Commonwealth v. Woods

18 Mass. L. Rptr. 205
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedAugust 3, 2004
DocketNo. 020960106
StatusPublished

This text of 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 205 (Commonwealth v. Woods) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Woods, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 205 (Mass. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

Connon, J.

BACKGROUND

On May 16,2002, the Defendant, William J. Woods, was arrested by the Barnstable Police Department in connection with a housebreak in Falmouth wherein a number of firearms were taken. The arrest occurred at approximately 1:30 a.m., as the defendant was walking along Route 28 in Hyannis near the Mobil station. When arrested on a warrant, the defendant had nothing on his person. The arresting officer, Brian Morrison, was in the defendant’s presence for approximately one hour up to the time when the defendant was booked. During this period, Officer Morrison did not detect any odors of alcohol and didn’t believe the defendant was under the influence at that time. Sergeant Kevin Tynan, the watch commander in the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift, booked the defendant at approximately 1:45 a.m. When the defendant first appeared in the booking area, Sergeant Tynan didn’t observe anything unusual about the way the defendant walked. Nor did he observe any smell of alcohol on the defendant’s breath, who was standing within 2V2 feet from him. The defendant was in Sergeant Tynan’s presence for approximately 15 minutes, and during the booking procedure, the defendant answered all questions appropriately.

After the booking, the defendant was taken to an interview room measuring 10 feet by 12 feet and containing a desk and three chairs, with a glass window. Detective Paul Everson, a detective with the Barnstable Police Department with 24 years experience, advised the defendant of his rights per Miranda Everson had been working with the Falmouth Police Department in the investigation of the housebreak in Falmouth. During the interview, Woods was seated across the desk from Everson, some five feet away. Everson did detect a smell of staleness from the defendant’s breath and asked Woods about alcohol and drug use. Woods responded that he had been on a “bender” but was okay right now. Woods gave a detailed statement of his involvement in the housebreaks in Falmouth after signing a waiver on May 16, 2002 at 8:47 a.m. After the break, Woods traded one of the guns for 1/2 ounce of cocaine and marijuana. Woods told the police that he was addicted to alcohol and Oxycontin and used up all of the drugs he received from trading the guns.

Garvin Kelley, of the Dennis Police Department, who on six to seven prior occasions had dealings with Woods, was standing some two and a half feet away from him at the police station. Kelley could smell a stale odor of alcohol coming from Woods’s breath, however Kelley didn’t believe that Woods was under the influence of alcohol and at one point he asked Woods if he was going to be dope sick, whereupon Woods responded, “No, not now.” In moving to suppress the statements, William Woods signed an affidavit on January 29th of 2004 which in part stated that at the time he was questioned he had been on alcohol and Oxycontin and confused, and when he was detained in jail he experienced drug and alcohol withdrawal. In addition, he averred that he had not signed a written statement when in effect he had signed a statement which was marked as Exhibit B in this Motion to Suppress.

Woods was held on bail at the Barnstable County House of Correction after his arrest. On May 16, an intake report completed by the Medical Department reflected in part that Woods told them he was an alcoholic; that , he had 24 beers and a fifth of gin and that he abuses Oxycontin and cocaine. The note in the report reflects that Woods would be monitored for detox, and that was at approximately 8:00 a.m. on May 17 of 2002. It was noted that when Woods was first seen in the medical unit, he had visible signs of withdrawal, i.e. tremors, and the protocol was started.

The Motion to Suppress in large part is based upon the defendant’s use of alcohol and drugs prior to his arrest, and that said use deprived the defendant of knowingly and voluntarily and intelligently waiving his rights under Miranda. On this issue, the defendant offered the testimony of Dr. Paul A. Spiers, a Board Certified Clinical Psychologist with an emphasis on neuropsychology (behavior as it relates to different parts of the brain which indicate whether that part is working), and forensic neuropsychology. In the past, Dr. Spiers has been qualified as an expert in Superior Court, Federal District Court and the Probate Courts in this Commonwealth as well as the District Court. A history given to Dr. Spiers by Woods was that in April of2002, the defendant started to abuse Oxycontin and [228]*228cocaine. At the time of his arrest, he had been abusing the drugs for approximately three weeks, drinking 30 beers a day and doing an ounce of cocaine every other day. Dr. Spiers testified that the defendant’s understanding and appreciation of Miranda was specifically assessed with the AUA-MR (Grisso 1998). His current scores were in the average range. The AUA-MR is divided into four sections: Comprehension of Miranda Rights (CMR); Comprehension of Miranda Rights— Recognition (CMR-R); Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary (CMV); and Function of Rights in Interrogation (FRI). The AUA-MR was developed by research funded by the National Institute of Mental Health to Dr. Thomas Grisso, Director of Forensic Training and Research at the University of Massachusetts. The procedure and methods of inquiry were standardized and normative data have been collected from populations of adult and juvenile offenders. In a number of cases, the AUA-MR has been accepted as a scientifically valid instrument for measuring the abilities required by a defendant to waive his/her rights under Miranda

Dr. Spiers further opined that given the predictable effect of alcohol on the frontal networks of the brain, an effect that is only exaggerated in the presence of neurodevelopmental compromise to these same networks, it is possible to state with certainty that Mr. Woods would have had significantly reduced ability to intelligently evaluate his circumstances and the potential implications of waiver on his rights. As such, Dr. Spiers doubted that the waiver Woods signed couldn’t have met the intelligent criteria. Dr. Spiers concluded and it was his professional opinion that Mr. Woods could not have given a valid waiver of Miranda or any voluntary statement to the Barnstable Police Department.

DISCUSSION

While there is no per se rule excluding as involuntary statements made during drug withdrawal, the court recognized that the prosecution bears a heavy burden to show that the defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights and his subsequent confession were voluntary. Commonwealth v. Paszko, 391 Mass. 164 (1984). The Supreme Judicial Court has held on numerous occasions in the context of waiver of Miranda rights that, “Intoxication alone isn’t sufficient to negate an otherwise voluntary act.” Commonwealth v. Doucette, 391 Mass. 443, 448 (1984); Commonwealth v. Ward, 426 Mass. 290 (1997); and Commonwealth v. Wolinski, 431 Mass. 228 (2000).

When this defendant was in custody, he did not appear to be intoxicated. All that was evident was a stale odor of alcohol coming from his breath. He appeared to respond appropriately to all of the questions asked and gave a detailed account of his involvement in the housebreak in Falmouth.

The Commonwealth has the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that any Miranda waiver by the defendant was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 Mass. 433, 447 (1995), citing Miranda v. Arizona,

Related

Miranda v. Arizona
384 U.S. 436 (Supreme Court, 1966)
Commonwealth v. Doucette
462 N.E.2d 1084 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1984)
Commonwealth v. Paszko
461 N.E.2d 222 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1984)
Commonwealth v. Fielding
353 N.E.2d 719 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1976)
Commonwealth v. Judge
650 N.E.2d 1242 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1995)
Commonwealth v. Selby
651 N.E.2d 843 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1995)
Commonwealth v. Raymond
676 N.E.2d 824 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1997)
Commonwealth v. Ward
688 N.E.2d 227 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1997)
Commonwealth v. Wolinski
726 N.E.2d 930 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
18 Mass. L. Rptr. 205, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-woods-masssuperct-2004.