NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
21-P-1122
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
WILLIAM MEJIA.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
On June 8, 2019, law enforcement officers seized a firearm,
ammunition, and other evidence1 during the execution of a search
warrant at 7 Carmody Court, apartment 809, in South Boston. The
defendant, William Mejia, was subsequently indicted on charges
of unlicensed possession of a firearm, possession of ammunition,
unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device,
possession of a loaded firearm, discharging a firearm within
five hundred feet of a dwelling, and being an armed career
criminal. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, claiming that the affidavit in support of the search
warrant failed to establish probable cause that the defendant
1 The search warrant return reflects the seizure of, among other items, a "Toyota car key with remote" and personal identification papers. participated in the alleged criminal act, and failed to provide
a sufficient nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the
defendant's apartment. The motion judge held a nonevidentiary
hearing in the Superior Court and subsequently issued a
memorandum of decision and order denying the motion to suppress.
A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the
defendant's application for leave to file this interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476
Mass. 1501 (2017). We affirm.
Legal standards. We review the question whether there was
probable cause to issue a search warrant de novo. See
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017). Our analysis
of the sufficiency of a search warrant application begins and
ends with the "four corners of the affidavit" (citation
omitted). Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003). In
this regard, "we determine whether, based on the affidavit in
its entirety, the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude
that a crime had been committed . . . and that the items
described in the warrant were related to the criminal activity
and probably in the place to be searched" (citation omitted).
Id. at 298. "[P]robable cause to believe [that] evidence of
criminal activity will be found in a particular place must be
demonstrated by a 'nexus' between the crime alleged and the
place to be searched." Commonwealth v. Hart, 95 Mass. App. Ct.
2 165, 167 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Matias, 440 Mass. 787,
794 (2004). See also Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710,
712 (2000) (in reviewing nexus we determine whether affidavit
supporting search warrant "provide[s] a substantial basis for
concluding that evidence connected to the crime will be found on
the specified premises"). Search warrant affidavits "should be
interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion," and "read
as a whole, not parsed, severed, and subjected to hypercritical
analysis" (citations omitted). Donahue, supra. Finally, we
give considerable deference to the magistrate's determination,
Commonwealth v. Walker, 438 Mass. 246, 249 (2002), and bear in
mind that the "resolution of doubtful or marginal cases . . .
should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to
warrants." Commonwealth v. Germain, 396 Mass. 413, 418 (1985),
quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).
Discussion. In the present case, the judge determined that
the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the
criminal activity -- the discharge of a firearm -- and the
defendant's residence. After de novo review, we reach the same
conclusion.
The affidavit, drafted by Detective John Shaughnessy of the
Boston Police Department, averred, inter alia, that at around
5:58 A.M. on June 8, 2019, the Boston Police Department
responded to a "ShotSpotter activation" at 318 Norfolk Avenue in
3 Dorchester; that a Boston police officer was approached by a
witness "who stated that the gunshots came from the window of a
red, maroon, or burgundy Toyota Camry with a MA license plate of
4YC772";2 that the witness followed that vehicle to Columbia
Road, onto Boston Street, and then saw it make a right turn
after 215 Dorchester Street toward the "war monument;" that an
inquiry showed the vehicle with Massachusetts license plate
4YC772 to be a 2007 red Toyota Camry that the defendant had been
operating when it was involved in a prior motor vehicle
accident, with the accident report for that incident listing the
defendant's address as 7 Carmody Court; that the defendant's
address listed on his Registry of Motor Vehicle license was "7
Carmody Ct.," which is located in the Old Colony Housing
Projects; that at 7:02 A.M., two other Boston police officers
responded to the Old Colony Housing Projects and located the
vehicle parked and unoccupied opposite 1244 Columbia Road, which
is "located next to 7 Carmody Ct. in the Old Colony Housing
Projects"; that as the officers approached the vehicle, "they
heard the sound of a beep coming from the car consistent with
the car being locked remotely with a key fob"; that at
2 The defendant neither claimed in the Superior Court nor argues on appeal that the affidavit failed to satisfy either prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. See generally Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 (1985).
4 approximately 7:30 A.M., Detective Shaughnessy and other
officers entered 7 Carmody Court and saw the defendant's surname
alongside the name "Mendez" on a mailbox for apartment 809; that
the officers "knocked on apartment #809" and Kassandra Mendez
answered the door; that Mendez acknowledged that the defendant,
her husband, was inside the apartment; that the officers asked
to speak to the defendant; that the defendant "was asked if the
red Toyota parked outside was his and he stated in the
affirmative"; that the defendant stated that no other person had
access to his vehicle; that police investigators reviewed video
surveillance footage that showed the red Toyota driving on
Boston Street and on Dorchester Street toward Old Colony Avenue
between 5:58 A.M. and 6:03 A.M.; and that the video evidence
confirmed "the route described by the witness, who observed the
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
21-P-1122
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
WILLIAM MEJIA.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
On June 8, 2019, law enforcement officers seized a firearm,
ammunition, and other evidence1 during the execution of a search
warrant at 7 Carmody Court, apartment 809, in South Boston. The
defendant, William Mejia, was subsequently indicted on charges
of unlicensed possession of a firearm, possession of ammunition,
unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device,
possession of a loaded firearm, discharging a firearm within
five hundred feet of a dwelling, and being an armed career
criminal. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, claiming that the affidavit in support of the search
warrant failed to establish probable cause that the defendant
1 The search warrant return reflects the seizure of, among other items, a "Toyota car key with remote" and personal identification papers. participated in the alleged criminal act, and failed to provide
a sufficient nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the
defendant's apartment. The motion judge held a nonevidentiary
hearing in the Superior Court and subsequently issued a
memorandum of decision and order denying the motion to suppress.
A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the
defendant's application for leave to file this interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476
Mass. 1501 (2017). We affirm.
Legal standards. We review the question whether there was
probable cause to issue a search warrant de novo. See
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017). Our analysis
of the sufficiency of a search warrant application begins and
ends with the "four corners of the affidavit" (citation
omitted). Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003). In
this regard, "we determine whether, based on the affidavit in
its entirety, the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude
that a crime had been committed . . . and that the items
described in the warrant were related to the criminal activity
and probably in the place to be searched" (citation omitted).
Id. at 298. "[P]robable cause to believe [that] evidence of
criminal activity will be found in a particular place must be
demonstrated by a 'nexus' between the crime alleged and the
place to be searched." Commonwealth v. Hart, 95 Mass. App. Ct.
2 165, 167 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Matias, 440 Mass. 787,
794 (2004). See also Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710,
712 (2000) (in reviewing nexus we determine whether affidavit
supporting search warrant "provide[s] a substantial basis for
concluding that evidence connected to the crime will be found on
the specified premises"). Search warrant affidavits "should be
interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion," and "read
as a whole, not parsed, severed, and subjected to hypercritical
analysis" (citations omitted). Donahue, supra. Finally, we
give considerable deference to the magistrate's determination,
Commonwealth v. Walker, 438 Mass. 246, 249 (2002), and bear in
mind that the "resolution of doubtful or marginal cases . . .
should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to
warrants." Commonwealth v. Germain, 396 Mass. 413, 418 (1985),
quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).
Discussion. In the present case, the judge determined that
the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the
criminal activity -- the discharge of a firearm -- and the
defendant's residence. After de novo review, we reach the same
conclusion.
The affidavit, drafted by Detective John Shaughnessy of the
Boston Police Department, averred, inter alia, that at around
5:58 A.M. on June 8, 2019, the Boston Police Department
responded to a "ShotSpotter activation" at 318 Norfolk Avenue in
3 Dorchester; that a Boston police officer was approached by a
witness "who stated that the gunshots came from the window of a
red, maroon, or burgundy Toyota Camry with a MA license plate of
4YC772";2 that the witness followed that vehicle to Columbia
Road, onto Boston Street, and then saw it make a right turn
after 215 Dorchester Street toward the "war monument;" that an
inquiry showed the vehicle with Massachusetts license plate
4YC772 to be a 2007 red Toyota Camry that the defendant had been
operating when it was involved in a prior motor vehicle
accident, with the accident report for that incident listing the
defendant's address as 7 Carmody Court; that the defendant's
address listed on his Registry of Motor Vehicle license was "7
Carmody Ct.," which is located in the Old Colony Housing
Projects; that at 7:02 A.M., two other Boston police officers
responded to the Old Colony Housing Projects and located the
vehicle parked and unoccupied opposite 1244 Columbia Road, which
is "located next to 7 Carmody Ct. in the Old Colony Housing
Projects"; that as the officers approached the vehicle, "they
heard the sound of a beep coming from the car consistent with
the car being locked remotely with a key fob"; that at
2 The defendant neither claimed in the Superior Court nor argues on appeal that the affidavit failed to satisfy either prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. See generally Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 (1985).
4 approximately 7:30 A.M., Detective Shaughnessy and other
officers entered 7 Carmody Court and saw the defendant's surname
alongside the name "Mendez" on a mailbox for apartment 809; that
the officers "knocked on apartment #809" and Kassandra Mendez
answered the door; that Mendez acknowledged that the defendant,
her husband, was inside the apartment; that the officers asked
to speak to the defendant; that the defendant "was asked if the
red Toyota parked outside was his and he stated in the
affirmative"; that the defendant stated that no other person had
access to his vehicle; that police investigators reviewed video
surveillance footage that showed the red Toyota driving on
Boston Street and on Dorchester Street toward Old Colony Avenue
between 5:58 A.M. and 6:03 A.M.; and that the video evidence
confirmed "the route described by the witness, who observed the
shooting and followed the Toyota."
The above-listed particularized information was more than
sufficient to establish probable cause that the defendant
committed the crime, and the requisite nexus between the crime
and the apartment searched.3 The witness advised police officers
that the gunshots came from a "red, maroon, or burgundy Toyota
Camry" with license plate 4YC772. The witness saw that vehicle
3 To the extent that the affidavit referenced the defendant's arraignment history and purported gang-related history, we do not rely on such averments in our probable cause analysis. See Commonwealth v. Ponte, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 78, 82 (2020).
5 drive away and followed it as it made turns and traveled toward
the "war monument," which was on the route to the defendant's
residence. Video evidence confirmed the witness's description
of the route taken by the vehicle. Approximately one hour after
the shots were fired, officers saw the red Toyota parked
adjacent to the defendant's address. As they approached the
vehicle, the car beeped, consistent with the remote locking of
the vehicle with a key fob. Combined with the defendant's
presence at the residence a mere hour after the crime, the
location and locking of the vehicle, and his admission that he
had sole and exclusive access to the vehicle, it was reasonable
to infer that the defendant had participated in the crime,
returned to his residence, and that evidence of the crime
"reasonably may be expected to be located" at the defendant's
apartment (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Thevenin, 82
Mass. App. Ct. 822, 825 (2012). Ample precedent supports our
determination. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alexis, 481 Mass. 91,
103 (2018) (reasonable to expect handgun would be located in
defendant's home one day after committing armed home invasion);
Commonwealth v. Rand, 363 Mass. 554, 562 (1973) (directed
verdict motion properly denied where in addition to
circumstantial evidence that defendant was driving car on street
half-hour before accident, there was evidence he "had authorized
no one else to use the car and that he had sole possession of
6 the keys to the ignition"); Commonwealth v. Fleurant, 2 Mass.
App. Ct. 250, 255 (1974) (unlike drugs, "weapons [are] not
likely to be consumed or destroyed"). Contrast Hart, 95 Mass.
App. Ct. at 167-168 (observation of firearm stored in
defendant's home sixty days before application for search
warrant insufficient to establish timely nexus between crime and
location searched). Although the defendant conjures possible
scenarios in which another person could have fired the gun, a
search warrant application need not disprove all other
possibilities. See Commonwealth v. Guastucci, 486 Mass. 22, 26
(2020) (probable cause "is not a high bar," it "does not require
definitive proof of criminal activity," and "officers need not
rule out a suspect's innocent explanation for suspicious facts
to obtain a warrant" [quotations and citations omitted]);
Commonwealth v. Clagon, 465 Mass. 1004, 1006 (2013) (search
warrant application "need not establish to a certainty that the
items to be seized will be found in the specified location, nor
exclude any and all possibility that the items might be found
elsewhere" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Harmon, 63 Mass.
App. Ct. 456, 461 (2005) ("The test is probable cause, not
certainty"). To hold otherwise would require a hypercritical
analysis and parsing of the affidavit that we are compelled to
reject. See Commonwealth v. Diaz-Arias, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 504,
508 (2020). See also Commonwealth v. Perez, 90 Mass. App. Ct.
7 548, 551 (2016), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175 (1949) ("In dealing with probable cause, however, as
the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act").
Order denying motion to suppress affirmed.
By the Court (Neyman, Shin & Hodgens, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: February 15, 2023.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.