the seriousness of the accident or the resulting injuries. See, e.g., O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 71-73; Commonwealth v. Cameron, 416 Mass. 314, 316-318 (1993).
4 apparent from the common name of the statute, is to prevent
"manipulation or misuse of the citation process because of any
unnecessary or unreasonable delay." O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 71,
quoting Commonwealth v. Cameron, 416 Mass. 314, 316 n.2 (1993).
The second purpose is "to afford prompt and definite notice of
the nature of the alleged offense to the putative violator."
Commonwealth v. Pappas, 384 Mass. 428, 431 (1981). We also bear
in mind the principle that, under the no-fix statute, "[e]ach
case must be decided on its own peculiar facts." Commonwealth
v. Provost, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 484 (1981).
a. Preventing manipulation. The Supreme Judicial Court has
repeatedly affirmed that "serious injuries resulting from the
traffic violation . . . create[] an ineradicable record of the
event" such that "manipulation is extremely unlikely."
Commonwealth v. Carapellucci, 429 Mass. 579, 581-582 (1999).
Accord O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 73. The same is true of serious
accidents where it is "inconceivable" that responding officers
"would regard this as a minor accident in which their discretion
concerning whether to issue a citation would be absolute and
unchecked." Pappas, 384 Mass. at 431-432.
The severity of the accident is more likely to create a
sufficient basis for preventing abuse when there are multiple
vehicles involved and third-party injuries, as opposed to
5 single-car accidents with no serious injuries. For example, in
both Cameron and Pappas, the defendant's vehicle crossed the
center line before striking and seriously injuring a third
party. See Cameron, 416 Mass. at 315; Pappas, 384 Mass. at 431-
432. In Commonwealth v. Babb, the defendant's car "went from
side to side in the road" before striking a parked car and a
bicyclist. Babb, 389 Mass. 275, 276 (1983). All three of those
situations satisfied the anti-abuse purposes of the statute. By
contrast, O'Leary and Carapellucci involved single-vehicle
accidents where only the driver and other passengers in the same
vehicle were injured, and the injuries were more minor. See
O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 68; Carapellucci, 429 Mass. at 580.
There, the anti-abuse purposes of the statute were not
sufficiently served, and so the exception did not apply.
The present case is more aligned with Pappas, Cameron, and
Babb. The citation here stems from a three-car head-on
accident, caused when the defendant crossed over the center
line, where the defendant and multiple third-party victims were
all transported to the hospital, including one who was later
transferred to another hospital by airlift. Emergency services
from multiple towns responded to the scene. Furthermore, the
Gill police chief took steps to ensure that there would be a
record of the accident itself when the CARS unit was brought in
6 to create a digital map of the scene. The severity of this
accident created an ineradicable record, rendering the risk of
manipulation extremely low. As a result, the anti-abuse
purposes of the statute were not frustrated by the delay in
issuing a citation here.
b. Notice. The defendant argues that he was never told
that criminal charges could result from the accident, and
therefore that he was not on notice of this possibility. The
notice requirements of the no-fix statute, however, can be
satisfied with implicit notice.3
"[T]he cases make clear that the very seriousness of
particular charges tends to minimize the importance of absolute
observance of the procedures because, again, 'fix' is virtually
excluded, and notice is implicit." Cameron, 416 Mass. at 317,
quoting Babb, 389 Mass. at 283. The purpose of notice is "to
prevent a situation in which a person cannot establish a defence
due to his being charged with a violation long after it occurs."
Cameron, supra at 316, quoting Commonwealth v. Gorman, 356 Mass.
355, 357-358 (1969). This purpose is served when it is "not
3 The Commonwealth concedes that the record does not support the judge's additional finding that State troopers explicitly notified the defendant that charges might result, and so we do not rely on this finding.
7 reasonable to conclude that the defendant was not aware of the
seriousness of the accident." Cameron, supra.
The seriousness of the accident here, and the defendant's
awareness thereof, was sufficient to put him on notice that
charges might result at a later date. Here, the defendant
acknowledged his fault in the crash during his interview with
State troopers in the hospital. He further expressed
understanding that multiple vehicles were seriously damaged.
Even if the defendant was not aware of the severity of the
others' injuries, it is unreasonable to conclude that he was not
aware of the seriousness of the accident.
c. Inadequacy of explanation. The defendant additionally
argues that the delay was inexcusable because the police already
had all the information needed to issue the citation on the day
of the accident. However, where notice is satisfied and no
purpose of § 2 is being thwarted, simple inadequacy of the
police explanation for the delay does not overcome the third
exception so long as police were not "seriously deficient or
negligent in their handling of the matter." Cameron, 416 Mass.
at 317-318.
Here, the record does not support a conclusion that the
Gill police chief was seriously deficient or negligent in his
handling of the matter when he issued the citation one week
8 after the accident. While the record is not completely clear
about the extent to which the chief may have been conducting an
ongoing investigation or communicating with State troopers
during the period of the delay, this lack of clear explanation
does not rise to being seriously deficient or negligent. There
is also nothing in the record here to indicate that the delay
stemmed from a review process that risks subverting the anti-
abuse purposes of the statute. Cf. O'Leary, 480 Mass. at 72-73
(delay resulting from supervisory review process was "strikingly
similar" to review processes in place before § 2's enactment and
which Legislature sought to eliminate).
Order denying motion to dismiss affirmed.
By the Court (Sacks, Smyth & Wood, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: October 10, 2025.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.