Commonwealth v. Thorpe

Massachusetts Appeals Court

Commonwealth v. Thorpe

429 N.E.2d 722, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 906, 1982 Mass. App. LEXIS 1167

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court

DecidedJanuary 6, 1982

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 429 N.E.2d 722 (Commonwealth v. Thorpe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 429 N.E.2d 722, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 906, 1982 Mass. App. LEXIS 1167 (Mass. Ct. App. 1982).

Pincite

Opinion

The defendant appeals from his conviction of a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 26, and claims that the judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion to dismiss was based on a contention that the language in G. L. c. 90, § 26 (as amended through St. 1965, c. 664), that “[t]he registrar may revoke or suspend the license of any person violating [907]*907any provision of this section” is “punishment,” thereby rendering inapplicable G. L. c. 90, § 20 (as appearing in St. 1975, c. 494, § 12), which provides, in part, “[a] person convicted of a violation of any provision of this chapter the punishment for which is not otherwise provided . . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty-five dollars.” The suspension or revocation of a license is not “punishment” for the purposes of G. L. c. 90, § 20, because such suspension or revocation is considered an administrative sanction and not a criminal penalty. Boyle v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 368 Mass. 141, 142-143 (1975). See also State v. Cowen, 231 Iowa 1117, 1119-1123 (1942). Because G. L. c. 90, § 26, is a criminal statute, the District Court has jurisdiction under G. L. c. 218, § 26, to hear such violation.

Brendan Leonard Hoyt, Jr., for the defendant. Robert M. Raciti, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Judgment affirmed.

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The defendant appeals from his conviction of a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 26, and claims that the judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion to dismiss was based on a contention that the language in G. L. c. 90, § 26 (as amended through St. 1965, c. 664), that “[t]he registrar may revoke or suspend the license of any person violating [907]*907any provision of this section” is “punishment,” thereby rendering inapplicable G. L. c. 90, § 20 (as appearing in St. 1975, c. 494, § 12), which provides, in part, “[a] person convicted of a violation of any provision of this chapter the punishment for which is not otherwise provided . . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty-five dollars.” The suspension or revocation of a license is not “punishment” for the purposes of G. L. c. 90, § 20, because such suspension or revocation is considered an administrative sanction and not a criminal penalty. Boyle v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 368 Mass. 141, 142-143 (1975). See also State v. Cowen, 231 Iowa 1117, 1119-1123 (1942). Because G. L. c. 90, § 26, is a criminal statute, the District Court has jurisdiction under G. L. c. 218, § 26, to hear such violation.

Brendan Leonard Hoyt, Jr., for the defendant. Robert M. Raciti, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

429 N.E.2d 722, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 906, 1982 Mass. App. LEXIS 1167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-thorpe-massappct-1982.

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