Commonwealth v. Taylor

36 Pa. 263
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 1, 1860
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 36 Pa. 263 (Commonwealth v. Taylor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 36 Pa. 263 (Pa. 1860).

Opinion

The defendants haying been examined on interrogatories, and their several answer’s thereto having been filed, and considered, the defendants were addressed as follows by

Lowrie, C. J.

No serious mind can avoid regarding as a severe strain upon our republican institutions, the process of combined resistance to law, in which the people of Pittsburgh and of Allegheny county are now engaged, or which they are suffering you and others to conduct in their name. We can scarcely regard you as the real leaders in this movement, for we are sure, that it was not originated by you, and you have not studied the' true character of the position which you have assumed, or the probable consequences to yourselves and to posterity that are involved in it. I have known some of you for more than a quarter of a century, and have always had reason to respect you as upright and excellent men, sincerely devoted to the order and welfare of society, and I regret exceedingly to find that you have suffered yourselves to be placed in a position which is condemned by the laws of your country, and by the unanimous voice of the civilized world; and that is approved only by those who have suffered their interests, or their passions, instead of their consciences, to guide their conclusions and sit in judgment on their duties. Though we sympathize most deeply with the people of Pittsburgh and Allegheny county, on account of their embarrassments, we must, in the name of the law, arid of the common conscience of mankind, and of all that is most sacred to our social state, condemn the measures of relief which you represent.

It is impossible that you can have studied all the questions involved in this controversy, so as to be able to give an intelligent account of them; we presume that none of you have done so. [264]*264Nearly all tbe questions raised belong to the form of the proceedings of your official predecessors in making the' contract, or of the process under which the cause was tried. But it cannot be that the people, or you either, have organized a rebellion against the judgment of their own highest court, merely because they disapprpve of some of the forms of the proceeding. Usually, it' is just results they want,- and they condemn all forms that interfere with these. Men do not quarrel with their builder for the' instruments he uses, or for his modes of handling them, if he turns out a proper house, in proper time; nor with the tailoring ■ process, if the coat is right. You can admire no judgment for or against you in your private rights, that- is founded on the mere formalities of -the case, amd not on its real merits. Honesty and conscience can take no pleasure in such judgments,- however selfishness and interest may regard them. All our legal practice in relation to amendments, shows how odious it is that judgments should turn on mere formalities. No suitor ever studies the forms in wrhich an action is conducted, in order to know that the final judgment is right. He refuses no judgment in his favour,1 and resists none that is against him, on any such grounds. Every business has its own forms, and men in other occupations are not expected to learn them, and have no interest in them, other than that they produce proper results with proper speed, economy, and certainty: However you and others may have been seduced into a questioning of the forms of the proceeding, it can hardly have been started out of court, except as a means of keeping up such a confusion of ideas, that mere self-interest or partisanship might evade the simplicity of the question of duty, as it arises on the merits of the case; None of you can be long imposed on by these side questions, if you will honestly keep your minds on the simple question of dirty. Self-interest is always an illegitimate element in questions of duty, and is sure to wrnaken, if not vitiate, the decision. A bankrupt never doubts his duty to his creditors, except when self-interest intervenes in the argument. Most errors of politicians arise out of their studying, not duty, but how their course will bé regarded at the next elections.

One of the objections to the form of the proceeding that has been most employed, is that the case was not submitted to a jury. It ought to be a sufficient answer to this, that,' according to the ordinary rules for administering justice, there was no question raised for the consideration of a jury. But this answer does not meet the spirit of the objection. It was not that the case might be tried by an impartial tribunal that this objection was made, but it was an appeal to sélfish principles, intended to invoke their aid in exciting contempt, and organizing opposition to the decision of the court. It was meant to urge the notion that the people of Allegheny county had a right to try their own causes. It wras [265]*265not an impartial jury that was wanted; there have been enough of them in other courts, and they have given no encouragement to the defences relied on. It was an appeal to your interests, not to your duty — to your combined force, not to your honesty; not for a fair verdict on a regular trial, but for á verdict already in effect pronounced in town meetings, and enforced by partisan elections; for a verdict, not according to truth and conscience, but according to your passions; not according to the evidence, but according to the oft-expressed determination of the very defendant in the cause. Still, I believe, that even Allegheny county juries would disappoint you in this. It is not to lead you into the perjury of a known, unrighteous, and unlawful decision; but to blind your judgment by your passions, that you may do wrong without knowing it. In other words, it is force, not right, that is to govern; the law of savage, not of civilized life; the will of the strongest is to be the definition of justice; unregulated force the law of society. This is the very principle of the complaint, that the defendants got no chance of a trial by jury. Let it stand out clearly by itself, and it can find no honest man to utter a word in its favour.

It is only on the very merits of a cause that an honest party can found any impeachment of the decision. He finds no faults for supposed or real defects of method, if the result is just. The methods of no kinds of business or occupation are ordained in town meetings. And on the merits of this cause, there is really but one fundamental question, and that is the first step in the whole matter, the constitutionality of the Act of Assembly authorizing the city councils to subscribe for stock. No one denies the fact of subscription, and the issue of the bonds, and these create the liability, if the legislature could invest the councils with such authority.

That question was at one time a disputable one; but after all that has taken place, no man who is guided by intelligent, generous, and honest principles, without the bias of local excitements, can raise that question. Several successive legislatures and governors, including your own members; several successive councils, boards of commissioners, and grand juries among yourselves, and many similar bodies in other parts of the state, and many town and county meetings, have acted on the principle, by authorizing, making and urging such subscriptions; and, on the faith of these proceedings, many millions of dollars of confiding people have been invested, and have been decided by your own Supreme Court to have been legally invested.

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Bluebook (online)
36 Pa. 263, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-taylor-pa-1860.