Commonwealth v. William J. Hanagan.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: June 3, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0535
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-535

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

WILLIAM J. HANAGAN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a bench trial in the District Court, the

defendant was convicted of vandalizing property in violation of

G. L. c. 266, § 126A. On appeal, he contends that a different

judge erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss pursuant

to Commonwealth v. DiBennadetto, 436 Mass. 310, 313 (2002). We

affirm.

Discussion. Where a clerk-magistrate has issued a criminal

complaint, "a motion to dismiss[] is the appropriate and only

way to challenge a finding of probable cause." DiBennadetto,

436 Mass. at 313. Typically, "[a] motion to dismiss for lack of

probable cause 'is decided from the four corners of the

complaint application, without evidentiary hearing.'" Commonwealth v. Leonard, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 187, 190 (2016),

quoting Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 565 (2013).

"The complaint application must include information to support

probable cause as to each essential element of the offense."

Humberto H., supra at 565-566. "Probable cause is, however, a

decidedly low standard" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Narvaez, 490 Mass. 807, 809 (2022). Our review

of a judge's probable cause determination is a question of law,

which we review de novo. Humberto H., supra at 566. We view

information set forth in the complaint application in support of

probable cause in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.

Leonard, supra.

To prove vandalism, the Commonwealth must establish that

(1) property was painted, marked, scratched, etched or otherwise

marked, injured, marred, defaced or destroyed;

(2) intentionally; (3) willfully and maliciously or wantonly;

and (4) the property belonged to someone other than the

defendant. See G. L. c. 266, § 126A. See also Commonwealth v.

McDowell, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 15, 22 (2004).

Here, Southborough police submitted a narrative report

(police narrative) in support of the application for criminal

complaint, which stated in relevant part:

"On 10/8/2021 I, Detective Neivert, was made aware of a complaint to the Town Administrator’s office from Mr.

2 Robert (Bob) Heavey. Mr. Heavey stated that the Southborough Police Department was refusing to file criminal charges against his former tenant, William Hanagan. . . . Mr. Heavey is alleging that Mr. Hanagan spray painted the apartment walls, damaged a door casing, and left property behind in the apartment. Mr. Heavey stated that there were other damages as well amounting to a total of '$39,000 to $49,000' worth of damage to the apartment. The damage that was documented in Mr. Heavey’s photographs1 is in addition to damage to the apartment’s normal, poor conditions."

The police narrative established probable cause for the first

element of vandalism where it explicitly alleged that the

defendant spray painted walls and stated, at least implicitly,

that he caused extensive damage in the apartment Heavey had

rented to him.

The second and third elements required that the police

narrative contain information sufficient to establish probable

cause that the defendant engaged in either intentional willful

and malicious conduct or intentional wanton conduct. See

McDowell, 62 Mass. App. Ct. at 22 (vandalism statute's malice

element is disjunctive). The defendant's intent may be

established circumstantially. Id. at 24. Here, the

Commonwealth argues only that the evidence supported probable

cause for intentional wanton conduct, which required a showing

that the defendant was indifferent to, or in disregard of,

1 The photographs were not attached to the application for criminal complaint and are not part of the record on appeal.

3 probable consequences. See id. at 22. We conclude that the

police narrative supported a reasonable inference of intentional

wanton conduct based on the assertion that "[the defendant]

spray painted the apartment walls [and] damaged a door casing"

and the statement that that there was "other damage" to the

apartment amounting to tens of thousands of dollars' worth.

Heavey's statement that "Mr. Hanagan spray painted the apartment

walls" alleges not merely that some action of the defendant led

to spray paint getting on the apartment walls but that the

defendant himself spray-painted the walls -- an intentional act

-- contributing to very costly damage to the apartment,

supporting an inference that the defendant acted with

indifference to, or in disregard of, the probable consequences.

We are not persuaded by the defendant's contention that the

information in the police narrative was equally consistent with

the defendant's "best efforts" at painting the apartment or that

there may have been innocent explanations for the damage. See

Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36, 41 (2014) (on appeal from

ruling on motion to dismiss, evidence is viewed in light most

favorable to Commonwealth); Commonwealth v. Torres, 102 Mass.

App. Ct. 359, 363 n.6 (2023) (existence of possible innocent

explanations does not vitiate probable cause).

4 Finally, although the defendant does not explicitly concede

the point in his brief, he does not appear to dispute that the

property (apartment) belonged to another (Heavey). In any

event, Heavey's report of damage to an apartment in which the

defendant was "[Heavey's] former tenant" sufficed to establish

probable cause as to the fourth element.

Ultimately, we conclude that the evidence contained in the

police narrative appended to the application for complaint in

this case "contain[ed] sufficient facts to establish the

identity of the accused, and provide probable cause as to each

element of the crime[]." Leonard, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 190.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Desmond, Sacks & Brennan, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: June 3, 2025.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.