NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-841
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
WILFRIDO CASTILLO.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial in the District Court, the
defendant, Wilfrido Castillo, was convicted of enticement of a
child under sixteen (child enticement).1 On appeal, he contends
that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction, (2) the jury instructions on child enticement were
erroneous and created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of
justice, (3) the verdict slip failed to reflect the elements of
child enticement, (4) the judge erroneously admitted duplicate
1The defendant was also charged with witness intimidation, unauthorized access to a computer system, and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen. The judge dismissed the count of unauthorized access to a computer system at the request of the Commonwealth. The jury found the defendant not guilty of witness intimidation and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen. first complaint testimony, and (5) the prosecutor's opening
statement, questioning of witnesses, and closing argument
contained errors that created a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice. Because we agree with the defendant
that the judge's instructions were incomplete, we vacate the
defendant's conviction.
Background. The victim became friends with the defendant's
stepdaughter2 in the summer of 2013. A few weeks after the
victim and the defendant's stepdaughter began "hanging out," the
victim met the defendant. The victim was thirteen years old at
the time.3 The defendant often drove the victim and his
stepdaughter places and watched movies with them at his house.
On August 31, 2013, the victim and the stepdaughter spent
the day together and returned to the stepdaughter's house. At
approximately midnight, the defendant, the victim, the
stepdaughter, and the stepdaughter's boyfriend were watching a
movie in the living room. At that time, the victim received a
text message from an unfamiliar number. The person who sent the
2 The defendant was the "boyfriend" of the victim's friend's mother. However, throughout trial the victim referred to the defendant as her friend's "stepdad" or "stepfather." Likewise, the victim's friend referred to the defendant as her "stepdad," and the defendant characterizes the victim's friend as his "stepdaughter" in his appellate brief.
3 The victim turned fourteen shortly before trial.
2 text identified himself as the defendant.4 The defendant sent
the victim text messages stating that he "liked" her, that he
thought she was "pretty," and that he thought she liked him
because she was "always looking at him." He also sent the
victim a message asking her to "meet him in the bathroom." At
some point, the defendant sent the victim a message asking her
to delete the texts, and when she replied that she did, he
"texted [her] back, I don't believe you." Later in the text
exchange, the defendant wrote, "I'm sorry" and called the victim
a "good girl."
After they exchanged messages, the defendant moved toward
the bottom of the couch where the victim was sitting and sat on
the ground in front of her. He turned towards her, asked to see
her phone, and "took it out of [her] hands." The victim
"snatched" her phone back from him. A few minutes later, the
defendant stood up, "looked directly in [the victim's] eyes,"
and rubbed his hand up her thigh. The rubbing "started by" the
victim's knee and "then it went up." The victim was "wicked
scared," "shaking," "panicking" and "really freaking out," but
"kind of like stayed still." She began texting and calling
members of her family, including her aunt, trying to find
4 The defendant had the victim's "telephone number," and had called her at that number in the past to reach his stepdaughter.
3 someone to pick her up from the stepdaughter's house, but was
unable to reach them. "[F]inally," the victim was able to reach
her cousin, and "told her that she needs to come get me," as the
victim believed that she was "not safe." The victim then walked
into the stepdaughter's bedroom to retrieve her belongings. The
defendant followed her into the bedroom. After the victim
fabricated an excuse to explain why she was leaving, the
defendant apologized to her and told her that she was a "good
girl." The victim left the house, saw her aunt's vehicle, and
ran to it.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. We review
the sufficiency of the evidence to determine "whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
[Commonwealth], any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"
(emphasis and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378
Mass. 671, 677 (1979). "If, from the evidence, conflicting
inferences are possible, it is for the [factfinder] to determine
where the truth lies, for the weight and credibility of the
evidence is wholly within [its] province." Commonwealth v. Lao,
443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) and 460
Mass. 12 (2011). In addition, "[c]ircumstantial evidence is
competent to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . and
the reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence need not be
4 necessary or inescapable, only reasonable and possible"
(quotations and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. MacCormack,
491 Mass. 848, 854 (2023).
"The crime of child enticement has four elements: (1) 'Any
one who entices,' (2) 'a child under the age of 16, or someone
he believes to be a child under the age of 16,' (3) 'to enter,
exit or remain within any vehicle, dwelling, building, or other
outdoor space,' (4) 'with the intent that he or another person
will violate [one of several enumerated statutes] . . . or any
offense that has as an element the use or attempted use of
force.'" Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 199, 202
(2008), quoting G. L. c. 265, § 26C. In the present case, the
Commonwealth proceeded on a theory that the defendant enticed
the victim intending to commit indecent assault and battery on a
child under fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B, one
of the statutes enumerated in the child enticement statute,
G. L. c. 265, § 26C.
The defendant first contends that the Commonwealth failed
to prove that he intended to commit a crime against a person he
knew or believed to be under the age of fourteen. We disagree.
"When the statute the defendant is alleged to have intended to violate is a strict liability statute . . . the Commonwealth is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of the crime of child enticement, that the defendant intended that his advances be directed to an underage person (i.e., under the age of fourteen for purposes of § 13B)" (emphasis omitted).
5 Commonwealth v. Filopoulos, 451 Mass. 234, 238 (2008). The
Commonwealth is not required to prove that the defendant knew
the exact age of the child, but that "his intention was to
direct his sexual advances to" a person under the age of
fourteen. Id. See Commonwealth v. Disler, 451 Mass. 216, 228
(2008). "[A] person's knowledge or intent is a matter of fact
which is often not susceptible of proof by direct evidence, so
resort is frequently made to proof by inference from all the
facts and circumstances developed at the trial" (quotation and
citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Schoener, 491 Mass. 706, 715
(2023).
Here, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for a
rational jury to find that the defendant knew or believed that
the victim was under fourteen. The evidence showed that the
victim and the defendant's stepdaughter were close friends, and
due to that friendship, the defendant spent time with and around
the victim. Indeed, in the two weeks leading up to the
incident, the victim and stepdaughter "hung out" on almost a
daily basis, including "a lot" of time at the defendant's house.5
Further, the jurors heard that the victim was thirteen years old
5 The Commonwealth did not present evidence of the stepdaughter's age during its case-in-chief. Called as a witness by the defendant, the stepdaughter testified that she was fifteen years old at the time of trial in March of 2014.
6 at the time of the incident, did not "turn fourteen" until
shortly before trial, was in eighth grade at the time of trial,
and thus was between seventh and eighth grade at the time of the
crime. In addition, the jurors had the opportunity to observe
her appearance during trial. See Commonwealth v. Pittman, 25
Mass. App. Ct. 25, 27 (1987) ("[p]hysical appearance may be
considered as an element in judging age").6 The Commonwealth
also presented abundant evidence of the defendant's
consciousness of guilt. He asked the victim to delete the text
messages he sent to her, grabbed her cellphone to try to delete
them himself, apologized to her, and told her she was a "good
girl" and that he "didn't mean to do that." See Disler, 451
Mass. at 231 ("recognizing the criminal nature of the planned
conduct, the defendant repeatedly told [the victim] that they
had to be careful"). Viewing the totality of evidence presented
at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the defendant
6 The Commonwealth notes in its brief that defense counsel referred to the victim in closing argument as a "petite 13 year old." Although this observation was consistent with the Commonwealth's argument that the victim's age was apparent from, inter alia, her youthful appearance, closing arguments do not constitute evidence and the jury was instructed to that effect. Thus, we do not consider defense counsel's statement in our analysis. See Commonwealth v. Malone, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 399, 410 (2021) (judge properly instructed jury "before and after trial that closing arguments are not evidence").
7 "intended that his advances be directed" to a person under the
age of fourteen. See Filopoulos, 451 Mass. at 238.
The defendant next contends that there was insufficient
evidence that he intended to commit an indecent assault and
battery on the victim. Again, we disagree. Although an overt
act by the enticer is not required, more than "merely speaking
words" is necessary -- the enticer's conduct must be accompanied
by the requisite criminal mens rea. LaPlante, 73 Mass. App. Ct.
at 202. See Disler, 451 Mass. at 222 ("[I]n addition to
enticing words or gestures . . . the person who entices [must
do] so with the intent to violate one or more of the enumerated
criminal statutes").
Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the
defendant texted the victim and told her that he thought she was
pretty, that he liked her, and that he thought that she liked
him. The content of the defendant's messages, his subsequent
rubbing of the victim's thigh, and the consciousness of guilt
evidence referenced above, were sufficient to demonstrate his
intent to commit an indecent assault and battery on her. The
defendant's argument that it was "equally plausible that he
wanted to talk to [the victim] alone, or chat with her further"
is not persuasive in view of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, including the touching of her
thigh, and the timing and content of the text messages. See
8 Commonwealth v. Santiago, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 567, 574-575 (2002)
(defendant's intent permissibly inferred in part from "the
absence of any other motive").
2. Jury instructions. The defendant claims that the judge
failed to instruct the jury that the Commonwealth was required
to prove that he intended that his advances be directed to a
person under the age of fourteen. Because there was no
objection to the instructions, our review is limited to
determining "whether an error occurred and, if so, whether that
error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice."
Commonwealth v. Arias, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 464 (2013). "We
evaluate jury instructions as a whole and interpret them as
would a reasonable juror." Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass.
682, 697 (2015).
Where a defendant is charged with child enticement, the
Commonwealth is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt "not
only that the defendant enticed a person under the age of
sixteen, or someone he believed to be under the age of sixteen,
but also that the defendant so acted with the intent to violate
one or more of the enumerated criminal statutes." Filopoulos,
451 Mass. at 238. Here the Commonwealth's theory was that the
defendant enticed the victim so that he could commit an indecent
assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen in
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B, a strict liability statue. As
9 noted supra, in these circumstances, the "Commonwealth is
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of
the crime of child enticement, that the defendant intended that
his advances be directed to" a person under the age of fourteen.
Filipoulous, supra.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the judge's
instructions in the present case. The judge first instructed
that the Commonwealth had the burden to prove the following
elements of child enticement:
"First, that the alleged victim here . . . was a child under the age of 16 or a person whom the defendant believed to be under 16 at the time of the alleged offense. Second, that the defendant enticed [the victim] to remain within a dwelling. Third, that the defendant did so with the intent that he would commit the offense in this case of an indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 14."
The judge elaborated briefly on each of the elements. With
respect to the third element, the judge told the jury that "the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that by this
enticement the defendant intended to commit the offense of
indecent assault and battery as I'm going to describe that
offense to you shortly." The judge next summarized the elements
of child enticement again:
"if you find the Commonwealth has proved all three of those things beyond a reasonable doubt, again that [the victim] was under the age of 16, a child under the age of 16 at the time; second, that the defendant enticed [the victim] to remain within a dwelling as I've defined that term for you; and third, that he did so with the intent that he would
10 commit an indecent assault and battery on this child then you should find the defendant guilty . . . of the charge of enticing a child under 16."
The judge subsequently instructed the jury on the elements of
indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen as
follows:
"First is that the alleged victim . . . in this case, was not yet 14 years of age at the time of the alleged offense. So she was under 14 years of age at the time of offense. Second, that the defendant committed an assault and battery on that child. Assault and battery in this context is essentially the intentional touch -- touching of another person without legal justification or excuse. And third, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the assault and battery was indecent as that word is commonly understood and measures by common understanding and practices. Jurors, again let me just go through those one more time. First . . . [t]he alleged victim . . . was not yet 14 years of age. So if she was 14 or older it would not be appropriate under this charge. It has to be under 14 at the time. Second, that the defendant committed an assault and battery on that child, again which would be essentially the intentional touching of another person without legal justification or excuse. So an accidental touching would not fall under this. It must be an intentional touching. And third, the Commonwealth . . . must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the assault and battery was indecent as that word is commonly understood measured by common understanding and practices . . . . So, Jurors, if you find that the Commonwealth has proved those three things beyond a reasonable doubt, that the complainant . . . was not yet 14 years of age at the time; second, that the defendant committed an assault and battery on that child as I've just described it; and third, that the assault and battery was indecent as the word is commonly understood and as I've just described or defined that for you, then you should find the defendant guilty of indecent assault and battery on a child."
The defendant contends that the judge's instructions failed
to inform the jury that the defendant's specific intention to
11 direct his advances on a child under fourteen was an essential
element of the enticement charge. See Filopoulos, 451 Mass. at
242-243. We agree. In Filopoulos, the defendant similarly was
charged with child enticement with the intent to commit indecent
assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. Id.
at 234-235. However,
"[a]t no point in his charge did the judge expressly inform the jury that, to satisfy the intent element of the child enticement statute . . . on the basis of an intent to violate G. L. c. 265, § 13B (indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen), the Commonwealth was required to demonstrate that the defendant intended the object of his advances to be a child under the age of fourteen." Id. at 242-243. As the instructions did not adequately convey
to the jury the Commonwealth's burden to prove that the
defendant specifically intended to direct his advances on a
child under the age of fourteen, the Supreme Judicial Court
determined that the error created a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice. Id. at 243.
In the present case, the instructions informed the jury
that the Commonwealth needed to prove that the defendant enticed
the victim "with the intent that he would commit the offense in
this case of an indecent assault and battery on a child under
the age of 14." The defendant was also charged with indecent
assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, and in
that context, the judge further instructed that the Commonwealth
must prove the elements of indecent assault and battery on a
12 child under the age of fourteen -- i.e., that the victim was not
yet fourteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense;
that the defendant committed an assault and battery on that
child; and that the assault and battery was "indecent." The
instructions on child enticement and indecent assault and
battery on a child under fourteen, standing alone, were correct.
However, just as in Filopolous, the instructions viewed as a
whole never conveyed to the jury that for the enticement charge,
"the Commonwealth was required to demonstrate that the defendant
intended the object of his advances to be a child under the age
of fourteen."7 Filopoulos, 451 Mass. at 242-243. See Note 1 to
Instruction 6.560 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for
Use in the District Court (2011).
We thus turn to whether the deficiency in the instruction
created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See
Commonwealth v. Desiderio, 491 Mass. 809, 815-816 (2023). "The
substantial risk standard requires us to determine if we have a
7 The Commonwealth argues that Filopoulos is distinguishable because the judge in that case "specifically told [the jury] that the Commonwealth need not prove the defendant's knowledge as to the alleged victim's age." Filopoulos, 451 Mass. at 243. This argument is unavailing. With or without the above- referenced language, the instruction in the present case omitted a required element of child enticement -- the defendant's intent that the object of his advances be a child under the age of fourteen. Thus, the error in the present case mirrors the error in Filopoulos. See id. at 242-243.
13 serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been
different had the error not been made" (quotation and citation
omitted). Id. "[T]o determine whether a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice is created by the omission of a required
element from the jury instructions, the question is . . .
whether the presence of the omitted element was an ineluctable,
or inescapable, inference from the evidence presented at trial."
Id. at 820.
Here, it was not an inescapable inference that the
defendant "intended the object of his advances to be a child
under the age of fourteen." Filopoulos, 451 Mass. at 243.8
While the evidence presented at trial "may have been sufficient
for the jury to infer" that the defendant had knowledge of the
victim's age or intended that she be under the age of fourteen,
such an inference was "hardly ineluctable." Desiderio, 491
Mass. at 821-822. The case hinged on a question of credibility,
and the evidence, while more than sufficient to survive a
required finding of not guilty, was not overwhelming. The
instruction lowered the Commonwealth's burden of proof and
created a risk that the jury would impermissibly find that the
Commonwealth had satisfied the element of the defendant's intent
8 We note that the jury acquitted the defendant on the count of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen.
14 based on evidence that he believed the victim was under the age
of sixteen or based on the victim's stated age. We are thus
constrained, under Desiderio, to conclude that the error may
have materially influenced the jury's verdict, requiring that
the defendant's conviction be vacated.
3. Verdict slip. The defendant further claims that the
verdict slip "misstated the elements" of child enticement
because it "did not require [the jury] to find that [the
defendant] intended to entice 'a child under the age of 14.'"
Because the defendant did not object to the verdict slip that
was used, we review the claim of error for a substantial risk of
a miscarriage of justice. See Arias, 84 Mass. App. Ct. at 464.
The charge listed on the verdict slip read, "Enticing a
Child Under Age 16." We agree with the Commonwealth that the
charge correctly reflected the title of the statute under which
the defendant was charged. Standing alone, we discern no error
in the content of the verdict slip, and the defendant cites no
persuasive authority to the contrary. But see Commonwealth v.
McCarthy, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 113, 117-118 (1994) (appearance of
"an abbreviated version of the offense" on verdict slip did not
create substantial risk of miscarriage of justice where "the
judge correctly instructed the jury with respect to all of the
elements of the offense").
15 4. First complaint testimony. The defendant argues that
the judge admitted duplicative first complaint evidence,
resulting in a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Under the first complaint doctrine, evidence of the victim's
report of abuse is limited to "the first person told of the
sexual assault." Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 67-68
(2011). "The first complaint doctrine does not, however,
'prohibit the admissibility of evidence that, while barred by
that doctrine, is otherwise independently admissible.'" Id. at
69, quoting Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 220-221
(2009). The judge designated the victim's cousin as the first
complaint witness.
The defendant challenges the admission of an excerpt of a
police report detailing parts of the victim's accusation, which
the trial judge read aloud to the jury due to the officer's
unavailability. The challenged portion of the report consists
of what the victim told the officer about the text messages she
received from the defendant. We discern no error in the
admission of the excerpt where it served an impeachment purpose
and was not admitted for the purpose of corroborating the
victim's testimony. The defendant had intended to call the
officer as a witness, and due to his unavailability, stipulated
to the content of the report in order to highlight
inconsistencies in the victim's testimony. Moreover, the
16 inclusion of the portion detailing the text messages ensured
that the jury was not left with the impression that the victim
had only reported the defendant touching her thigh, and thus it
was admissible as it "serve[d] to clarify the context of the
admitted portion" (quotation and citation omitted). Aviles, 461
Mass. at 75.
The defendant also challenges the admission of testimony
that the victim reported the incident to others. As the
Commonwealth concedes, much of the challenged testimony
constituted subsequent complaint testimony and should have been
struck. See Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 457 (2008)
(victim "should not have been allowed to testify" that she "told
various other people"). Even so, we discern no substantial risk
of a miscarriage of justice where the defendant solicited
additional testimony from the victim on cross-examination about
her subsequent reports of the allegation to others. See
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 851-852 (2010) ("the
defense capitalized on inconsistencies in [the victim's]
testimony during the cross-examination" which "inured to the
defendant's benefit"). The subsequent references to the
victim's complaints were brief, and the prosecutor did not use
the additional testimony in her closing argument. See
Commonwealth v. Roby, 462 Mass. 398, 409-410 (2012).
17 5. Prosecutorial misconduct. The defendant argues that
errors in the prosecutor's opening statement, direct
examination, and closing argument amounted to prosecutorial
misconduct. As the defendant did not object to the claimed
errors, our review is again limited "to determine if the
statements were error, and, if so, whether they created a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice." Commonwealth v.
Sanchez, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 9 (2019).
During her direct examination, the prosecutor asked the
victim about how the defendant was related to the stepdaughter
and how he behaved around the stepdaughter and the victim. We
discern no error in this line of questioning. The victim's
brief testimony about the defendant's previous behavior was
relevant and admitted for the limited purpose of showing the
nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant.
See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 128-129 (2006) (in
sexual assault cases, evidence of uncharged conduct "may be
admissible to give the jury a view of the entire relationship
between the defendant and the alleged victim").
We agree that the prosecutor erred in stating in her
closing argument that the jury "saw who this defendant is" and
"[t]hat is who he is as a person." Nonetheless, this error did
not rise to the level of creating a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice. The remarks were fleeting, and the
18 judge instructed the jury, before opening statements and in his
final charge, that opening statements and closing arguments are
not evidence.
Also in her closing argument, the prosecutor described the
victim as "emotionally scarred" and "brought [] to tears on the
stand." This argument was not improper. The prosecutor was
permitted to address the victim's demeanor during her testimony.
See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 430 Mass. 111, 118-119 (1999) ("A
prosecutor can address, in a closing argument, a witness's
demeanor, motive for testifying, and believability, provided
that such remarks are based on the evidence, or fair inferences
drawn from it, and are not based on the prosecutor's personal
beliefs"). In addition, the judge instructed the jury to render
a verdict "based solely on a fair consideration of the
evidence," and that they "may not be swayed by prejudice nor by
sympathy." See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 209-210
(2005) (judge mitigated any potential prejudice by instructing
jurors, inter alia, "not to base their verdicts on any sympathy
or emotion").
Finally, there was no error in the prosecutor's reference
to first complaint testimony in her opening statement and
closing argument. During her opening statement, the prosecutor
told the jury that "at the close of the evidence you will have
no doubt what happened on [August 31, 2013] . . . . You will
19 also know, because you'll hear from [the first complaint
witness]" about "what [the victim] told her." This was an
accurate preview of the first complaint testimony that was later
admitted. See Commonwealth v. Qualls, 440 Mass. 576, 586 (2003)
("[t]he prosecutor could state in her opening statement anything
she reasonably, and in good faith, expected to prove"). There
was likewise no error in the prosecutor's comment in her closing
argument that the jury should consider the first complaint
testimony as supportive of the victim's credibility. The
purpose of first complaint testimony is to help the jury assess
the veracity of the victim's accusations. See Commonwealth v.
King, 445 Mass. 217, 219 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216
(2006). Furthermore, the judge instructed the jury on the
proper use of first complaint testimony, both at the time it was
admitted and at the close of the evidence.
Conclusion. The defendant's conviction of enticement of a
child under sixteen is vacated and the verdict is set aside.
So ordered.
By the Court (Blake, C.J., Neyman & Grant, JJ.9),
Clerk
Entered: March 21, 2025.
9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.