OPINION BY
BOWES, J.:
On appeal, Rosha Charles Williams assails the propriety of the trial court’s refusal to suppress cash found on his person and drugs discovered in a vehicle from which he was selling cocaine.1 We affirm.
[614] At the September 1, 2006 suppression hearing, Erie Police Officer Michael Nolan testified that he had fourteen years of experience as a police officer, was assigned to the Drug and Vice Unit of the police department for eleven years, and was commander of that unit for the preceding two years. On March 13, 2006, he returned home from work for the day when he received a telephone call from a confidential informant (“Cl”). The Cl advised Officer Nolan that within the preceding few minutes, he or she had observed Appellant seated in a black Expedition in the BOO block of Myrtle Street selling bags of crack cocaine. Officer Nolan, whom the suppression court found credible, related that the Cl had been a source of reliable information for ten years. As a result of prior facts received from the Cl, the officer obtained convictions of over twenty individuals for felony drug violations, and seized over $100,000 in drug proceeds and in excess of ten kilograms of cocaine or crack cocaine.
Officer Nolan knew Appellant from prior contact with him, was aware that he drove a black Expedition, and had received numerous complaints that Appellant was conducting drug-related activity in the 800 block of Myrtle Street. On the night of March 13, 2006, after receiving the telephone call from the Cl, Officer Nolan immediately proceeded to Myrtle Street in an unmarked cruiser and requested backup assistance. He observed Appellant in a black Expedition that was parked in the 300 block of Myrtle Street.
Officer Nolan drove past Appellant and parked about one and one-half blocks away from Appellant’s vehicle. He then conducted unenhanced visual surveillance. During a twenty-minute time frame, Officer Nolan observed four individuals separately approach Appellant’s vehicle, interact with Appellant, and viewed what they were doing with their hands.
While one person merely conversed with Appellant, who was located in the driver’s seat of the car, the three others placed their hands momentarily inside Appellant’s vehicle. Their “activity was very consistent with retrieving or handing items to and from someone.” N.T. Pre-Trial Hearing, 9/1/06, at 8. Officer Nolan continued that he had “conducted hundreds of hours of surveillance and I’ve observed probably close to fifty drug deals take place during surveillance, and this activity was consistent with that.” Id. Officer Nolan also completed a computer check of Appellant’s driver’s license, which was suspended.
After the four interactions, Appellant drove away from Myrtle Street, and Officer Nolan followed him. Officer Nolan stopped behind Appellant’s vehicle as Appellant, who lived nearby, pulled into his driveway. Officer Nolan activated his lights, approached Appellant, patted him down, and discovered $600 in cash in his pocket. Appellant was handcuffed and [615] transported to the Erie Police Department.
Appellant’s black Expedition was then driven by another police officer to the police department garage so that the K-9 drug dog could conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle. While the Expedition was driven to the police station, no search was made of the vehicle, and no evidence was recovered. When the K-9 made a positive indication to the driver’s side of the Expedition, Officer Nolan shined his flashlight at that location and observed a plastic baggie protruding from the roof liner near the driver’s side. Officer Nolan delineated, “Plastic baggies are overwhelmingly the most common method to package drugs of all types, but specifically crack cocaine in particular.” Id. at 11. Thereafter, Officer Nolan obtained a search warrant for the Expedition and discovered seven plastic baggies containing crack cocaine, a knife, and two cellular phones.
As a result of this investigation, Appellant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving with a suspended license. After litigating an unsuccessful motion to suppress the evidence, he was convicted of all charges. On May 24, 2007, Appellant was sentenced to three to eight years imprisonment. A panel of this Court affirmed, and we then granted en banc review. Appellant raises two challenges to the suppression court’s ruling:
1. Whether the Court of Common Pleas erred and/or abused its discretion in denying the Appellant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence based on his illegal arrest, and allowing into evidence $600.00 cash found on the appellant’s person, and crack cocaine found in his vehicle, at trial.
2. Whether the Court of Common Pleas erred and/or abused its discretion in denying the Appellant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence based on the illegal seizure of his vehicle from his driveway, and allowing into evidence crack cocaine subsequently seized from his vehicle.
Appellant’s brief at 7.
Preliminarily, we note that Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement was untimely filed; however, the trial court overlooked its tardy nature and elected to address the issues on the merits. Thus, we decline to find waiver. Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 430 (Pa.Super.2009) (en banc).
We note our well established standard of review:
“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 591 Pa. 1, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 894, 128 S.Ct. 211, 169 L.Ed.2d 158 (2007). Those properly supported facts are binding upon us and we “may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.” Id.
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa.2009).
The first issue we address is whether Officer Nolan had probable cause to arrest and search Appellant after Appellant exited his car and was walking toward his residence.
[616] Probable cause is made out when “the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.” Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 526 Pa. 268, 585 A.2d 988, 990 (1991). The question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was “correct or more likely true than false.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 780, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). Rather, we require only a “probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). In determining whether probable cause exists, we apply a totality of the circumstances test. Commonwealth v. Clark, 558 Pa. 157, 735 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1999) (relying on Gates, supra).
Id. (emphases in original).
Thompson provides guidance herein. In that ease, a plainclothes police officer was patrolling a high crime area when he observed the defendant perform what the officer concluded was a drug transaction with another man. Defendant was arrested, and drugs were discovered on his person. The issue addressed by our Supreme Court was whether the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant despite the fact that the police officer had not viewed the objects exchanged between the defendant and the other individual.
In Thompson, the officer concluded that drugs had been sold based upon his narcotics-related experience, the location of the activity in a high crime area, and the manner in which the transaction was conducted. The officer pointed to specific information which established that the area in question was one where narcotics were sold regularly. He also delineated the extensive nature of his background and training in detecting narcotics activity. Finally, the officer confirmed that he made numerous drug arrests based upon personal observation of drug transactions that were identical to the one made by the defendant. Our Supreme Court held that the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant.
In reaching its decision, the Court articulated a list of factors that are pertinent to the determination of whether probable cause for arrest for a drug sale has coalesced: the time of the drug sale, whether the drug sale was made on the street, the number of drug sales, where the drug items are kept, whether the location is established as one where drug-related activity normally transpires, the specific experience that the police officer has in observing narcotics trafficking, and the movements and mannerisms of the parties involved in the exchange. The Court stated that a police officer should provide specific information establishing both that the area is one where drug-related activity occurs and that he has the precise experience necessary to recognize a drug sale. Our Supreme Court ruled that officers who have specialized training in drug crimes are able to recognize criminal activity in that respect; however, generalized police experience is not as persuasive in the probable cause analysis. Thus, a police officer’s cursory proffer that he has police training is not as weighty in this context as particularized training and experience with drug trafficking.
Applying Thompson to the present case, it is clear that Officer Nolan had probable cquse to effectuate Appellant’s arrest. First, he received information from a reliable Cl that Appellant was selling drugs from an Expedition on Myrtle [617] Street. Officer Nolan knew that Appellant drove that type of car and had received complaints from other citizens that Appellant sold drugs from that location, substantiating that Myrtle Street was a location for drug trafficking. Armed with this information, Officer Nolan proceeded to observe Appellant, who was located in the Expedition on Myrtle Street. He saw Appellant perform three transactions within twenty minutes, and all appeared to be drug sales. Officer Nolan had particularized training in narcotics investigation, was a member of the narcotics unit for eleven years, and was its commander for two years. He had personally observed fifty drug transactions and testified that Appellant’s behavior with the three individuals at Appellant’s car was consistent with drug activity. The transactions occurred at night and on the street. Thus, each factor supporting a determination of probable cause, as outlined in Thompson, is present in this case.
Moreover, we have herein the added information from a reliable Cl that Appellant was, in fact, in the process of drug trafficking immediately prior to Officer Nolan’s arrival on the scene. The Cl previously provided reliable information leading to numerous drug convictions. The Cl’s tips were corroborated by Officer Nolan’s direct observation of Appellant conducting drug transactions at the location described by the Cl. In addition, Appellant’s reputation from other sources as a drug dealer on Myrtle Street supported the Cl’s tip. The facts and circumstances herein, based on information from the Cl as substantiated by the experienced narcotics officer’s direct observation of Appellants’ behavior of conducting three drug sales within a twenty-minute period, were sufficient to warrant anyone of reasonable caution to believe that Appellant was involved in selling drugs at that time. See Commonwealth v. Prosdocimo, 308 Pa.Super. 187, 454 A.2d 84 (1982) (en banc) (reliability of informant for purposes of supporting arrest warrant can be established by following factors, not all of which must be present: informant gave past reliable information, current information supplied by Cl was corroborated, Cl made declaration against interest, and the defendant’s reputation supports the Cl’s tip). Probable cause thus existed for Appellant’s arrest. Appellant’s first contention fails.
The next issue we address is whether the warrantless seizure of the Expedition requires suppression of the evidence seized therefrom during execution of the warrant. As noted, police drove the vehicle to the police department garage where the canine sniff was conducted. The Expedition remained there while the warrant was obtained. The car was not searched nor was any evidence seized from that vehicle while the vehicle was being driven from the driveway of Appellant’s house to the garage of the police department.
The Commonwealth represents that the police could not leave the car on the private driveway of Appellant’s residence because at that location, other people with whom Appellant lived could have accessed the vehicle and destroyed any drug evidence.2 The Commonwealth asserts that [618] the drugs would have been inevitably discovered based upon the validly-procured canine sniff and search warrant. It argues that the suppression court’s ruling was therefore valid.
We first examine whether the warrant-less seizure of the car was unconstitutional. Our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Holzer, 480 Pa. 93, 389 A.2d 101 (1978), addresses this very question. In that case, the police had impounded and towed the defendant’s car, which had been located on a public street near his residence. Police then procured a search warrant for the car, executed it, and discovered evidence utilized against defendant in that vehicle. At that time, police had probable cause to believe that the defendant was involved in a robbery and murder and had placed him into custody. The defendant contended that the results of the search of his car, which had been used during the perpetration of the crimes, should be suppressed because the car itself was seized without a warrant.
Our Supreme Court concluded that the towing of the car was not improper, holding: “It is reasonable ... for constitutional purposes for police to seize and hold a car until a search warrant can be obtained, where the seizure occurs after the user or owner has been placed into custody, where the vehicle is located on public property, and where there exists probable cause to believe that evidence of the commission of crime will be obtained from the vehicle.” Id. at 106 (footnote omitted). The Court also observed that if the “vehicle is located on the defendant’s private property (garage or driveway), it becomes more difficult, although not impossible, to find the police conduct reasonable, since there has been a greater infringement upon defendant’s expectations of privacy.” Id. at 106, n. 7. In this case, the car was seized while it was located in Appellant’s driveway. Hence, the Court’s ruling in Holzer constitutes a significant impediment to condoning the police conduct herein.
This conclusion inevitably leads to the question of whether the Commonwealth has properly invoked the inevitable discovery rule, which has been used interchangeably with the independent source doctrine. Our Supreme Court has indicated that the inevitable discovery rule applies in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Melendez, 544 Pa. 323, 676 A.2d 226, 230, 231 (1996) (stating that the “inevitable discovery rule, sometimes referred to as the ‘independent source rule,’ ” is valid law in Pennsylvania but that the inevitable discovery rule had no application in that case).
We begin our analysis by noting that the “inevitable discovery rule” and the “independent source rule” actually are distinct doctrines. The Third Circuit in United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3rd Cir.1992) (emphases in original), observed that the two concepts are often conflated, and the Court cogently analyzed the difference between them:
[U]nder the independent source doctrine, evidence that was in fact discovered lawfully, and not as a direct or indirect result of illegal activity, is admissible. In contrast, the inevitable discovery doctrine ... permits the introduction of evidence that inevitably would have been discovered through lawful means, although the search that actually led to the discovery of the evidence was unlawful. The independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines thus differ in that the former focuses on what actually happened and the latter considers what would have [619] happened in the absence of the initial search.
We believe that the independent source doctrine, which, in this case, the Commonwealth has quite validly confused with the inevitable discovery rule, applies herein. The independent source rule derives from the very nature of the exclusionary rule; thus, we start at the beginning. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained due to an unconstitutional search or seizure cannot be used against a defendant. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). The exclusionary rule also applies to any evidence discovered as a result of the original illegal police conduct; such evidence is termed “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939).
In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the Supreme Court re-affirmed the basic principle that evidence derived from unconstitutional police conduct must be suppressed.
In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746, this Court held nearly half a century ago that evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute proof against the victim of the search. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652. The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319.
Id. at 484-85, 83 S.Ct. 407. Thus, the “exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.” Id. at 485, 83 S.Ct. 407. In extending the rule to verbal evidence, the Wong Sun Court again referred to all evidence derived from unconstitutional police conduct as fruits of the poisonous tree, which cannot be used against a defendant.
The Wong Sun Court continued that the exclusionary rule does not prevent the introduction of evidence that is “gained from an independent source,” but rather applies only to “knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong.” Id. at 485, 83 S.Ct. 407 (quoting Silverthome Lumber Co., supra at 392, 40 S.Ct. 182). The Supreme Court in Wong Sun noted that evidence is admissible if the “connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” Id. at 487, 83 S.Ct. 407 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court ruled: “We need not hold that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, where evidence was obtained through constitutional police action unconnected with the illegal police conduct, it is “purged” of “taint” based upon its derivation from an independent source.
The Supreme Court further expounded on the concept of the independent source doctrine in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). In that case, the Court granted review to “decide whether, because of an [620] earlier illegal entry, the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of evidence seized later from a private residence pursuant to a valid search warrant which was issued on information obtained by the police before the entry into the residence.” Id. at 797-98,104 S.Ct. 3380.
In that case, drug enforcement' officers made an invalid warrantless entry into the defendant’s apartment because there were no exigent circumstances permitting such an entry. However, the drug agents did not conduct a search of the premises with the exception that they visually inspected each room solely to ensure that no one was present who posed a threat or would destroy evidence. The drug officers then secured the apartment in order to preserve the status quo while a search warrant was procured. Significantly, the drug enforcement officers did not seize any evidence, even that in plain view, until the warrant arrived. Additionally, the government did not use any information that was found due to the initial entry into the apartment to support issuance of the warrant.
The Supreme Court held that, even though the initial warrantless entry into the apartment was illegal, it did not taint the discovery of the evidence found and seized pursuant to the warrant. It reasoned that “the evidence discovered during the subsequent search of the apartment the following day pursuant to the valid search warrant issued wholly on information known to the officers before the entry into the apartment need not have been suppressed as ‘fruit’ of the illegal entry.” Id. at 799, 104 S.Ct. 3380. The Supreme Court concluded that suppression was unnecessary “because the warrant and the information on which it was based were unrelated to the entry and therefore constituted an independent source for the evidence under Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920).” Id. The Supreme Court noted that the evidence obtained as a result of the valid warrant did not result to any extent from the original, invalid entry. It observed:
It has been well established for more than 60 years that evidence is not to be excluded if the connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint,” Nardone v. United States, supra, 308 U.S., at 341, 60 S.Ct., at 268. It is not to be excluded, for example, if police had an “independent source” for discovery of the evidence[.]
Id. at 805,104 S.Ct. 3380.
Thus, the “independent source rule” naturally flows from the concept of the exclusionary rule itself and has been extant since 1920. In the present case, the independent source rule unquestionably applies. First, as analyzed supra, police had probable cause to believe that Appellant was dealing drugs from the Expedition, and, therefore, that it contained contraband. They drove the vehicle from the driveway to the police station to conduct the canine sniff and wait for the warrant. Police did not search the Expedition while driving to the police station, and no information gleaned during that ride was utilized to support the warrant. Thus, the warrantless seizure of the vehicle did not result in the discovery of a scintilla of evidence used by the government in any aspect of this prosecution.
The information supporting the canine sniff and the warrant was not derived to any extent from the singular act of taking the Expedition from the driveway to the police station to secure it. Rather, those two searches were based upon facts learned prior to the act of transporting the vehicle. Thus, the independent source [621] doctrine, as articulated in Segura, is directly applicable.
Our Supreme Court examined a similar situation in the case of Commonwealth v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 643 A.2d 61 (1994). Therein, Appellant was arrested inside his home without a warrant and without the existence of exigent circumstances. Our Supreme Court first concluded that the arrest was unconstitutional because “absent exigent circumstances, an arrest warrant supported by probable cause is required to arrest an individual in his home.” Id. at 68. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)).
The Carter Court then addressed the defendant’s requested relief pursuant to that illegal arrest. Specifically, the defendant asked the Court “to reverse his conviction because his arrest was illegal,” but the Court declined to do so. It observed that the defendant was “not himself a suppressible fruit, and the illegality of his detention cannot deprive the Government of the opportunity to prove his guilt through the introduction of evidence wholly untainted by the police misconduct.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980)). Our Supreme Court continued: “The remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment is exclusion of all evidence that is the fruit of that violation.” Id. (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)). It then concluded that since “there was no evidence introduced at trial that was obtained as a result of the illegal arrest,” the defendant was “not entitled to any relief.” Id. Herein, Carter applies. Appellant cannot obtain relief based upon the improper seizure of his vehicle because no evidence resulted from that seizure. Rather, his conviction is premised entirely upon evidence completely untainted by the police misconduct at issue herein.
More recently, our Supreme Court employed similar reasoning when deciding that a confession that defendant made following his invalid arrest was admissible at trial. Commonwealth v. Smith, 995 A.2d 1143 (Pa.2010). In that case, the police arrested the defendant pursuant to an infirm warrant that police mistakenly but in good faith believed was valid. After the arrest, the defendant was administered Miranda warnings three times, waived his constitutional rights, and confessed.
In seeking relief under the PCRA, the defendant in Smith argued that prior counsel was ineffective for not obtaining suppression of the confession based upon the taint of the illegal arrest. Our Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s position on the merits. Relying partially upon Wong Sun, it concluded that his confession was voluntary and therefore not subject to exclusion based upon the fact that he had properly waived his Miranda rights and police had acted in good faith when they executed the warrant. As in Smith, any taint applicable to the evidence seized from the Expedition due to the police action of driving the car to the police station was purged by the securing of a constitutional canine sniff and warrant that were not premised upon any facts garnered during that drive. We therefore conclude that the suppression court properly refused to suppress the evidence found in the Expedition when the warrant herein was executed.
We now address the propriety of the K-9 sniff of the Expedition. In Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454, 530 A.2d 74, 79 (1987), our Supreme Court held that “a narcotics detection dog may be deployed to test for the presence of narcotics, on the facts of this case where: 1. the police are able to articulate reason[622] able grounds for believing that drugs may be present in the place they seek to test; and 2. the police are lawfully present in the place where the canine sniff is conducted.” See also Commonwealth v. Rogers, 578 Pa. 127, 849 A.2d 1185 (2004). In the present case, Appellant argues that police were not “lawfully present in the place in which the canine search” was conducted. Appellant’s brief at 16. This proposition is untenable. The canine search was conducted at the police station where police unquestionably were permitted to be present. Furthermore, as analyzed above, probable cause existed to believe that Appellant was selling drugs from the Expedition; therefore, reasonable suspicion was present to conduct the K-9 sniff of that vehicle.
The true crux of Appellant’s argument relates back to the fact that the police drove his car to the police station where police were lawfully present. However, as analyzed supra, the facts supporting the existence of reasonable suspicion to conduct the search by the canine were not derived to any extent from the act of driving the Expedition to the police station. Instead, the facts supporting the canine sniff included the information provided to Officer Nolan by the Cl and his observation of Appellant’s activities on Myrtle Street. Hence, the canine sniff was not infirm.
Appellant’s final position is that the suppression court, when analyzing the propriety of the conduct of Officer Nolan, “improperly credited” the information provided by the Cl. Appellant’s brief at 17. He assails the trustworthiness of the Cl because the Cl was paid two hundred dollars for providing information against Appellant. He also contends that the Cl was unreliable because he or she informed Officer Nolan that the drugs would be on Appellant’s person whereas they actually were located in his car.
In the present case, the suppression court credited the testimony of Officer Nolan, who related the following. The Cl telephoned Officer Nolan and advised Officer Nolan that “he or she had, just within the last five minutes, or just within the last couple minutes, had seen Rosha Williams, the defendant, seated in a black Expedition with large, large rims in the 300 Block of Myrtle, and that Williams had several baggies of crack cocaine on him that he was selling.” N.T. Pre-Trial Hearing, 9/1/06, at 3-4.3 Officer Nolan continued:
[T]his source has provided me with information for over ten years. And as a result of this informant’s information over twenty individuals have been arrested and convicted in State and Federal Court for felony drug violations. Additionally, we have seized — as a result of this informant’s information, we seized over one hundred thousand dollars in drug proceeds and over five, or over ten kilos of cocaine and/or crack cocaine. So a combination of the two, ten kilograms of coke or crack—
Id. at 9/1/06, at 5.
The Cl’s information was corroborated by Officer Nolan’s receipt of “numerous complaints over the past, over the previous several years regarding drug activity involving Mr. Williams in that particular area that the Cl stated Williams was at.” Id. at 6. In addition, Officer Nolan had firsthand knowledge that Appellant drove a black Expedition with “big chrome wheels, twenty-four inch wheels,” and Officer Nolan related that Appellant was seen [623] driving that vehicle on “numerous occasions.” Id.
Based on the Cl’s telephone call, Officer Nolan immediately proceeded to Myrtle Street where he observed Appellant seated in his black Expedition parked “in the 300 Block of Myrtle right where the informant stated he would be parked.” Id. at 6-7. The officer then viewed Appellant make three drug transactions in a twenty-minute time frame.
In leveling his claims, Appellant disregards the fact that the drugs were on Appellant’s person during the course of the drug transactions. Thus, the Cl was not incorrect when he told Officer Nolan that Appellant had drugs on his person. Furthermore, Appellant overlooks the pertinent law because “[i]t is within the. suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Dutrieville, 982 A.2d 240, 242 (Pa.Super.2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 828 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa.Super.2003)). Since it was within the suppression court’s sole power to believe or disbelieve Officer Nolan’s representations regarding the Cl’s information and reliability, we must necessarily reject Appellant’s position that the suppression court “improperly credited” Officer Nolan’s testimony in this respect.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge BENDER files a Dissenting Opinion in which Judge DONOHUE and Judge SHOGAN join.