NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-481
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
VANNARA ROM.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
A District Court judge revoked the defendant's probation
following a violation hearing in which he concluded that the
defendant had committed new crimes. On appeal the defendant
claims the judge erred in admitting and relying on hearsay
evidence and in excluding impeachment evidence. We affirm.
Background. The defendant admitted to sufficient facts to
support a conviction for vandalism, in violation of G. L.
c. 266, § 126A, on December 13, 2023, and was placed on
probation for one year. One of the conditions of his probation
was to obey "all local, state and federal laws." On January 22,
2024, the probation department alleged that the defendant had violated his probation by committing new offenses of assault and
battery, kidnapping, strangulation, and witness intimidation.
At the defendant's subsequent probation violation hearing,
the judge admitted, over the defendant's objection, two police
reports containing statements from the victim of the new
offense. Through these statements, the victim detailed that the
defendant had held her against her will for the previous four
days, punched her face and body numerous times, pulled out her
hair, and broken her ribs. Though she did not identify her
attacker by name, she stated that he was and had been her
boyfriend for the previous seven months, provided his address,
identified that address as the location of the assaults, and
stated that she had been involved in previous domestic incidents
at that address.
The reporting officers wrote in their police reports and
also testified at the probation violation hearing about their
direct observations of the victim's injuries that were
consistent with her report. By searching the police database
for incident reports involving the victim, the police identified
the defendant as her boyfriend. Upon arriving at the address
provided by the victim, the officers found and arrested the
defendant, who was wearing a sweatshirt with "multiple blood
2 stains" and had been sleeping in a small bedroom which "was
completely destroyed."
Based on this evidence, the judge found the defendant in
violation of his probation.
Discussion. 1. Reliability of evidence. We review a
judge's finding of a violation of probation to determine
"whether the record discloses sufficient reliable evidence to
warrant the findings by the judge[, by a preponderance of the
evidence,] that [the probationer] had violated the specified
conditions of his probation" (citation omitted). Commonwealth
v. Jarrett, 491 Mass. 437, 440 (2023). Hearsay is admissible at
probation violation hearings and can be the basis of a
revocation "where it has substantial indicia of reliability."
Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 484 (2016). Here,
sufficient evidence supported the violation finding.
The police report admitted in evidence contained hearsay,
but the judge could reasonably find that hearsay was
substantially reliable. The reports were created within hours
of the victim's alleged abuse and captivity. See Abbott A. v.
Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 36 (2010) (reliability of hearsay
bolstered by observations made "close in time to the events in
question" [citation omitted]). The statements of the victim
contained in the report were highly detailed, alleging numerous
3 specific instances of abuse, many resulting in physical injuries
which were directly observed by the interviewing officers. See
Commonwealth v. Rainey, 491 Mass. 632, 648 (2023) ("factually
detailed" hearsay statements corroborated by injuries observed
by officer were substantially reliable). The officers'
observations that the victim was "visibly shaking," that the
defendant's bedroom was "completely destroyed," and that his
sweatshirt displayed "multiple blood stains" also support the
reliability of the victim's statements. Id. (circumstances of
statements, including "emotional distress of the victim,"
support reliability). Many of the victim's statements were
excited utterances because she was still under the influence of
the "exciting events" as she described them. Commonwealth v.
King, 436 Mass. 252, 254 (2002) (statement admissible as
exception to hearsay rule when "made under the influence of an
exciting event" and which tends to "explain the underlying
event"). The victim initially spoke to police the same morning
that she stated she had been abused by the defendant; the
reporting officer noted that she was "visibly shaking" as she
discussed the events. Any evidence admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule, such as an excited utterance, is
"presumptively reliable." See Commonwealth v. Durling, 407
4 Mass. 108, 118 (1990). The judge's finding of substantial
reliability was proper and well-founded.1
Additionally, the violation finding was supported by the
officers' non-hearsay testimony describing their personal
observations of the victim, the defendant, and the room in which
the alleged abuse occurred. See Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 491
Mass. at 445 (affirming violation finding based on hearsay
testimony and corroborating testimony of direct observations).
2. Exclusion of evidence. The defendant claims that the
judge's exclusion of the victim's medical records and court
activity record information (CARI) so impeded his ability to
impeach her admitted statements that it deprived him of his
right to present a defense. We disagree.
Although a "probationer's right to present a defense is not
coextensive with the parallel right held by a criminal
defendant," Commonwealth v. Costa, 490 Mass. 118, 132 (2022),
quoting Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 324 (2013), he
must nevertheless have "a meaningful opportunity" to do so.
1 The victim's subsequent recantation letter did not require the judge to find her earlier statements unreliable. See Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 131 (2010) (recantation letter raises "not a question of admissibility . . . but of the sufficiency of the evidence"). It was for the judge "to decide how much weight to give the evidence of recantation," and he committed no error in finding that the Commonwealth sustained its burden. Id.
5 Costa, supra, quoting Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 480. However, "a
probationer is not necessarily deprived of the right to present
his theory of defense simply because the judge excludes a piece
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-481
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
VANNARA ROM.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
A District Court judge revoked the defendant's probation
following a violation hearing in which he concluded that the
defendant had committed new crimes. On appeal the defendant
claims the judge erred in admitting and relying on hearsay
evidence and in excluding impeachment evidence. We affirm.
Background. The defendant admitted to sufficient facts to
support a conviction for vandalism, in violation of G. L.
c. 266, § 126A, on December 13, 2023, and was placed on
probation for one year. One of the conditions of his probation
was to obey "all local, state and federal laws." On January 22,
2024, the probation department alleged that the defendant had violated his probation by committing new offenses of assault and
battery, kidnapping, strangulation, and witness intimidation.
At the defendant's subsequent probation violation hearing,
the judge admitted, over the defendant's objection, two police
reports containing statements from the victim of the new
offense. Through these statements, the victim detailed that the
defendant had held her against her will for the previous four
days, punched her face and body numerous times, pulled out her
hair, and broken her ribs. Though she did not identify her
attacker by name, she stated that he was and had been her
boyfriend for the previous seven months, provided his address,
identified that address as the location of the assaults, and
stated that she had been involved in previous domestic incidents
at that address.
The reporting officers wrote in their police reports and
also testified at the probation violation hearing about their
direct observations of the victim's injuries that were
consistent with her report. By searching the police database
for incident reports involving the victim, the police identified
the defendant as her boyfriend. Upon arriving at the address
provided by the victim, the officers found and arrested the
defendant, who was wearing a sweatshirt with "multiple blood
2 stains" and had been sleeping in a small bedroom which "was
completely destroyed."
Based on this evidence, the judge found the defendant in
violation of his probation.
Discussion. 1. Reliability of evidence. We review a
judge's finding of a violation of probation to determine
"whether the record discloses sufficient reliable evidence to
warrant the findings by the judge[, by a preponderance of the
evidence,] that [the probationer] had violated the specified
conditions of his probation" (citation omitted). Commonwealth
v. Jarrett, 491 Mass. 437, 440 (2023). Hearsay is admissible at
probation violation hearings and can be the basis of a
revocation "where it has substantial indicia of reliability."
Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 484 (2016). Here,
sufficient evidence supported the violation finding.
The police report admitted in evidence contained hearsay,
but the judge could reasonably find that hearsay was
substantially reliable. The reports were created within hours
of the victim's alleged abuse and captivity. See Abbott A. v.
Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 36 (2010) (reliability of hearsay
bolstered by observations made "close in time to the events in
question" [citation omitted]). The statements of the victim
contained in the report were highly detailed, alleging numerous
3 specific instances of abuse, many resulting in physical injuries
which were directly observed by the interviewing officers. See
Commonwealth v. Rainey, 491 Mass. 632, 648 (2023) ("factually
detailed" hearsay statements corroborated by injuries observed
by officer were substantially reliable). The officers'
observations that the victim was "visibly shaking," that the
defendant's bedroom was "completely destroyed," and that his
sweatshirt displayed "multiple blood stains" also support the
reliability of the victim's statements. Id. (circumstances of
statements, including "emotional distress of the victim,"
support reliability). Many of the victim's statements were
excited utterances because she was still under the influence of
the "exciting events" as she described them. Commonwealth v.
King, 436 Mass. 252, 254 (2002) (statement admissible as
exception to hearsay rule when "made under the influence of an
exciting event" and which tends to "explain the underlying
event"). The victim initially spoke to police the same morning
that she stated she had been abused by the defendant; the
reporting officer noted that she was "visibly shaking" as she
discussed the events. Any evidence admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule, such as an excited utterance, is
"presumptively reliable." See Commonwealth v. Durling, 407
4 Mass. 108, 118 (1990). The judge's finding of substantial
reliability was proper and well-founded.1
Additionally, the violation finding was supported by the
officers' non-hearsay testimony describing their personal
observations of the victim, the defendant, and the room in which
the alleged abuse occurred. See Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 491
Mass. at 445 (affirming violation finding based on hearsay
testimony and corroborating testimony of direct observations).
2. Exclusion of evidence. The defendant claims that the
judge's exclusion of the victim's medical records and court
activity record information (CARI) so impeded his ability to
impeach her admitted statements that it deprived him of his
right to present a defense. We disagree.
Although a "probationer's right to present a defense is not
coextensive with the parallel right held by a criminal
defendant," Commonwealth v. Costa, 490 Mass. 118, 132 (2022),
quoting Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 324 (2013), he
must nevertheless have "a meaningful opportunity" to do so.
1 The victim's subsequent recantation letter did not require the judge to find her earlier statements unreliable. See Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 131 (2010) (recantation letter raises "not a question of admissibility . . . but of the sufficiency of the evidence"). It was for the judge "to decide how much weight to give the evidence of recantation," and he committed no error in finding that the Commonwealth sustained its burden. Id.
5 Costa, supra, quoting Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 480. However, "a
probationer is not necessarily deprived of the right to present
his theory of defense simply because the judge excludes a piece
of evidence supporting such theory" (citation omitted). Costa,
supra. The judge must consider "the totality of the
circumstances," weighing whether the proposed evidence might be
significant in determining whether a violation occurred; whether
the evidence would be cumulative; and, where live testimony is
at issue, whether there is an unacceptable risk that the
witness's well-being would be significantly jeopardized by
testifying. Hartfield, supra, at 480-481.
The defendant's constitutional right was not infringed
here. The judge admitted in evidence a letter from the victim
recanting her accusations and claiming that she suffers from
"depression" and "hallucinations," that she had attended at
least one treatment center, and that she was hallucinating on
the day she spoke with the officers. As the defendant concedes,
the excluded medical records were largely cumulative of this
evidence. Thus, the judge's exclusion of those records did not
deny the defendant the right to present a defense. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Pickering, 479 Mass. 589, 598 (no infringement
6 where defendant "presented other compelling evidence that was
more probative of his theory of defense").2
3. Identification and arrest. The defendant also claims
that the police violated his constitutional right to due process
by identifying and arresting him without adequate evidence that
he had committed a new offense. We are unpersuaded. The victim
did not provide the officers with the defendant's name, but she
did reveal that the attacker was "her boyfriend of 7 months,"
that they had a history of previous "domestic incidents
involving [the Lowell Police Department]," that she had been
held captive at his residence,3 and that she "was not
romantically involved with any other individual at this
address." The officer's search of the police database which
revealed the prior reported domestic assaults did not implicate
the defendant's privacy rights. See Roe v. Attorney General,
2 For substantially the same reasons, we find that the judge did not abuse his discretion by excluding a CARI report offered to show that the victim "had a motive to lie." See Costa, 490 Mass. at 132-133. While it is not entirely clear, the defendant seems to argue that he should have been permitted to call the victim. This argument is also unavailing, as the judge properly determined that the victim had validly invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege. See Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827, 834 (2009) ("witness's valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination trumps a defendant's right to call the witness").
3 The victim provided the officers with the defendant's address and stated that he "lived in the basement."
7 434 Mass. 418, 438 (2001) (no privacy interest implicated by
police looking at information they already have). And the
victim's statements, combined with the corroborating
observations of the officers, were plainly adequate to satisfy
the relatively low threshold of probable cause necessary to
effect the arrest. See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 53 Mass.
App. Ct. 201, 206-07 (2001).
Order revoking probation affirmed.
By the Court (Ditkoff, D'Angelo & Woods, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: November 14, 2025.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.